Attitudes Towards Peace Operations: A Structural Analysis by Clark, Christina U
ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE 
OPERATIONS: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
CHRISTINA U. CLARK 
Thesis submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
Department of Psychology 
School of Human Sciences 
University of Surrey 
2004 
© Christina U. Clark, 2004 
-. t 
SUMMARY 
This thesis is about attitudes towards peace operations and their determinants. 
Although British participation in peace operations has been one of the most 
prominent foreign policy commitments in the past two decades, little research has 
explored public attitudes towards such missions. British public opinion polls have 
assessed support for some humanitarian operations, most notably Bosnia and 
Kosovo, but these polls are purely descriptive and offer no insight into the nature and 
structure of belief systems (Ziegler, 1987). 
This thesis builds on the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes (Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1987) to explore attitudes towards peace operations with respect to five 
present-day missions. According to this model, specific foreign policy attitudes are 
shaped by two types of general predispositions: "postures", such as militarism, and 
"core values", such as patriotism. Although this model has been applied to a variety 
of foreign policy issues, several theoretical underpinnings and empirical limitations 
of this model had yet to be tested. 
These limitations were addressed in empirical research, conducted amongst the 
general population in Guildford, which include both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
interview and questionnaire data. The data are analysed using multivariate statistics 
and structural equation modelling. 
In accordance with the hierarchical model, the results show that attitudes towards 
specific peace operations are shaped by more general orientations, and that political 
knowledge has no significant impact on how attitudes are structured. Empirical 
findings further suggest the importance of including images in explaining specific 
attitudes. Finally, an exploration of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992) in addition 
to the "core values" traditionally studied in existing work suggests a parsimonious 
approach to examining the value basis of foreign policy attitudes and a useful 
extension to the hierarchical model. 
ý\ý 
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CHAPTER I 
UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES TOWARDS PEACE 
OPERATIONS 
The British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe that as 
well as defending our rights, we should discharge our responsibilities in 
the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian 
disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a 
lead, we want to be a force for good (Ministry of Defence, 2000) 
This thesis is about attitudes towards peace operations and their determinants. The 
academic literature on such operations has been concerned primarily with practical, 
policy-related issues, such as the design and conduct of particular missions, with the 
aim of offering advice and recommendations to decision-makers (Dandeker & Gow, 
2000; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004; Paris, 2000). Research in this area has 
also focused on the attitudes towards peace operations by soldiers assigned to such 
missions (e. g. Segal, 1996; Segal, Segal & Eyre, 1992), which has highlighted the 
psychological ambiguities that may affect soldiers' performance in such operations 
(e. g. Britt, 1998; Franke, 1999). Several of these studies have found that perceived 
public support has a significant effect on the attitudes of soldiers in the field (e. g. 
Halverson & Bliese, 1996). 
Both types of research have emphasised the role of public opinion in promoting a 
country's participation in peace operations (e. g. Raevsky, 1996; Avant & Lebovic, 
2000). However, only a few polls have investigated attitudes towards such operations 
in the general public, and even fewer empirical studies have explored the underlying 
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determinants of such attitudes in a general population (for a similar conclusion from 
a U. S. perspective see Boettcher, 2004). According to Boettcher (2004, p. 333), "A 
significant body of literature regarding foreign policy frames and uses of military 
force has emerged in the field of international relations in the past 15 years, but these 
studies have never focused exclusively on humanitarian interventions. " This thesis 
aims to fill this empirical gap. 
Peace operations: Definitions 
What are peace operations? Peace operations involve both political activity and the 
use of an armed force, and are distinct from classic warfare and traditional combat. 
Numerous definitions exist for the concept of war. Common to most of these is the 
understanding that war consists of a conflict between the armed forces of two or 
more countries or coalitions, in which the goal is to achieve certain political 
objectives (O'Connell, 1995). 
Like war, peace operations are military enterprises that serve political ends (Franke, 
1999). However, unlike war, peace operations support diplomatic efforts to establish 
or maintain peace in areas of conflict. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, 
there have been 56 UN peace operations. 43 of these missions have been created by 
the Security Council since 1988 (UN, 2003)1.1. There are currently 14 operations in 
the field, ranging from UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNMIK in Kosovo, UNAMA in 
Afghanistan to UNAMISL in Sierra Leone. 
The literature frequently makes a distinction between first and second generation 
peace operations. First generation operations refer to missions conducted during the 
Cold War. These operations were carried out under the following conditions 
(Langholtz, 1998a, p. 220): 
1'1 A reason for this marked increase in operations since the end of the Cold War is given by 
Langholtz, 1998a, p. 219. 
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" Both nations participating in the dispute sought an end to hostilities 
" Both nations consented to the presence of UN troops 
" Sovereignty was clearly defined 
" The belligerent parties had established armies with disciplined soldiers 
" Armies pulled back and established a recognisable buffer zone 
" An agreed upon cease-fire was in place 
"A UN Security Council Resolution established the mission 
" Unarmed or lightly armed UN soldiers were inserted into the buffer zone 
" UN Forces monitored a cease-fire while diplomats sought a permanent 
political solution. 
Under the above constraints, UN peace operations remained relatively small-scale 
operations. According to Goulding (1993), UN peacekeepers acted impartially 
between parties in conflict for the first four decades and would use force only in self- 
defence. 
With the end of the Cold War, second generation UN peace operations have 
expanded beyond traditional operations undertaken under limited conditions, and 
now include both humanitarian relief and peace enforcement/peace building 
operations conducted under more demanding circumstances (for an overview of 
peace operation categories see Diehl, Druckman & Wall, 1998). Compared to first 
generation operations, second generation operations have also been carried out when 
hostilities were ongoing, when there was no consent for a UN presence, or even 
when there was armed opposition to UN peace forces (Langholtz, 1998a, p. 220). 
According to Martin and Fortmann (1995), second-generation peace operations have 
become much harder and more dangerous for at least three reasons: (1) peace 
operations encompass an ever growing number of tasks, therefore becoming more 
difficult to comprehend; (2) the goals of peace operations have become more 
confusing and less clear-cut; and (3) soldiers on peace operations have been revealed 
to be fallible human beings. 
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What is already known about British attitudes to peace 
operations/humanitarian involvement? 
British participation in UN and NATO peace operations was one of the most visible 
aspects of Britain's foreign commitments in the 1990s; a commitment that appears to 
continue in the new millennium. According to the Ministry of Defence (2001), 
We need to be aware of the ways in which public attitudes might shape and 
constrain military activity. Increasing emotional attachment to the outside 
world ... and a public desire to see the 
UK act as a force for good is likely 
to lead to public support, and possibly public demand, for operations 
prompted by humanitarian motives. 
Indeed, a survey by MORI (April 2003) indicated that the majority of respondents 
(75%) agreed with the statement "Britain is a force for good in the world", whilst 
another MORI poll (June 2003) reported that seven out of ten respondents (72%) 
agreed that the "UK Armed Forces contribute to making the world a safer place". A 
majority of respondents (58%) also believed that Britain should continue to play a 
leading role in creating a new world order by its involvement in resolving 
international conflicts (ICM, November 2001). 
Does this mean that the British public is supportive of Britain's involvement in peace 
operations or "humanitarian" operations? We simply do not know. Although 
numerous public opinion polls have assessed British attitudes towards the war in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan or, more recently, Iraq, only a few British opinion polls have 
investigated British attitudes towards peace operations or humanitarian interventions. 
Similarly, only a few empirical studies provide direct information on what might 
determine support for such operations. 
For example, British opinion polls have provided information about the public's 
view on a variety of international conflicts. An illustration of British approval of 
several military interventions from 1950 to 2001 is provided in Figure 1.1, which 
shows that support for military missions has generally been high in the British 
public. 
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Whilst public opinion on combat missions has frequently been documented, only a 
few British public opinion polls have investigated attitudes towards conflicts in 
which military force has been used for humanitarian purposes. 
Figure I. I. British support for international conflicts, 1950-2001 (in percent) 
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For example, at the time when Bosnian Serb forces were surrounding the town 
Srebrenica, MORI (April 1993) asked over a thousand British adults whether they 
would support or oppose an international peacekeeping force, including British 
troops, to be deployed in Bosnia. 64 percent of the respondents supported such a 
force, whilst 27 percent opposed it and nine percent had no opinion. When asked 
whether they would support or oppose sending troops, even if they might have to 
stay in the area for several years, 44 percent of those who had initially supported 
sending troops still supported such involvement, whereas 20 percent were opposed to 
sending troops under those circumstances. Similarly, when asked whether they 
would still support sending troops, even if many were likely to die, 37 percent of 
respondents who had initially supported sending troops still supported this, whereas 
27 percent opposed it under these circumstances. 
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When presented with a series of abstract scenarios for the use of national troops in 
international affairs, the majority of British respondents were also willing to use 
British troops for humanitarian purposes, such as to assist a population struck by a 
famine (90%) or to bring peace to a region where there is a civil war (75%), whilst 
61 percent of respondents were willing to use troops to ensure the supply of oil 
(Worldviews Survey, 2002). 
Indirect information about attitudes towards humanitarian missions might also he 
drawn from polls about attitudes towards the United Nations (UN). For example, a 
1988 Gallup poll showed that an overwhelming majority (81%) of the British public 
thought that what happened in other countries should be of concern to Britain, with 
only 15% claiming that it was not Britain's business to get involved in other 
countries' problems. Two in three respondents (67%) also thought that the UN was 
doing a good job in trying to solve the problems it had to face, compared to 33 
percents who thought that the UN was doing a poor job (Eurobarometer No 32, 
1989). When asked to give some examples of why they felt the UN was doing a good 
job, 45 percent of respondents provided reasons relating to world peace, resolving 
problems and peacekeeping. In 1995,41 percent of British respondents still believed 
the United Nations was doing a good job, with 79 percent of the British public also 
supporting Britain remaining a member of the UN, compared to only ten percent who 
believed that Britain should leave the UN (Gallup, August, 1995). 
In summary, although little specific information is available about attitudes towards 
peace operations, the British public emerges as one that supports humanitarian 
interventions and wants to be involved with the UN. 
Public opinion and peace operations: An international perspective 
Although no British opinion poll has focused exclusively on attitudes towards peace 
operations, several international surveys have done so. For example, a Canadian 
analysis of public attitudes towards peace operations from 1986 to 1992 showed that 
the majority of respondents believed that peacekeeping should be the priority of the 
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Canadian Armed Forces, followed by domestic defence issues (Martin & Fortmann, 
1995). Similarly, U. S. analyses indicate that the American public not only supports 
US involvement in peace operations in principle, but also with respect to specific 
missions in Rwanda and Bosnia (e. g. Kull & Destler, 1999). Similar results have 
been reported for Slovenia (e. g. NATO, 2002), the Netherlands (van der Meulen & 
de Konink, 2001), France (La Balme, 2001) and South Africa (e. g. Liebenberg, 
Malen, Gilliers, Sass & Heinecken, 1997). These studies indicate that respondents 
from a variety of countries are supportive of their country's involvement in peace 
operations. 
Why should attitudes to peace operations be studied? 
Descriptive analyses, such as the ones reported above, have a long tradition in public 
opinion research as they require less methodological sophistication than more 
analytically oriented studies. Opinion polls are carried out on behalf of newspapers 
and magazines, political parties and governmental offices, and only indicate attitudes 
'about issues that are of immediate media or political interest (Rattinger & Holst, 
1998; Ziegler, 1987). 
Opinion poll data are essential for examining opinion and trends on specific issues. 
According to Verba (1996, p. 3), 
sample surveys provide the closest approximation to an unbiased 
representation of the public because participation in a survey requires no 
resources and because surveys eliminate the bias inherent in the fact that 
participants in politics are self-selected ... surveys produce just what 
democracy is supposed to produce - equal representation of all citizens. 
However, opinion polls only characterise patterns of attitudes and do not reveal 
which attitudes influence, promote or preclude each other. They therefore provide no 
information about the nature and structure of belief systems (Ziegler, 1987). 
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Recent studies indicate that public opinion has an impact on foreign and national 
security policies. For example, U. S. (e. g. Holsti, 1992; Sobel, 2001) and European 
research (La Balme, 2001; Rattinger & Juhasz, 1998; Ziegler, 1987) suggests that 
public opinion establishes a framework within which policy makers are able to 
consider various policy options. A more advanced knowledge of the determinants of 
attitudes towards peace operations could therefore be vital to develop durable foreign 
and security policies. 
Existing studies: Methodological concerns 
A considerable amount of work in the political sciences, including political 
psychology, has been concerned with understanding public attitudes towards foreign 
policy issues and their determinants. However, this research is severely fragmented 
and atheoretical. Social-psychological work on foreign policy attitudes, such as war, 
has been more theoretical and consistent in its approach, but studies are few and far 
between, and their results rarely published. Although both strands of research are 
carried out in the same domain, they seem to be oblivious to each other's findings; 
foreign policy research appears to be ignoring the advances made by social- 
psychological research and vice versa. This thesis therefore draws upon two main 
strands of study: political-psychological research into foreign policy attitudes, which 
has been conducted mainly in United States, and social-psychological research into 
attitudes towards war and other forms of inter-group hostility. 
Furthermore, current discussions of public opinion on foreign policy issues are 
restricted in three important ways. Firstly, the majority of studies have been carried 
out in the US, whilst less attention has been paid to European publics (Everts, 
2001a). Secondly, and more importantly, even US research has not yet moved 
beyond the context of the Cold War, thus neglecting a diverse set of issues that have 
become prominent after the Cold War (Everts, 2001a). Finally, discussions of the 
form and structure of international attitudes have been limited to demographic and 
political ideology data. Only recently have attempts been made to structure such 
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attitudes in terms of general worldviews or policy orientations. However, this 
research is sketchy and lacks thorough analysis. 
This thesis 
A distinction is frequently made between the individual and aggregate levels of 
analysis in public opinion research. Research at the aggregate level has focused on 
two major questions: the stability of public opinion and its rationality. Research at 
the individual level has concerned itself with the determinants or sources of public 
opinion and the ways in which individuals come to think about foreign policy issues. 
Early research into foreign policy attitudes at the individual level concluded that 
individuals were not only ill informed about political matters but that their political 
opinions also lacked structure or coherence (e. g. Almond, 1950; Converse, 1994). 
However, these studies focused on a single dimension of liberal ism/conservatism as 
orienting individuals' beliefs, an approach that has been challenged by those who 
have proposed a multi-dimensional structure of belief systems (Holsti, 1996; Hurwitz 
& Peffley, 1987). 
Investigations in this thesis are conceptually guided by a multi-dimensional model of 
foreign policy attitudes, specifically the hierarchical model as proposed by Hurwitz 
& Peffley (1987). According to this model, specific attitudes are shaped by 
constructs situated at different levels of abstraction. The next chapter examines this 
model in detail and places it in the context of a general overview of foreign policy 
research. Chapter 3 focuses on one important construct within this model, namely 
core values. 
The issues highlighted in the two review chapters are addressed in Chapters 4-9, 
which report empirical studies that focus on one particular issue in today's political 
climate - British involvement in peace operations. In the final chapter, findings from 
this programme of research are evaluated and their wider relevance is discussed. 
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FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES: THE SEARCH FOR 
PREDICTABLE STRUCTURE 
Discussions of public opinion and foreign policy frequently question whether 
attitudes towards international affairs2.1 are rational and consistent. One method for 
investigating the stability and coherence of foreign policy beliefs is to search for the 
underlying dimensions that structure such opinions at the level of the individual, 
referred to as "constraints". According to Converse (1964, p. 207), constraint refers 
to the "success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an 
individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes. " 
Early work on such constraints of foreign policy attitudes concluded that mass 
opinions on foreign policy issues lacked not only stability but also predictable 
structure (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964). 
However, these claims did not survive the challenge of rigorous empirical testing, 
and most current research has converged on two main points: (1) attitudes to 
international affairs are in fact structured in at least moderately predictable ways, and 
(2) a single dimension of internationalism, which had been the focus of earlier 
studies, inadequately describes opinions on international affairs (Holsti, 1992). 
Indeed, recent empirical investigations have been concerned more with the question 
of how individuals' foreign policy attitudes are structured rather than if they are 
2'1 In this thesis the terms foreign policy attitudes, international attitudes and attitudes towards 
international affairs are used interchangeably. 
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structured (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999). This chapter briefly outlines early structural 
work, which has focused on the horizontal constraint of political attitudes, or the link 
between attitudes across policy domains. This is followed by a discussion of two 
recent structural models of foreign policy attitudes that exemplify an approach to 
attitude structure that has dominated current research. Common to both these 
structural models is the concept of vertical constraint, or the link between specific 
policy attitudes and more general orientations. However, they differ in the extent to 
which they evoke such a linkage. 
Previous work: Almond and Converse 
For decades it was believed that foreign policy attitudes lacked any coherent 
structure or content. Almond (1950) was one of the first researchers to examine 
systematically the public's attitudes towards foreign policy issues. In a series of 
studies, Almond (1950) showed that US citizens were ignorant of international issues 
and did not behave predictably to objective international events. Since people's 
opinions were not based on fixed values or followed strategic calculations he 
concluded that their attitudes were volatile and influenced by temporary mood 
changes; what Almond termed `mood theory' and what became known as the 
Almond-Lippmann consensus (see also Lippmann, 1955). 
Almond's conclusions were reinforced by Rosenau (1961, p. 36), who argued that 
the general public's position on foreign policy issues was "impulsive, unstable, 
unreasoning, unpredictable, [and] capable of suddenly shifting direction or of going 
in several contradictory directions at the same time. " 
The lack of structure was also confirmed by Converse (1964) whose work on mass 
belief systems is one of the most widely cited studies in political science. According 
to Converse (1964, p. 207), a belief system is "a configuration of ideas and attitudes 
in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional 
dependence. Furthermore, he' argued that if general principles or ideological 
perspectives shape political opinions, attitudes towards one policy issue in one 
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domain should not only predict attitudes towards other issues in the same domain, 
but should also determine attitudes in other policy domains. 
However, when analysing the relationships between responses to foreign and 
domestic policy questions, Converse found only low correlations across and between 
policy domains. This led him to conclude that the public's political beliefs lacked 
any underlying ideological consistency that would provide structure or coherence to 
their political thinking. 
Furthermore, using panel data from the 1950s to 1960s, he not only found that there 
was little coherence between policy items, but also that there was remarkable 
inconsistency in answers to the same question over time. Indeed, answers to the same 
foreign policy questions were so unstable as to be nearly random. Converse (1964) 
thus suggested that opinions in the political domain should be regarded as `non- 
attitudes'. However, he also conceded that, 
Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or 
quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the 
doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what 
can be measured is not important to study. (1964, p. 206) 
Pessimistic conclusions about the attitude structure of the British public were also 
made by Butler and Stokes (1974). Assessing attitudes towards nationalisation, 
Butler and Stokes (1974) found such high levels of opinion instability that they 
questioned whether well-formed attitudes actually existed in the British public. They 
concluded that it "seems more plausible to interpret the fluidity of the public's view 
as an indication of the limited degree to which attitudes are formed towards even the 
best-known policy issues" (Butler & Stokes, 1974, p. 281). 
The claim that foreign policy attitudes are unstructured was later questioned on four 
methodological grounds: statistical methods, uni-dimensionality, level of abstraction 
and question framing. Firstly, Converse's failure to find evidence of ideological 
constraint has been attributed to his reliance on correlation coefficients (e. g. Luttbeg, 
1968; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1978). Others argued that Converse's data were 
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riddled by a large amount of random question measurement error and low 
reliabilities (e. g. Achen, 1975). 
Secondly, much of the research during and after World War II relied on a single 
dimension to uncover the structure of foreign policy beliefs. For example, 
Converse's (1964) work on U. S. foreign policy belief systems stressed the 
importance of a liberal (internationalist)-conservative (isolationist) continuum as 
orienting beliefs on policy issues, which assessed the extent to which individuals 
agreed or disagreed that a state should be involved in international politics. 
Individuals who manifested such structural consistency in their worldviews were 
described as `ideologues', and their attitudes on foreign policy issues could be 
predicted from knowledge of their position on this dimension. However, few such 
ideologues were found (e. g. Barton & Parson, 1977; Stokes, 1966; Wittkopf, 1981), 
and the applicability of a single ideological dimension was thus questioned 2.2. 
Thirdly, Almond and Converse's claims have been criticised for using an 
inappropriate analytical level of abstraction to uncover any inherent structure. For 
example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argued that by looking for coherence across 
policy domains (e. g. domestic and foreign policy issues), Converse focused on 
horizontal constraint, that is, the relationship amongst various attitudes within and 
across different policy domains. However, researchers who have focused on vertical 
constraint, that is, the relationships between abstract ideas and specific attitudes 
within a specific policy domain, have uncovered stable and coherent structures in 
mass attitudes (Conover & Feldman, 1984; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; 
Juhasz, 2001; Murray & Cowden, 1999). This issue will be explored in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
Lastly, the framing of questions, particularly those gauging the public's interest in 
foreign affairs, also emerged as another pivotal flaw in earlier research. For example, 
Caspary (1970) severely criticised Almond's study on the grounds that he had used 
2.2 There is some indication that Converse's data also included multiple dimensions that he was unable 
to uncover with the statistical methodology he employed. For example, subjecting Converse's 
correlation matrix to a factor analysis, Luttbeg (1968) found that several factors explained a large 
amount of variance, thus suggesting the presence of multi-dimensional ideologies. 
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"mentioning of international problems as most important" as an indicator of interest 
in foreign policy. Using knowledge of different foreign policy questions as an 
indicator of interest instead, Caspary (1970) found that attitudes on international 
issues were much more coherent and stable than Almond had asserted. 
Almond's mood theory and Converse's findings were thus not only open to a range 
of criticisms, but they were also contradicted by confrontation with public opinion 
data (for a discussion of U. S. public opinion stability see Knopf, 1998 and Page & 
Shapiro, 1992; for European attitude stability see Isernia, Juhasz & Rattinger, 2002; 
for an analysis of Canadian attitudes towards peacekeeping operations see Martin & 
Fortmann, 1995). Together, these critiques changed the view about the consistency 
and coherence of individuals' attitudes on foreign policy issues, and led to new 
research in this area. 
Recent work: The search for multi-dimensionality 
Due to advancements in survey and statistical methods, a consensus has emerged in 
the literature that attitudes to foreign policy issues are structured, and that this 
structure is multi-dimensional in nature. However, there is still disagreement 
regarding the nature and number of these dimensions (Everts, 2001a). It should be 
stressed that recent studies do not challenge the idea that individuals are ill informed. 
A typical observation is that "public opinion polls show that people do not follow 
foreign affairs closely and often do not know enough about the specifics of a 
particular issue to form opinions" (Light & Lake, 1985, p. 94). Instead, these studies 
challenge the claim that foreign policy attitudes have no structure or content (but see 
Clark, Dautrich, Murray, Kull & Ramsay, 2000 who claim that modern public 
opinion on foreign policy issues is still lacking structure). 
It should be noted that the models presented below have been exclusively derived 
from, or tested on, U. S. public opinion data. Considerably fewer studies have been 
identified in the literature that were based on European data (e. g. Bjereld & 
Ekengren, 1999; Carrubba & Singh, 2004; Chittick & Freyberg-Inan, 2001; Everts, 
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1995; Gable, 1998; Isernia, Juhasz & Rattinger, 2002; Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell & 
Herron, 2004; Juhasz, 2001; Kostadinova, 2000; Rattinger, 1991; Wober, 1981; 
Ziegler, 1987). This is unsurprising given the extensive trend data that has been 
collected by U. S. opinion pollsters since the end of World War II, which provide 
unrivalled information. Yet, since the U. S. represents perhaps the last superpower of 
the post-Cold War era, its position, status and foreign policy concerns are likely to 
limit the extent to which structural findings can be generalised to other countries 
(Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Everts, 2001b). With the exception of a recent study, 
there is limited cross-country evidence available on this issue. Jenkins-Smith, 
Mitchell and Herron (2004) compared the structure of foreign and domestic policy 
beliefs in U. S. and British publics. They found that although British and American 
belief systems differed in the distribution of beliefs, the structural relationships 
within the two samples were remarkably similar. 
Two models of foreign policy attitudes 
The following sections describe and discuss two models that have been used to 
describe foreign policy attitudes. The first model is a classification scheme that 
categorises foreign policy attitudes along two dimensions. The second model 
proposes that foreign policy attitudes are formed through a series of linkages 
between abstract and concrete cognitions. 
MI/CI classification scheme 
Much of the research during and after World War II relied on a single indicator of 
internationalism to uncover the structure of foreign policy beliefs. Whilst this uni- 
dimensional approach had been found wanting, recent research suggests that two 
faces of internationalism are important predictors of international attitudes. 
The most influential account of the dimensions underlying foreign policy beliefs is 
the Militant Internationalism (MI) - Co-operative Internationalism (CI) scheme, 
originally developed by Wittkopf (1981,1986,1990; Maggiotto & Wittkopf, 1981). 
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Factor-analysing the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) trend data, 
Wittkopf found that a significant amount of variance in mass foreign policy beliefs 
could be explained by two internationalism dimensions: one oriented towards co- 
operative relations with other countries (co-operative internationalism), the other 
oriented towards competitive, interventionist and militaristic actions (militant 
internationalism). 
Based on these findings, Wittkopf (1981,1986; Maggiotto & Wittkopf, 1981) 
proposed the MI/CI scheme in which individuals are classified according to four 
belief types, derived from dichotomising and crossing the two dimensions: hardliners 
(support MI and oppose CI), accommodationists (oppose MI and support CI), 
internationalists (support both MI and CI), and isolationists (oppose both MI and 
CI)2'3. More specifically, Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) posited that these types 
take the following international stance: "Hardliners" favour international 
involvement, but oppose co-operation and support more unilateralist action and 
military intervention; "Accommodationists" support involvement in international 
affairs, believe in co-operating with other nations, and oppose military interventions; 
"Internationalists" also support international involvement, but are negative about co- 
operation and may use military force on a unilateral basis; and "Isolationists" oppose 
any kind of international involvement. 
Using five surveys conducted between 1976 and 1992 from the Foreign Policy 
Leadership Project (FPLP), Holsti and Rosenau (1990,1993) confirmed the above 
scheme, albeit with a different methodology. Whilst Wittkopf derived his dimensions 
from factor analytical studies, Holsti and Rosenau used the descriptions of the factors 
found by Wittkopf to design scales tapping into militant and co-operative 
internationalism. These two scales were used to group respondents into the four 
belief types identified by Wittkopf, and the resultant groups were then compared on a 
wide variety of foreign policy questions. In a series of studies they found that 
knowing how respondents are classified was a powerful predictor of their attitudes 
towards a wide array of international issues, such as attitudes towards the Gulf War 
and national security threats (see Holsti, 1996 for a review of these studies). Holsti 
2.3 A similar typology was identified by Jonas (1966) on pre-World War II data, whose types included 
"belligerent isolationists", "timid isolationists", "radical isolationists" and "conservative isolationists". 
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and Rosenau (1993) therefore concluded that the MI/CI scheme was an effective way 
of classifying foreign policy beliefs. 
Of interest is that Ziegler (1987), using Eurobarometer data, derived two rather 
similar dimensions of European public opinion on international issues, which he 
termed "military co-operation" and "non-military co-operation", whilst similar 
dimensions were also found in Sweden by Bjereld & Ekengren (1999). In addition to 
the dimensions reported by Ziegler, Everts (1995) found that a third dimension - 
attitudes towards the UN - also substantially structured European attitudes towards a 
variety of foreign policy issues. 
Changes in the international arena have raised doubts about the temporal stability of 
the scheme (Holsti, 1992, Nincic, 1992). Nincic (1992), for example, cautioned that 
Wittkopfs dimensions, being based on factor analysis of data collected between 
1974 and 1986, only reflect the concerns of the Cold War era. The implication is that 
the MI/CI scheme might not adequately describe opinions relevant to contemporary 
international affairs. Studies of the applicability of the MI/CI scheme with respect to 
post-Cold War foreign policy concerns indicate that the basic structure of attitudes 
towards foreign affairs proved resistant to change (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Holsti, 
1996,1997; Murray, 1996). For example, Holsti (1997) extended previous analyses 
of the FPLP survey by including data up to 1996. Despite changes to the MI scale, 
due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the MI/CI provided a stable way of 
classifying opinions. 
However, there is some evidence that the MI/CI scheme is not sufficient to describe 
all the facets of contemporary foreign policy attitudes (Belmont & Mueller, 1998; 
Richman, Malone & Nolle, 1997; Rosati & Creed, 1997) since it does not account for 
differences in multi-lateralism (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Chittick & Freyberg-Inan, 
2001; Chittick, Billingsley & Travis, 1995; Hinckley, 1988,1992; Wittkopf, 1986; 
but see Holsti, 1997). For example, Hinckley (1992) argued that a distinction should 
be made between individuals who seek to gain international goals through multi- 
lateral efforts with international institutions or allies, and those who prefer their 
country to pursue interests uni-laterally. A similar claim was made by Rattinger and 
Juhasz (1998), who investigated the extent to which `international postures' affect 
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foreign policy opinions. According to Rattinger and Juhasz, three components 
constitute differences in international postures: the extent to which the state should 
be involved internationally (internationalism), how the state should be involved 
(militarism), and whether the state should be acting alone or with partners (multi- 
lateralism). 
Thus, there is some disagreement over the number of dimensions and sub- 
dimensions that are needed to describe accurately the complexity of foreign policy 
opinions. But at the same time, the literature concedes that the MI/CI classification is 
successful in explaining broad differences between individuals' opinions (Rosati & 
Creed, 1997). 
The hierarchical model of constraint 
A hierarchical approach to the question of foreign policy attitude structure was 
proposed by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,1990; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985,1992), 
who criticised Wittkopfs scheme on methodological grounds. Hurwitz and Peffley 
(1987) argued that Wittkopfs decision to juxtapose two factor-analytical dimensions 
at their midpoints to yield a two-by-two structure of four cells was arbitrary (see also 
Kegley, 1986). Instead of emphasising foreign policy types, Hurwitz and Peffley 
retain the constructs of MI and CI as abstract dimensions of more specific foreign 
policy attitudes. Indeed, research indicates that dimensions rather than types more 
accurately describe foreign policy beliefs (Chittick & Billingsley, 1989; Chittick, 
Billingsley & Travis, 1995; Oldendick & Bardes, 1982,1990). 
Based on information-processing research, Hurwitz and Peffley posited that it might 
be more fruitful to uncover the structure of foreign policy attitudes by adopting an 
approach that is both domain-specific and limited in the level of abstraction. 
Concerning domain specificity, they proposed that to detect any underlying 
connections it is necessary to limit the analysis of attitude structures to specific 
policy domains. Failure to do so might lead to an interpretation of spurious 
relationships between attitudes that are not actually connected. Thus, Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1987, p. 1114) proposed that public opinion on foreign policy attitudes was 
structured, but with a structure that is "distinctive to the foreign policy domain". 
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"normative beliefs 
... concerning the appropriate role of government in its handling 
of foreign affairs" (p. 1104), such as isolationism/internationalism and militarism, are 
based on findings from factor analytical research, such as Wittkopf's MI/CI scheme. 
Postures have also been referred to as "policy core beliefs" by Sabatier and Jenkins- 
Smith (1999, p. 56). 
It should be reiterated that these constructs are operationalised as dimensions and not 
types in this model. These postures, in turn, constrain opinions on specific policy 
issues that are located at the most specific level of abstraction. 
The model proposes that individuals who are uncertain about their opinion on a 
specific issue will use their postures and, in an indirect way, their core values as 
guidance to form an opinion. Individuals are thus able to categorise and evaluate a 
wide variety of issues about which they may not otherwise have the necessary 
information to form clear or stable attitudes 2.7. It should be noted that the model also 
suggests a close relationship between values, postures and specific issues even if 
there is no uncertainty in opinion, due to the general tendency of individuals to strive 
for consistency in their attitudes (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990). 
The hierarchical model is not intended to represent a developmental model. Hurwitz 
and Peffley repeatedly stress that they "make no assumptions about whether abstract 
beliefs are acquired first, from socialization, or whether concrete attitudes are 
acquired first, from experience" (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985, p. 877). Instead, they 
argue that at any particular point in time, individuals use general principles to derive 
specific attitudes. 
There is good evidence that individuals employ more abstract beliefs or `heuristics' 
to form attitudes about political issues (e. g. Alvarez & Brehm, 1997; Feldman & 
Zaller, 1992; Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock & Brady, 1986; but see also Kuklinski & 
Quirk, 2000; Luskin, 2002)2'8. For example, Brady and Sniderman (1985) explored 
2.7 The ability of heuristics to make individuals behave as if they are fully informed has been termed 
low-information rationality by Popkin (1991). 
2'B Kuklinski and Quirk (2000, p. 118) noted that political scientists and psychologists use the concept 
of heuristics in different ways: "The psychologist starts with the layperson's common sense 
perception that people are generally rational. ... In describing their effects, therefore, psychologists 
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the importance of heuristics in political reasoning and found that structure was 
obtained by cues individuals drew from their primary group affiliations and from 
available information on events, which, in turn, shaped their belief systems. Conover 
and Feldman (1984) also reported that multiple, distinct schema organised attitudes 
in six domains, including foreign policy beliefs and economic beliefs, whilst 
Feldman (1988) found that people drew upon beliefs about equality and 
individualism when making judgements about social welfare programmes. Finally, 
Rattinger (1991) reported that German security opinions were organised by a few 
hierarchically-related general concepts, such as attitudes on deterrence and defence, 
judgements about military balance and communist threat. 
A similar approach has also been applied to voting behaviour in Britain, with 
findings indicating that vote choice is organised by persisting political principles 
(such as political ideology; e. g. Heath, Howell & Curtice, 1985; Rose & McAllister, 
1986, see also Denver & Hands, 1990) or core beliefs (such as libertarianism- 
authoritarianism; e. g. Heath, Evans & Martin, 1993; Scarbrough, 1984). Converse 
(1964) anticipated this kind of value-based attitudinal network, likening core value 
positions to "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs" 
(p. 211). 
The approach taken by the hierarchical model is not undisputed. For example, 
Denver and Hands (1990) have argued strongly against the notion that persistent 
principles shape evaluations. Instead, they proposed a model in which choice was a 
function of evaluations of specific issues in specific contexts. Kristiansen and Zanna 
(1988,1994) have also argued that the direction of causality could be reversed, and 
have suggested that values may function as socially acceptable cliches that justify 
past actions. Similarly, Zaller (1992) has cautioned against proceeding too quickly 
with models that presume coherent value beliefs. Instead, he argues that individuals 
"make up attitude reports as best they can as they go along" and "are heavily 
influenced by whatever ideas happen to be at the top of their minds" (Zaller, 1992, p. 
76). 
highlight the error. Political scientists, on the other hand, start with the research showing that people 
are political ignorant. They find evidence that political heuristics can save them from being strictly 
clueless. So, unlike psychologists, they are inclined to stress the positive sides". 
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Nevertheless, in a series of studies, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,1990; Peffley & 
Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993) found that when underlying 
dimensions were measured as a series of vertical relationships between attitudes at 
different levels of abstraction, a structure of attitudes was produced that had more 
predictive power than partisanship or political ideology, or a series of horizontal 
relationships. Across several studies, individuals' core values were significant 
predictors of their foreign-policy postures, which in turn were significantly related to 
specific policy opinions. 
Using structural equation modelling on a sample of 435 U. S. respondents, Hurwitz 
and Peffley (1987) found that specific opinions about military involvement, defence 
spending and Soviet policy were shaped by isolationism, that is, the individual's 
general belief as to whether or not the United States should be involved in 
international affairs (see Figure 2.2 for details of the relationships in the hierarchical 
model). 
Figure 2.2. Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) structural relationships between 
foreign-policy attitudes in hierarchical model of constraint 
(from Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 1105) 
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Isolationists were more opposed than internationalists to committing troops abroad 
and to renew relations with the Soviet Union. Isolationism, in turn, was influenced 
by two core values, morality of warfare and ethnocentrism. Individuals who endorsed 
an ethnocentric view of their country as superior to all others were more likely to be 
isolationists than individuals with no such views. 
Similarly, attitudes towards military involvement and nuclear arms policy were 
shaped by individual's beliefs as to whether or not military force should be used to 
solve international problems (militarism). In turn, individuals who favoured a 
militaristic stance in world politics were not only more likely to oppose the idea that 
killing in wartime is immoral but also tended to endorse an ethnocentric view that 
their country is superior to all others. 
Although the applicability of this model to countries other than the U. S. has rarely 
been tested, there is some indication that this model may be equally applicable 
outside of America. Testing their model in Costa Rica, where individuals were found 
to be more pacifist and isolationist in their beliefs than Americans, Hurwitz, Peffley 
and Seligson (1993) reported that compared to the American population, militarism 
in the Costa Rican sample did not constrain specific foreign policy beliefs, possibly 
due to their nation's lack of experience in dealing with national security issues. Anti- 
communism, however, powerfully constrained more specific attitudes in the Costa 
Rican sample. Perez (1999) similarly reported that Panamanian public attitudes 
towards relations with the U. S. were constrained by anti-communism and 
internationalism, which in turn were influenced by nationalism and political trust. 
Finally, investigating the hierarchical structure in Germany, Juhasz (2001) also found 
that three postures, namely internationalism, militarism and uni-lateralism, 
substantially shaped attitudes towards international military operations. These 
postures in turn were significantly affected by the core values of nationalism and 
morality of warfare. Together these studies indicate that the hierarchical model of 
constraint may also be relevant to the structure of foreign policy in countries other 
than the U. S. 
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Criticisms and limitations of the hierarchical model 
The hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes has been applied to a variety of 
foreign policy issues, and its structure has been supported by findings from non-U. S. 
samples. However, several theoretical underpinnings of this model have yet to be 
tested and other limitations of existing work still have to be addressed. 
Direct effects 
The original model does not postulate a direct relationship between core values and 
specific opinions. This assumption, however, is problematic "since, if this were true, 
then it would be unnecessary to consider [core values] in the explanation of specific 
issues at all" (Juhasz, 2001, p. 64). 
Indeed, previous research on the determinants of foreign policy issues has found a 
direct relationship between core values and specific policy opinions (see Chapter 3). 
For example, several studies have reported a link between nationalism and various 
policies, such as nuclear armament (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) or support for the 
European monetary union (Mueller-Peters, 1998). 
However, because this research rarely employs a modelling approach, it is possible 
that these effects will be mediated by other constructs, such as postures in the 
hierarchical model. Indeed, when Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) allowed for direct 
relationships in testing their model in a later study, they found a small direct 
relationship between some core values (e. g. nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism) and specific policy attitudes. This issue will be addressed 
specifically in Chapter 4. 
Direction of causality 
According to the hierarchical model, the effects in the model are top-down (i. e. from 
more abstract to concrete levels) as opposed to bottom up (i. e. from more concrete to 
more abstract levels). However, the premise that attitudes are always influenced by a 
higher-order attitude is problematic. It is conceivable that the main determinant of an 
24 
Chapter 2 Foreign policy attitudes: The search for predictable structure 
attitude is not necessarily from a higher (i. e. more abstract) level but from the same 
or lower (i. e. more specific) level of abstraction (Nincic, 1992; see also Denver & 
Hands, 1990). For example, if an individual has to evaluate the use of military force 
in a specific context, he/she might be influenced greatly by historic events (Juhasz, 
2001). 
Thus, a general attitude about the use of military force may be affected by specific 
international events. This leads on to another controversial point in the model, 
namely the lack of bi-directional influences. It is possible that dramatic events or 
developments in the international arena lead to changes in postures or core values 
(e. g. Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993). Chapter 5 describes longitudinal data that address the 
question of causality within the hierarchical model. 
Effects of knowledge 
According to the model, most individuals use core values and postures to form 
specific foreign policy opinions. However, there is evidence that individuals need to 
have at least some information about the issue in question to convert broader beliefs 
into specific attitudes (e. g. Goren, 2001a; Pollock, Lilie & Vittes, 1993; Zaller, 
1992). Zaller (1992), for example, found that the more politically aware individuals 
were, the more heavily they depended on core values in the formation of specific 
attitudes, whilst attitudes of the ill informed were unconstrained by such orientations. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies have also reported that knowledge neither 
promotes nor inhibits the use of core values (Sears, Huddy & Schaffer, 1986; 
Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). For example, by controlling for methodological 
issues that had been neglected in previous research in this area, such as the validity 
and reliability of measures across cognitively heterogeneous samples, Goren (2001b, 
2004) found that information levels did not affect the use of core values and postures. 
Thus, the literature presents an unclear picture of the effects, if any, of political 
knowledge on the relationships within the hierarchical model. Chapters 6 and 7 
investigate the impact of two types of knowledge - general political knowledge and 
25 
Chapter 2 Foreign policy attitudes: The search for predictable structure 
specific foreign policy-related knowledge - on the constructs within the hierarchical 
model. 
Choice of postures and core values 
An examination of the effects of postures on foreign policy concerns within this 
model has almost exclusively been restricted to isolationism, containment (anti- 
communism) and militarism (for an exception see Juhasz, 2001). In particular the 
relevance of Soviet containment in post-Cold War concerns is questionable. Despite 
Peffley and Hurwitz's (1992) finding that American post-Cold War attitudes were 
still constrained by anti-communism, a more recent study (Richman, Malone & 
Nolle, 1997) into the post-Cold War dimensions of American foreign policy attitudes 
indicated that attitudes were influenced by U. S. global interests and securing 
American interests (Wittkopfs co-operative internationalism), military security 
(Wittkopf's Militant Internationalism) and global altruism (Chittick et al. 's multi- 
lateralism). 
Similarly, with the exception of Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, the examination of the effects of core values within the 
hierarchical model has been limited to morality of warfare (e. g. Hurwitz & Peffley, 
1987; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Juhasz, 2001), moral traditionalism 
(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990), ethnocentrism or nationalism (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 
1990; Juhasz, 2001; Perez, 1999) and political ideology or party identification 
(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1985,1987; 1990; Juhasz, 2001; Perez, 1999). 
As will be shown in the next chapter (Chapter 3), there is a long research tradition in 
the political sciences that has linked specific political attitudes to core values. 
Although moral traditionalism and nationalism may be important elements in 
shaping political attitudes, several key factors have been identified that have yet to be 
addressed within the hierarchical model. 
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Contextual effects 
Finally, with the exception of images (see Chapter 3), none of the models or the 
studies reviewed here has addressed the question of the possible impact of contextual 
effects on specific policy attitudes. However, there is a growing body of research that 
explores the extent to which beliefs are shaped by policy-specific contextual 
information (e. g. Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999). 
The question can be asked to what extent the perceived success or failure of a foreign 
policy issue constrains individuals' attitudes towards this policy (e. g. Everts, 2001b). 
For example, studying attitudes towards foreign aid, Taormina and Messick (1983) 
reported that individuals were more likely to render help if they believed in the 
effectiveness of the aid. Indeed, perceived effectiveness of the action had the largest 
single impact of all the studied dimensions (including perceptions of need and 
perceived similarity) on judgements of deservingness. 
Evidence from studies on the effect of casualties on foreign policy attitudes also 
indicates that contextual effects may be an important consideration (e. g. Mueller, 
1973,1996). According to Boettcher (2004), Americans evaluating a potential 
humanitarian operation will consider the number of US troops lives lost and the 
probability of success and failure. This issue will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4 and subsequent chapters. 
Choice of policy concerns 
With the exception of Juhasz (2001) and Perez (1999), existing research into the 
hierarchical model has been applied exclusively to Cold-War policy concerns. 
Although there is no a priori reason why this structure should not be applicable to 
post Cold-War concerns, it warrants empirical investigation. 
The empirical chapters in this thesis address the applicability of the hierarchical 
model to one particular foreign policy issue - British involvement in peace 
operations. Five different peace operations are discussed. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on 
Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, describing both cross-sectional and 
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longitudinal findings. Chapter 6 discusses attitudes towards the European Rapid 
Reaction Force, which Britain committed to in 2001 and which was to be 
implemented in 2003. Chapter 7 explores attitudes towards Britain's involvement in 
the humanitarian operation in Afghanistan, whilst Chapter 8 compares attitudes 
towards this humanitarian intervention to a concurrent combat mission in 
Afghanistan. Chapter 9 describes two studies - one about attitudes towards a 
hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East, the other about Britain's 
humanitarian intervention in Iraq. 
Conclusion 
According to Converse (1964), constraint refers to a linkage between abstract 
orientations and specific policy beliefs. Furthermore, he (1964, p. 211) argued that, 
Such constraint is quasi-logically argued on the basis of some 
superordinate value or posture toward man and society, involving 
premises about the nature ofsocial justice, social change, "natural law"; 
and the like. Thus, a few crowning postures ... serve as a sort of glue to 
bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these 
postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole. 
Although Converse did not operationalise constraint in such a way in his own 
studies, two models were presented in this chapter in which such a linkage is central 
to the conceptualisation of political belief systems. 
Despite its criticisms and limitations, the hierarchical model of foreign policy 
attitudes affords perhaps the most promising approach to understanding these kinds 
of attitudes and will form the conceptual background to the empirical chapters in this 
thesis. Using both cross-sectional and panel data, the aim of this thesis is to address 
each of the criticisms and limitations outlined above. 
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A substantial focus of this thesis is also on one particular component within the 
hierarchical model - core values. Investigations of the hierarchical model with regard 
to core values have so far been limited in scope. However, as will be shown in the 
next chapter, this limitation is a reflection of the lack of systematic research or 
theoretical guidelines that has characterised foreign policy research in this area. 
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CORE VALUES AND FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES 
According to Keele and Wolak (2003, p . 3), "core values are the currency of politics, 
influencing how individuals structure their political priorities as well as how elites 
form political discourse. " As outlined in the last chapter, "core values" are pivotal 
constructs within the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes. Core values are 
"easily distinguishable from postures in that they do not refer directly to 
governmental actions or policies" (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 1105), and should be 
thought of as overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about 
government, citizenship and society (e. g. McCann, 1997). They also refer to "any 
relatively stable, individual-level predisposition to accept or reject particular types of 
arguments" (Zaller, 1991, p. 1216), which may be rooted in personality, ideology, 
gender, interest, philosophy or party identification (e. g. McCann, 1997; Mueller, 
1973; Zaller, 1991). 
As outlined in the previous chapter, individuals will be more or less supportive of 
policy issues, depending on their endorsement of a certain set of core values. Indeed, 
there is a long tradition in the political sciences of attributing the nature of political 
attitudes and behaviour to such general orientations (e. g. Conover & Feldman, 1984; 
Huntington, 1981; Kinder & Sears, 1985). Kinder and Sears (1985, p. 676), for 
example, regarded core values as being "in an intermediate position between broad, 
encompassing ideological frames of reference ... and specific opinions on particular 
topics and candidates, which come and go as the political seasons change. " This 
chapter focuses on the general orientations that have been shown to shape attitudes 
towards foreign policy issues in general, and towards issues dealing with 
international conflict and co-operation in particular. 
Chapter 3 Core values and foreign policy attitudes 
Some preliminary remarks 
Different policy domains are associated with different sets of core values. Attitudes 
towards American welfare policies, for example, have been linked most frequently to 
core values such as egalitarianism, individualism and moral traditionalism (e. g. 
Craig, Kane & Martinez, 2002; Feldman, 1988). Similarly, vote choice has been 
most commonly associated with liberalism, egalitarianism and individualism, both in 
the United States (e. g. Kinder & Sears, 1985) and Britain (e. g. Evans, Heath & 
Lalljee, 1996). It is of interest that these principles are thought to be critical for 
democratic existence (e. g. Griffith, Plamenatz & Pennock, 1956) 
By contrast, investigations into the relevant core values within the foreign policy 
domain have been minimal and unsystematic. Research that has assessed the link 
between general orientations and foreign policy issues has predominantly focused on 
attitudes towards defence spending or international conflict, such as Vietnam or the 
Gulf War 1990/1991. Remarkably less research has emphasised co-operative 
policies, such as foreign aid or humanitarian operations. 
Apart from Wittkopf's dimensions of militant and co-operative internationalism (and 
their variants), studies of international attitudes have also primarily relied on political 
ideology, party identification and demographic variables, such as gender and age. 
For example, when studying South African attitudes towards participation in 
peacekeeping operations, Liebenberg, Malan, Cilliers, Sass & Heinecken (1997) 
reported how public support for peace operations varied according to party affiliation 
and race. 
Indeed, when investigating the effect of public concern for human rights violations in 
the world on the public's willingness to support international action on behalf of the 
victims, Harff (1987) highlighted the lack of research that addressed the impact of 
factors other than political ideology on support for humanitarian governmental 
action. According to Jackson (1983, p. 844, see also Amato, 1970 and Herrmann & 
Keller, 2001), "there is, unfortunately, little hard theory to guide the selection of 
variables"; a statement that still holds true, 
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Scholars who are investigating the international attitudes and beliefs of 
citizens and who are searching for well-researched off-the-shelf measures 
of their constructs may be disappointed. Put simply, until recently the 
international (foreign policy) domain of public opinion was both data poor 
and measurement poor, and while improvements have been made, there is 
much that remains to be done. (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999, p. 533) 
However, research shows that the set of core values that underlie attitudes towards 
issues in the domestic policy domain do not figure significantly in research on 
foreign policy issues. Indeed, a common finding is that national and social 
perceptions are more important in structuring attitudes towards foreign policy issues 
than personal self-interest (e. g. Bartels, 1994; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Lau, 
Brown & Sears, 1978; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Tessler & Warriner, 1997). 
Similar observations were also made in a study that assessed the impact of political, 
social and economic principles on attitudes towards the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
process. Examining attitudes towards peace in a Palestinian sample, Tessler and 
Nachtwey (1999) found that factors pertaining to national or societal concerns were 
important predictors of peace attitudes whilst factors referring to personal 
circumstances were not. Similar findings were also made by Sahliyeh and Deng 
(2003) who reported that Palestinian support for the peace process was related to 
trust in political institutions and governmental accountability, but was not associated 
with economic conditions. 
With little theory to guide research, several constructs are presented that were 
conceptually deemed relevant, such as national attachment, trust, authoritarianism 
and images. Their theoretical underpinnings will be discussed and research relevant 
to the present topic, if any, will be outlined. This discussion concludes with a note on 
the difference between the conception of values in political psychology and social 
psychology. 
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Political ideology and party identification 
Early work predominantly attributed the structure of political attitudes to ideology 
(e. g. Converse, 1964) or party identification (Campbell, Converse, Miler & Stokes, 
1960). In their seminal work of voting behaviour, Campbell et al. (1960) 
conceptualised party identification as an attachment to a party, which helps 
individuals to position themselves on the political landscape. Indeed, most political 
scientist believed that identification with political parties (liberal-conservative 
taxonomy) was the single most powerful and persistent political orientation 
(Huckfeldt, Levine, Margan & Srague, 1999; see Krosnick, 1991 for a review). 
Ideology and party identification have also consistently been recognised as having a 
strong relationship with attitudes towards the use of force (e. g. Holsti, 1996; Russett, 
Hartley & Murray, 1994). 
According to Miller and Levitan (1976, p. 36), party identification serves three 
functions: an information, normative and reference function. These help individuals 
to answer questions of what is going on (information function), what they should do 
(normative function) and who they are in political terms (reference function). Two 
further explanations have been advanced to explain the link between ideology, party 
identification and policy preferences. Some researchers have argued that rather than 
working out their position on any particular issues themselves, individuals simply 
take cues to their issue position from elites they identify as representing their own 
political values (e. g. Zaller, 1991). Similarly, it has been suggested that individuals 
respond to policy debates simply on the perceived credibility of their sources (e. g. 
Mueller, 1973). 
There is some indication in the literature that the degree of ideological coherence 
differs between individuals living in two-party or multi-party political systems. For 
example, Klingemann (1979) compared levels of ideological conceptualisation 
between Austria, Britain, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United States. 
Controlling for levels of political interest and education, Klingemann (1979) found 
that individuals living in multi-party systems (Austria, the Netherlands and West 
Germany) showed higher levels of ideological conceptualisation than individuals 
living in two-party systems (United States and Britain, which was a two party system 
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at that time). These findings were replicated by Sidanius, Brewer, Banks and 
Ekehammar (1987) in their study of ideological constraint in Sweden and the United 
States. 
Several studies have reported a strong link between political ideology and foreign 
policy attitudes. Comparing foreign and domestic policy beliefs in the US and 
Britain, Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell and Herron (2004) found that such attitudes in both 
publics were constrained by political ideology. Similarly, Murray and Cowden 
(1999) reported that political ideology played a significantly more central role than 
enemy images in structuring elites' foreign policy beliefs. 
However, recent research that has assessed political ideology or party identification 
in tandem with other core values has generally found only a weak, or non-existent, 
relationship between these and foreign policy attitudes in the mass public (e. g. 
Bartels, 1994; Cohrs, Moschner, Kielman & Mass, 2002; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 
1990; Pratto, Stallworth & Conway-Lanz, 1998; for a review of the impact of 
political ideology on political attitudes see Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 2002). 
For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) reported strong correlations between 
willingness to use force, ethnocentrism and morality of warfare, but only weak 
correlations between political ideology or party identification and militarism. In 
particular, Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993, p. 247) argued that ideology "has 
received little, if any, support in the U. S. context, where citizens are often described 
as innocent of such sweeping ideologies". Exploring the determinants of willingness 
to use force in foreign policy, Bartels (1994) also found that political ideology only 
significantly affected foreign policy attitudes when other correlates were omitted 
from the analyses. Whilst political ideology was significantly related to use of force 
in a simple regression analysis (ß = . 403), this relationship became insignificant (ß 
=. 004) when patriotism (ß =. 364) and trust in people (ß = -. 266) were entered into the 
equation. 
These findings indicate that it may be too simplistic to focus on political ideology or 
party identification as the sole determinants of political attitudes. The effect of 
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political ideology on foreign policy attitudes when assessed concurrently with other 
constructs thus warrants further investigation. 
National attachment 
In addition to political ideology, a number of studies have demonstrated that national 
attachment is a central element in mass belief systems, shaping and structuring 
political attitudes in a variety of policy domains, including foreign policy (e. g. 
Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Perez, 1999). Indeed, Pritzel (1998, p. 12) has argued that 
the conduct of foreign policy "has a strong dialectical relationship with national 
identity". Foreign policy is central to a sense of national identity, and to an 
understanding of the nation's purpose, role and values (Wallace, 1991; Pritzel, 1998), 
whilst a nation's self-perception greatly influences how it relates to other countries 
(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1999; Pritzel, 1998). 
In the social-psychological literature, national identity is used to refer to a 
subjectively positive attitude towards one's nation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also 
Blank & Schmidt, 2003, and Blank, Schmidt & Westle, 2001). National identity may 
arouse commitment, emotional attachment, feelings of nationalism and patriotism, 
and even self-sacrifice (Brewer, 1991). It manifests itself in history, collective values 
and symbols, such as the national flag. In a world marked increasingly by tendencies 
towards globalisation, there is, perhaps paradoxically, a trend towards the 
reaffirmation of national identities (Breakwell & Lyons, 1996; Herb & Kaplan, 
1999). 
Discussions of national identity have frequently been dominated by two terms - 
nationalism and patriotism 3.1, whose definitions and relationships are often elusive, 
leading into a "bog of semantic quicksand" (Worchel & Coutant, 1997). For 
example, the media, politicians, researchers and laypersons alike have often used 
these terms interchangeably, suggesting little difference between them (Billig, 
3'1 For variants on this distinction see Schatz, Staub &Lavine (1999); Sullivan, Fried & Dietz (1992). 
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19953.2; Worchel & Coutant, 1997). However, joining these two concepts together 
may hide important differences about the processes involved in and the foundations 
on which attachment to one's country are based. Adorno and colleagues (1950, p. 
107), for example, asked whether patriotism is "a blind attachment to certain national 
cultural values, uncritical conformity with prevailing group ways, and rejection of 
other nations as outgroups" or whether the true patriot is someone who "can 
appreciate the values and ways of other nations". 
Patriotism 
Most commonly, patriotism is thought of as an attachment by group members to 
their group and territory in which they reside (Bar-Tal, 1993; Bar-Tal & Staub, 
1997). This attachment is characterised by "a desire to belong to a group which is 
positively valued" (Bar-Tal, 1997, p. 248). Patriotism thus reflects a positive 
evaluation of and emotion towards the group, which is expressed in beliefs and 
feeling connoting pride, love, loyalty, commitment and care (Bar-Tal, 1993; Hurwitz 
& Peffley, 1999; Janowitz, 1960; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). Patriotism need not 
be confined to a nation, but may involve attachment to a group that does not 
necessarily comprise a nation (Bar-Tal, 1993). However, what is necessary for 
patriotism is to experience "we-ness" as a group and to feel a sense of belonging to it 
(Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). 
Nationalism 
By contrast, nationalism is most frequently defined as national attachment grounded 
in the perception of national superiority and an orientation towards national 
dominance (Doob, 1964; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Worchel & Coutant, 1997). 
Nationalism thus focuses on the relative evaluation of one's country vis-ä-vis other 
countries or international groups (DeLamater, Katz & Kelman, 1969; Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1999; Janowitz, 1960). Furthermore, it also refers to the motivation to 
3.2 Conversely, Billig (1995, p. 55-59) has also argued that the popular usage of these terms describes 
the "nationalist" as a bigoted national chauvinist, which has precipitated a rhetorical polarisation 
between "good" (patriotic) and "bad" (nationalistic") ways in which nationals relate to their nations 
(see also, Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). 
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enhance the national group - its status, power and influence (Bar-Tal & Staub, 
3 1997). .3 
Whilst affect and attachment are core components of both nationalism and 
patriotism, it is important to bear in mind the distinction Kosterman & Feshbach 
(1989; see also Worchel & Coutant, 1997) made between these two constructs: 
nationalism always involves a positive evaluation of one's country relative to other 
countries, whereas patriotism does not necessarily entail considering one's country as 
superior. It should also be noted that although nationalism and patriotism are thought 
to be stable beliefs, the detailed meaning of patriotism might change over time (e. g. 
Sullivan, Fried & Dietz, 1992) as it is socially constructed (Anderson, 1992). 
Foreign policy attitudes, nationalism and patriotism 
Studies investigating the effect of nationalism and/or patriotism on foreign policy 
attitudes have shown conflicting results. Assessing the relative usefulness of 
nationalism and patriotism in explaining foreign policy attitudes, Conover and 
Feldman (1987) found that patriotism and nationalism were both strongly correlated 
with militarism. However, patriotism was a more powerful predictor of foreign 
policy attitudes than nationalism, second only to "militarism", even when 
demographic factors and basic orientations were controlled for. Similar findings were 
also made by Kaplowitz (1990). Bartels (1994) also reported that pride in the 
American flag (patriotism) was the strongest predictor of willingness to use force. An 
interesting qualification to these findings was made by Heskin and Power (2001). 
They found that patriotism (measured by a semantic scale of perceived satisfaction 
with one's country) was positively related to moral justifications of the Gulf War 
(e. g. freeing the people of Kuwait) but was not significantly associated with 
belligerence (i. e. more force should have been used in the Gulf War). 
By contrast, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) found that nationalism was more 
strongly related to belligerent attitudes than patriotism, indicating that hostility 
3.3 It should be noted that the use of nationalism as an individual-difference variable is not undisputed 
in the political sciences. For example, extensive research indicates that nationalism is also an ideology 
(e. g. Gellner, 1983), advocating national self-determination and a belief in the natural distinctiveness 
of national groups. 
37 
Chapter 3 Core values and foreign policy attitudes 
towards other nations is not necessarily implied in attachment to one's nation. 
Similar findings were also reported by Feshbach (1990), who reported that 
nationalism was related to military policies and readiness to go to war, whereas 
patriotism was associated with nuclear disarmament and willingness to self-sacrifice. 
A strong link between nationalism and militarism was also reported by Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1987), who found that nationalism (what they termed ethnocentrism) was 
the strongest predictors of the use of force to solve international problems, followed 
by morality of warfare. Nationalism (or what was termed patriotism in their 1990 
study) powerfully predicted not only militarism but also attitudes towards the Soviet 
Union (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990). 
Work on European integration attitudes that investigated the effect of national 
identity on views such as the Euro (e. g. Cinnirella, 1996,2001; Mueller-Peters, 1998; 
Routh & Burgoyne, 1998) has also documented the importance of national identity 
processes in shaping European attitudes. Such research has shown that a strong 
national identity is related to negative attitudes to European integration. Contrary to 
Conover and Feldman (1987), who found patriotism to be a powerful predictor of 
foreign policy issues, Mueller-Peters (1998) found that nationalistic sentiments in 
particular posed an obstacle to the acceptance of the Euro, especially in individuals 
who were proud of their country's currency. Patriotic feelings, on the other hand, did 
not hinder the acceptance of the Euro. 
These studies agree that nationalism and/or patriotism are important predictors of 
foreign policy attitudes. However, they disagree on the direction of the effect, which 
is possibly due to inconsistent conceptualisations, use of different measures of these 
constructs (see Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) and different statistical methodologies. 
This issue will be explored empirically throughout this thesis. 
It should be noted that there is some empirical evidence that nationalism and 
patriotism are not merely surrogates for political ideology. Heath and colleagues 
(1993) investigated whether nationalism should be conceptualised as an autonomous 
political dimension from common left-right values. Using data from the British 
Election Panel Study, they found that nationalism has exploratory power over and 
above that of long-standing left-right and libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. For 
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example, nationalism was found to be a better predictor than the other two 
dimensions of attitudes towards political issues, such as European Integration, 
Britain's nuclear deterrent and aid to the Third World. Similar findings were also 
made with regard to patriotism. Sullivan, Fried and Dietz (1992) found that measures 
of patriotism had an impact on vote choice above and beyond that of measures of 
party identification or political ideology. Together, these findings suggest that these 
forms of national attachment are not merely substitutes for political ideology. 
Trust 
According to Uslaner (2000, p. 569), "trust is the chicken soup of social life. It 
reputedly brings us all sorts of good things. " Like nationalism and patriotism, trust is 
a stable orientation that may serve as a basis for forming other evaluations. The link 
between trust and politics has been of longstanding interest to researchers. However, 
only recently have studies examined whether trust shapes public opinion (Brewer & 
Gross, 2003). Two types of trust have been identified in the literature as being 
particularly relevant to foreign policy: political trust and social trust3'4. Their 
relationship to foreign policy attitudes will be described in turn. 
Political trust 
Political trust, or trust in the government, has most commonly been defined as 
"evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in 
accordance with normative expectations held by the public" and as being "a 
summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in 
the absence of constant scrutiny" (Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358, see also Stokes, 
1962)3'5. 
3.4 Brewer and Gross (2003) have recently identified another type of trust, international trust, which 
refers to a generalised belief that one's nation can trust other nations. Brewer, Gross, Aday & Willnat 
(2004) showed that international trust is shaped by social and political trust, and in turn shapes 
internationalism and attitudes towards military action in Iraq. 
33 For alternative definitions of political trust see Levi and Stoker (2000). 
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Yet, political trust not only affects evaluations of political institutions, but also 
provides a basis for deciding how much freedom one should grant the government 
(Hetherington, 1998). According to Hetherington and Globetti (2002, p. 254, see also 
Hetherington, 1999), political trust may "act as a simple decision rule for supporting 
or rejecting government activity", particularly in situations when individuals are 
asked to support policies for which they receive no direct benefit but for which they 
incur real or perceived costs. Trust in the government may therefore serve as another 
"standing decision" that affects political evaluations (Hetherington, 1999). 
Political trust grows out of childhood political experiences and pre-adult 
socialisation. For example, there is evidence that children who grew up during a time 
of political scandals or upheaval are less likely to be politically trusting than if they 
had grown up during a politically stable time (Damico, Conway & Damico, 2000). 
Similarly, children who grow up with politically trusting parents are more likely to 
be politically trusting in later life. Panel research has shown that the single best 
predictor of later political trust is early levels of political trust (e. g. Damico et al., 
2000). However, individuals are not slave to their political up-bringing. Political trust 
is also later shaped by people's experiences with and perceptions of the government 
(e. g. Coleman, 1990). 
Numerous studies have investigated the sources of political trust (see Levi & Stoker, 
2000 for a review), and the causes of declining political trust (e. g. Newton, 1999), 
which appears to be endemic in many modern democracies (see Miller & Listhaug, 
1990). Areas of research where the consequences of trust have received most 
attention concern political participation (e. g. Tarrow, 2000), and vote choice (e. g. 
Sigelman, Sigelman & Walkosz, 1992). For example, lower levels of trust have been 
associated with voting for an `outsider' candidate (e. g. Luks & Citrin, 1997), and 
with diminished approval of the president (Hetherington, 1998). Conversely, higher 
levels of political trust have been associated with presidential support and confidence 
in the congress (Brewer, Aday, Gross & Willnat, 2002). 
Comparatively little work has been conducted on the link between political trust and 
attitudes towards international affairs. However, the research that has been carried 
out suggests that political trust can have an important impact on foreign policy 
40 
Chapter 3 Core values and foreign policy attitudes 
attitudes. According to Popkin and Dimock (2000), individuals use political trust for 
judging whether they favour internationalist or isolationist interventions. Compared 
to the politically distrustful, politically trusting individuals are said to be more 
confident that the government can act effectively in international affairs. 
Consequently, such individuals might be more willing to see the government get 
involved with other nations' problems, both co-operatively and militarily. 
Although the effects of political trust on internationalism or militarism were not 
directly assessed by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), they found that political trust 
was positively related to attitudes towards defence spending and warm feelings 
towards the military. Increased levels of political trust have also been linked to 
increased support for the war in Vietnam (Lau, Brown & Sears, 1978) and Kosovo 
(Cohrs & Moschner, 2002), whilst decreased levels of political trust have been 
associated with the rejection of a government's military policy and types of 
interventions (e. g. Modigliani, 1972). 
Social Trust 
Although numerous studies have investigated the effects of political trust on political 
attitudes, research indicates that beliefs about human nature are also an important 
predictor of individuals' political attitudes and behaviour (e. g. Conover & Feldman, 
1984; Sullivan, Aldrich, Borgida & Rahn, 1990; Bartels, 1994; Brehm & Rahn, 
1997; Rahn & Transue, 1998; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). A central component of 
the belief about human nature is trust in other people (Wrightsman, 1991; Couch & 
Jones, 1997; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). Social trust, also referred to as 
interpersonal trust or generalised trust, can be defined as a generalised belief that one 
can trust strangers (Uslaner, 2002), which may be used for deciding whether or not to 
trust people in particular situations (e. g. Rahn & Transue, 1998). 
According to Stack (1978), trust in others develops out of the expectancies that a 
given behaviour will lead to a specific positive or negative outcome. He thus noted 
that, 
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Each individual has different expectancies for reinforcement in interactions 
involving trust: He is not as likely to be reinforced for believing a stranger 
as for believing his best friend. ... After many experiences with 
different 
agents in varying situations, an individual builds up generalised 
expectancies (1978, p. 567-568). 
Similarly, Orbell & Dawes (1991) have argued that individuals project their own 
trustworthiness onto others. People therefore use information about themselves as a 
heuristic to form beliefs about whether or not they can trust others. 
Individuals who believe in the goodness of human nature therefore believe that other 
people are trustworthy and have good intentions, whilst those who are cynical about 
human nature assume that others cannot be trusted and will take advantage of them 
when the opportunity arises (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). According to Rahn and 
Transue (1998, p. 545, see also Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), social trust is thus a 
"'standing decision' to give most people - even those whom one does not know from 
direct experience - the benefit of the doubt". 
These beliefs are thought to be stable over time (e. g. Couch & Jones, 1997; Uslaner, 
2002) and to influence judgements in a variety of contexts, such as attitudes towards 
business ventures (e. g. Currall & Inkpen, 2002), participation in voluntary 
associations (e. g. Anheier & Kendall, 2002) and work organisations (e. g. Baba, 
1999), and whether or not to comply with tax laws (e. g. Scholz & Lubell, 1998). 
Recent research has also shown that social trust is a relevant construct in political 
research (e. g. Putnam, 1993). Interpersonal trust has been related to a variety of civic 
orientations, such as conceptualisations of citizenship and running for student 
government office (e. g. Crystal & DeBell, 2002). Similarly, Brehm and Rahn (1997) 
showed that individuals derive their level of confidence in the government in part 
from their social trust. 
A few studies have also investigated the link between social trust and public attitudes 
towards foreign policy issues (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). For example, using 
1992 American National Election Study data, Bartels (1994) showed that as trust in 
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others decreased, support for the use of military force to solve international problems 
increased. This line of inquiry will be explored in detail in Chapter 6. 
Social dominance orientation 
Another variable that has frequently been associated with political attitudes is social 
dominance orientation (SDO). SDO is grounded in social dominance theory 
(Sidanius, 1993), which posits that societies are group-based with clearly defined 
hierarchies. SDO more specifically reflects "a general attitudinal orientation toward 
intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be 
equal, versus hierarchical" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994, p. 742). 
Although SDO was initially conceptualised as a dimension of personality (e. g. Pratto 
et al., 1994), it is now more commonly referred to as a measure of enduring belief 
(e. g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Saucier, 2000; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 
1998)3'6. 
SDO thus refers to an individual's tendency to classify social groups along a 
superiority-inferiority dimension and to favour policies that maintain social 
inequality. People who are high in SDO prefer hierarchical relations amongst groups 
compared to equal relations amongst groups. These individuals are hierarchy- 
enhancing and support a variety of "legitimising myths" that align groups on a 
superior-inferior dimension. These myths include racial and ethnic prejudice, 
nationalism, patriotism, sexism and political conservatism. 
Research on SDO has indicated strong relationships between SDO and general 
conservative beliefs, such as political and economic conservatism, right-wing 
political party preferences and ethnic prejudice (e. g. Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, 
Stallworth & Sidanius, 1997; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996). 
3.6 For a recent criticism of the SDO construct see Schmitt and Branscombe (2003), and Turner and 
Reynolds (2003). 
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Pertinent to the present concern, the relevance of SDO to foreign policy attitudes has 
also been demonstrated. Early work on personal dominance orientation indicated that 
such an orientation was effective in predicting more hostile policies in international 
settings (Etheredge, 1978). Shepard (1988) followed up Etheredge's (1978) work 
using secondary sources and biographical material, and found that higher levels of 
personal dominance were associated with advocating more conflictual policies 3.7. 
Recent work on SDO has shown that it is negatively associated with co-operative 
strategies (Schafer, 1997a). For example, people high in SDO are more likely to 
support military programmes in general as well as to support specific military 
operations in the Gulf War (Pratto, Stallworth & Conway-Lanz, 1998; see also 
Sidanius & Liu, 1992). Similar findings were also made by Cohrs, Moschner, 
Kielmann & Mass (2002) who reported a strong relationship between SDO and 
several military interventions, including attitudes towards military fight against 
terrorism and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights. Regarding 
military fight against terrorism, Henry, Sidanius, Levin, Pratto, & Nammour (2002) 
found that high levels of SDO were also predictive of support for "anti-terrorist" 
violence, that is, support for military action in Afghanistan. 
The only study to date that has investigated the relationship between SDO and 
humanitarian action reported a significant negative correlation (r = -. 41; Pratto et al., 
1994). However, these humanitarian operations were hypothetical, and the effects of 
SDO in predicting attitudes towards peace operations therefore need to be validated 
in a realistic setting. It is one of the aims of Chapter 8 to address this issue. 
Authoritarianism 
Another factor that has been linked to foreign policy attitudes is authoritarianism. 
The construct of authoritarianism was developed as part of a larger effort to 
understand why certain individuals might be more prejudiced than others. According 
3'7 It should be noted that these two studies refer to personal dominance, which differs from SDO 
conceptually. 
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to Adorno et al. (1950), generalised ethnocentrism could be explained in terms of a 
personality syndrome rooted in Freudian psychodynamics. In particular, 
authoritarians were characterised as displaying rigidity of thought and moral 
development, and as tending to be punitive towards individuals whose behaviours 
deviate from conventional norms. 
Both the conceptual underpinnings of authoritarianism as well as its measurement 
have been subjected to intense criticisms (for a review see Altemeyer, 1996). The 
most extensive recent research in the area of authoritarianism has been conducted by 
Altemeyer (1981,1988,1996), who examined the antecedents and consequences of 
what he termed right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). According to Altemeyer (1981), 
RWA is comprised of three elements: authoritarian submission, authoritarian 
aggression, and conventionalism. Furthermore, he proposes that authoritarians are 
prejudiced and intolerant because of their generally hostile nature and their social 
conservatism. 
Based on social learning theory, Altemeyer argues that authoritarianism is acquired 
through interaction with parents, peers and the media, and through experiences with 
people who hold unconventional beliefs and lifestyles. Through these interactions 
children learn to trust and obey authorities, which `coalesce' into a personality trait 
during adolescence. However, the view that RWA represents a personality dimension 
has recently been disputed, and several researchers have suggested that RWA would 
be better conceived of as a social worldview (e. g. Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 
2003) that is broadly ideological in nature (e. g. Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Saucier, 
2000). 
RWA has been related to support for repressive government actions, taking harsher 
positions towards drug users and the homeless (Peterson, Doty & Winter, 1993), and 
support for tougher sentences for criminals, including the death sentence (Altemeyer, 
1996). Moghaddam and Vuksanovic (1990) also found that individuals with high 
RWA scores were less supportive of universal human rights than individuals with 
low scores. 
45 
Chapter 3 Core values and foreign policy attitudes 
Authoritarianism has also been repeatedly linked to support for military 
interventions. For example, authoritarianism has been linked to support for the 
Vietnam War (e. g. Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Izzett, 1971), the Gulf War 
1990/1991 (Doty, Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Stephan, Berger, 
Schmidt & Herrmann, 1995) and the Kosovo War (Bartholomes, Gericke, 
Hartenstein et al., 1999, Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). Cohrs and colleagues (2002) also 
reported a strong relationship between RWA and several military interventions, 
including attitudes towards military fight against terrorism and attitudes towards 
military enforcement of human rights. Finally, moral conservatism/traditionalism, 
which is a component of RWA, was found to be predictive of militarism, 
isolationism and a variety of defence issues in a series of studies by Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1987). 
Empirical research has only explored the relationship between military interventions 
and RWA. The possible link between RWA and attitudes towards peace operations 
will be assessed in detail in Chapter 8. 
A note on SDO and RWA 
Recent research (e. g. Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis & Birum, 2002; 
Saucier, 2000) has suggested that SDO and RWA map unto two basic dimensions 
that structure social and political attitudes. Zaller (1992) argued that values are 
organised along a left-right dimension, where certain values will tend to be supported 
by liberal arguments, whereas other values will tend to underlie conservative ideas. 
Indeed, reviewing research on socio-political attitudes and socio-cultural values, 
Duckitt (2001) found evidence for such a bi-dimensional structure, which is 
reproduced in Table 3.1. These two roughly orthogonal dimensions are thought to 
correspond broadly to RWA and SDO. The table indicates one RWA-like dimension, 
which has variously been termed authoritarianism, traditionalism or social 
conservatism at one pole versus liberalism or freedom at the other pole. The other 
SDO-like dimension has typically been termed economic conservatism, belief in 
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Table 3.1. Bi-dimensional structure of socio-political attitudes 
Study RWA-like SDO-like 
Sociopolitical attitudes and 
values 
Eysenck (1954) 
Tomkins (1964) 
Rokeach (1973) 
Hughes (1975) 
Forsyth (1980) 
Kerlinger (1984) 
Katz & Hass (1988) 
Middendorp (1991) 
Braithwaite (1994) 
Saucier (2000) 
Cultural values 
Hofstede (1980) 
Schwartz (1992) 
Tromenaars (1993) 
Triandis & Gelfand (1998) 
From: Duckitt (2001) 
Conservatism vs Liberalism 
Normativism (high vs low 
conservatism) 
Low vs high Freedom 
Social Conservatism vs 
Liberalism 
Low vs high Relativism 
(tolerance) 
Conservatism (mainly high 
vs low Protestant ethic / 
traditionalism) 
High vs low protestant ethic 
Cultural Conservatism vs 
Openness 
High vs low National 
Strength and Order 
Alphaism (conservatism and 
authoritarianism) 
Collectivism vs 
Individualism 
Conservatism vs Openness 
Group loyalty vs 
Individualism 
Collectivism vs 
Individualism 
Tough vs tender (humane vs 
inhumane social attitudes 
Humanism (low vs high 
humanitarianism) 
Low vs high Equality 
Economic Conservatism vs 
Social welfare 
Low vs high Idealism 
(altruism / social concern) 
Liberalism (mainly low vs 
high egalitarianism / 
humanitarianism) 
Low vs high 
humanitarianism / 
egalitarianism 
Economic Conservatism vs 
Equality 
Low vs high International 
Harmony and Equality 
Betaism (SDO and 
Machiavellianism) 
High vs low Power Distance 
Power vs Egalitarianism 
Hierarchy vs Egalitarianism 
Vertical vs Horizontal 
Values 
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inequality or power at one pole, and humanitarianism, egalitarianism or social 
welfare at its other pole. A variety of measures therefore exist that tap into these two 
dimensions. However, RWA and SDO seem to be the most reliable uni-dimensional 
measures that have a consistently better predictive power of socio-political attitudes 
than the other scales (see Altemeyer, 1998). 
Images 
Images, or perceptions of foreign countries, have also received considerable 
theoretical and empirical attention within foreign policy research. A large literature 
on the effects of images of other nations on political attitudes proposes that a major 
function of such images is to simplify a complex international environment and to 
guide perceptions of, and responses to, particular countries (e. g. Brewer & 
Steenbergen, 2002; Cottam, 1977; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 
1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler & Ciarrochi, 
1997; Hermann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999; Murray & Cowden, 1999). 
The concept of image in the analysis of international systems was pioneered by 
Boulding (1956,1959), who argued that images of "other" and images of "self' are 
important factors affecting foreign policy decision-making. Boulding defined an 
image as, "the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, 
or its internal view of itself and its universe" (1959, p. 119). According to Boulding 
(1959, p. 121; see also Herrmann, 1986; Cottom, 1977), images that are important in 
the international arena are "those which a nation has of itself and of those other 
bodies in the system which constitute its international environment. " Furthermore, he 
argued that perceived hostility or friendliness and the perceived strength or weakness 
of a nation were central features of an individual's image of that nation. 
It should be noted that the concept of `image' is similar to that of `national 
stereotypes' advanced in social-psychological studies (e. g. Alexander, Brewer & 
Herrmann, 1999). According to these studies, four types of `realistic' differences 
between nation states can be differentiated that are reflected in the content of national 
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stereotypes: perceived political and economic power (Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994), 
perceived cultural differences (Peabody, 1985), geographic features (Linssen & 
Hagendoorn, 1994), and political and economic relations between different nations 
(Poppe & Linssen, 1999). 
Of Boulding's features, perceptions of hostility or friendliness, trustworthiness or 
threat, have perhaps received the most attention in foreign policy research (e. g. Chen, 
2001). For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990,1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 
1993) identified individuals' images of the Soviet Union to be a key organising 
factor that constrained Americans' foreign policy beliefs during the Cold War. 
Similarly, Feshbach and White (1986) found that perceptions of fear and distrust of 
the Soviet Union were significantly related to positive attitudes towards American 
nuclear arms policies. 
Conceptualising threat as the belief that the Soviet Union is a nation determined to 
expand its influence, and defining trust as the perception that the Soviet Union is an 
honest actor with which to deal, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) found that both were 
important predictors of two postures: militarism and containment. More specifically, 
they found that individuals who perceive the Soviet Union as untrustworthy and as 
threatening preferred an assertive foreign policy position that emphasised military 
strength. Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals who were distrustful of the Soviet 
Union were more likely to endorse its containment than individuals with no such 
beliefs. 
Bartels (1994) also reported that attitudes towards U. S. defence spending during the 
Cold war were significantly determined by individuals' attitudes towards the use of 
force, followed by their attitudes towards Russia. In this study, individuals who had a 
negative image of Russia and who believed that the U. S. should be tougher with 
Russia were more likely to favour increased U. S. defence spending than individuals 
who viewed Russia more favourably. 
Further examining how general beliefs structure foreign policy beliefs outside the 
U. S., Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993) found that images of salient nations (e. g. 
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Cuba, Nicaragua and the U. S. ) were a better predictor of specific foreign policy 
issues in Costa Rica than were militarism or anti-communism. 
However, the majority of this research has been carried out during the Cold War 
when "enemy images" were prevalent. Thus, the question arises to what degree 
national images of foreign countries have remained a key factor in organising 
attitudes in the post-Cold era when nations cannot easily be classified in terms of 
bipolar conflict (Chanley, 1999). There is some tentative evidence that U. S. national 
images of the Soviet Union still played a role in structuring early post-Cold War 
political attitudes in that "revised Soviet images appear to have affected ... 
respondents' views on many different national security issues" (Peffley & Hurwitz, 
1992, p. 452). Overall, with the end of the Cold War, U. S. respondents had moved 
away from a more militant stance towards the Soviet Union as a result of more 
favourable images of it. The role of images in shaping attitudes towards a 
contemporary foreign policy, namely peace operations, will be explored in Chapters 
7 and 8. 
A final word on "core values" 
Core values have so far been discussed as referring to overarching normative 
principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society (e. g. 
McCann, 1997), a definition that is prevalent in the literature reviewed above. 
However, the term "value" in social psychology has a different connotation. Values 
in psychology are commonly defined as desirable, trans-situational goals that vary in 
importance and serve as guiding principles in people's lives (Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992; for a review of the different definitions of the term "value" see 
Rohan, 2000). 
Values are distinct from attitudes or beliefs because they function as an organised 
system, and are regarded as broad qualities that underlie and justify attitudes and 
behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996). "Values" in social psychology are thus 
organised and interlinked, and, by being more primary, distinct from "core values". 
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The interdependencies among values have been widely recognised. A number of 
two-dimensional value models of social or political goals have been proposed. For 
example, Scott (1960) identified two groups of policy goals: international co- 
operation (comprising measures of humanitarianism and pacifism) and international 
competitiveness (comprising measures of nationalism and power), whilst Rokeach 
(1973) proposed that values underlying political ideology could be summarised in 
terms of equality and freedom. 
Recently, Braithwaite (1997) proposed the security-harmony model in which social 
values are regarded as part of two supra-ordinate value orientations, security and 
harmony, which together explain the way in which individuals evaluate social and 
political events. According to this model, the security value dimension provides 
order, legitimates competition for resources and constrains the way in which such 
competition is played out in society. By contrast, the harmony dimension orients 
action towards cooperation, peaceful coexistence and regard for the collective. In 
addition, investigating the influence of values on voting, Barnea and Schwartz (1998) 
found that ten value types, as identified by Schwartz' (1992) value system, may be 
politically relevant depending on context. 
The relationship between "values" in the psychological sense and "core values" in 
the foreign policy literature will be explored in detail in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF THE 
HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS PEACE OPERATIONS 
THE CASE OF SIERRA LEONE 
Chapter Two argued that the hierarchical model of constraint as described by 
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992) represents one of the 
most promising approaches to understanding foreign policy attitudes. However, 
several conceptual and empirical limitations were highlighted, which included the 
lack of direct relationships between core values and specific attitudes, and a lack of 
empirical application to present-day political issues. 
A time-series interview study was used to explore the utility of the hierarchical 
model with regard to understanding attitudes towards peace operations. In doing so, 
it compares its validity to alternative models, and also examines any possible direct 
effects of core values on specific attitudes, thus addressing both of the described 
limitations of the model and empirical research. 
Chapter Two also briefly noted the lack of contextual factors in previous research, 
such as policy outcome perceptions. The study described here therefore also explores 
the contribution of two contextual variables to the model of specific policy attitudes, 
namely perceived risk of casualties and perceived outcome of a mission. Both of 
these variables will be discussed in detail in the next sections. 
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Contextual influences: The effects of casualties on foreign policy attitudes 
The link between accumulation of casualties and public opinion is based on the 
pioneering work of Mueller (1973), who examined public support during both the 
Vietnam and Korean wars. Using time-series data, Mueller (1973) found that whilst 
domestic political events (e. g. presidential change) did not affect public war support 
over time, war fatalities had a considerable negative effect on support for both the 
Vietnam and the Korean War. More specifically, he found that a ten-fold increase in 
casualties led to a significant drop of 15 percent in support for both of these wars. 
Furthermore, Mueller (1973, p. 62, see also Mueller, 1994) found that the cumulative 
logarithm of casualties in these two wars were better predictors of support than raw 
casualties because, 
While they [Americans] did weary of the wars, they generally seem to have 
become hardened to the wars' costs: they are sensitive to relatively small 
losses in the early stages, but only to large losses in later stages. 
He therefore argued that a cumulative log of national casualties would be the best 
predictor of wartime opinion (see also Burk, 1999 and Larson, 1996; for an 
alternative explanation see also Gartner, Segura & Wilkening, 1997; Kull & Ramsay, 
2001). 
There is also some evidence that the public will not support peacekeeping missions if 
they incur casualties. For example, although American support for the peacekeeping 
mission in Somalia was initially strong, American troops had to be withdrawn due to 
negative public reactions following the deaths of 18 peacekeepers in Mogadishu in 
1993 (Daniel, 1996; but see also Kull & Ramsay, 2001). Indeed, Mueller (1996, p. 
131) remarked that, "when Americans asked themselves how many American lives it 
was worth to save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives, the answer came out rather 
close to zero". 
Similarly, fear of casualties has been blamed for the reluctance of European powers 
to risk ground troops to counter aggression in the former Yugoslavia (e. g. Luttwak, 
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1996). For example, after Spanish troops had suffered 17 deaths in Bosnia, the 
Spanish government withdrew from further confrontation (Hedges, 1997). 
Reviewing public reactions to post-Cold War American peace missions, Mueller 
(2000, p. 8) concluded that, 
risking lives for a goal as ungraspable and vaporous as policing a small, 
distant, unthreatening, and seemingly perennially-troubled place like 
Somalia or Bosnia has proved difficult to manage. It seems clear that 
policing efforts will be tolerable only as long as the costs in lives for the 
policing forces remain extremely low. 
However, empirical evidence for the casualty hypothesis with regard to peace 
operations is not unequivocal. An interesting scenario was studied by Kull and 
Ramsay (2001), who examined public support for the mission in Bosnia. Although 
no American troops had been killed in Bosnia, it appeared that the majority of 
Americans believed that they had. If individuals are highly sensitive to casualties, the 
misperception that fatalities have been incurred should be an important factor in 
shaping their attitudes towards Bosnia, and their attitudes should differ from those 
who know that there have been no casualties. Kull and Ramsay (2001), however, 
found no relationship between the perception of American fatalities and support for 
US participation in Bosnia. Instead, even amongst respondents who believed that 
there had been more than 1,000 US casualties, support for the mission in Bosnia was 
not any lower than for those who believed that there had been none. 
There is also some evidence that the British public supported the mission in Kosovo 
despite the possibility of casualties. At the beginning of the action in Kosovo, the 
majority of British respondents (51%) were prepared to send ground troops as well as 
accept casualties (Gallup Poll, 1999). Another poll carried out at the same time, 
however, indicated that 56% of respondents agreed that the protection of the 
Albanian Kosovars was "not worth a single British life" and only 19% of 
respondents agreed to casualties in the order of 1-1,000. 
The evidence that, as in war situations, the public will only approve of peace 
operations when they are casualty-free (Burk, 1999; Luttwak, 1994) is therefore not 
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clear. Indeed, it has been argued that a correlation between fear of casualties and 
mission support does not necessarily imply that less acceptance for casualties causes 
a decline in support (e. g. Isernia, 2001). Instead, it has been suggested that the link 
between casualties and mission support is contrived since polling agencies fail to 
take into account other variables, such as perceptions of mission success, that might 
mediate this relationship (see Everts, 2001b); an issue that will be explored in the 
next section. 
Contextual influences: Outcome perceptions - An important qualification to the 
casualty debate 
Several researchers (e. g. Everts, 2001b; Larson, 1996; van der Meulen & Konink, 
2001; Record, 1993) have argued that the lack of apparent mission success is often 
more important in explaining diminishing public support than the occurrence of 
casualties. Similarly, according to the Ministry of Defence (2001, section 45), public 
support is vital to conduct military interventions, and "will depend in large measure 
on the success of such interventions". 
Examining the relative unpopularity of the Vietnam War, for example, Record 
(1993) concluded that, "The American People will support even a costly war for a 
just cause, but they will withdraw their support when they no longer see a reasonable 
chance for realising a preferred or acceptable outcome" (p. 137). Similarly, Schwarz 
(1994, p. 18) concluded that, 
Once committed, regardless of its opinion concerning the initial decision - 
and regardless of costs incurred - the public shows little inclination to quit 
an intervention and instead strongly supports an escalation of the conflict 
and measures it believes are necessary to win a decisive victory. 
Larson (1996) also suggested that the public shows considerable resilience in 
response to casualties because the effect of fatalities is mediated by a means-end 
analysis, and is thus indirect. According to Larson, support for a military intervention 
is the result of a series of questions that need to be answered by an individual: 1) Are 
the benefits of the intervention great enough; 2) Are the prospects for mission 
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success good enough; 3) Are the actual or expected costs (e. g. financial or loss of 
lives) low enough; and 4) Taken together, does the probable outcome seem to be 
worth the costs. Furthermore, in weighing these benefits, prospects and costs, 
individuals also gauge consensus or dissent among political leaders to inform their 
own evaluations. 
A similar claim to Larson's was also made by Burk (1995,1999), who argued that 
public support for a military action is not unconditional, but dependent on the 
perceived effectiveness and purposefulness of the action. Studying the rapid decline 
of public support for military action in the Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) 
following heavy casualties, which led to a withdrawal of American troops in these 
conflicts, Burk (1995) found that whilst public attitudes were not insensitive to the 
deaths of American soldiers, public support for both missions was largely determined 
before casualties occurred. 
Similar conclusions about the effects of casualties and outcome perceptions of 
success on support for the mission in the Lebanon were also made by Kull and 
Ramsay (2001). Kull and Ramsay found that attitudes towards US participation in 
peace operations were shaped by the following concerns: (1) whether the mission 
was multilateral, (2) whether the US was contributing its fair share, (3) whether the 
population wanted the operation, and most importantly (4) whether the operation was 
likely to succeed. 
Thus, a rather more complex picture than that painted by the casualty hypothesis has 
emerged. Support for a mission is likely to be sustained even in the event of fatalities 
if the public supported the mission in the first place, and if the public believes that 
the mission is likely to succeed. 
The importance of outcome perceptions has also been noted by several studies of 
humanitarian issues. Cheung and Chan (2000) found that outcome efficacy was an 
important factor that promoted public intention to donate to a charity. Similarly, 
Taormina and Messick (1983) reported that perceived effectiveness of foreign aid 
had the largest single impact on judgements of deservingness of such aid. The 
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possible effect of outcome perceptions on attitudes towards peace operations 
therefore merits further investigation. 
Choice of core values and postures 
According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992), 
nationalism is a stable orientation that may serve as a basis for forming other 
evaluations. As discussed in Chapter 3, previous research has shown a differential 
effect of nationalism and patriotism on a variety of political issues. However, these 
studies disagree on the direction of these effects. Thus, their differential impact on 
peacekeeping attitudes within the hierarchical model needed to be investigated. 
Because of the interview approach employed in this study, which limited the number 
of questions that could reasonably be asked, the investigation of core values is 
restricted to the effects of nationalism and patriotism within the hierarchical model. 
Unlike Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,1990) who examined isolationism, militarism and 
containment as postures in their research, the selection of postures in this thesis was 
guided by the works of Chittick and colleagues (1995), Rattinger & Juhasz (1998) 
and Ziegler (1987), who found that foreign policy attitudes were best described in 
terms of three dimensions: internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism. The 
dimension of internationalism refers to the extent to which an individual believes that 
it is in their nation's interest to get involved in international affairs. Militarism 
concerns the individual's position on the appropriateness of the use of force in 
solving international problems. The final dimension, multi-lateralism, refers to the 
extent to which individuals believe that their nation should actively co-operate with 
other nations and organisations to solve international issues. 
The context - Sierra Leone 
The effects of casualties and outcome perceptions on support for a peace operation in 
this study will be examined with respect to Britain's intervention in Sierra Leone in 
2000. Britain's link with Sierra Leone, on the west coast of Africa, dates back to 
1787, when a Crown Colony was established to settle freed slaves. Sierra Leone 
gained its independence from Britain in 1961, and became a republic in 1971. 
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The recent history of Sierra Leone has been characterised by instability, caused by 
several military coups and eight years of internal conflict with the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh. In March 1991, fighters from the RUF 
launched a war to overthrow the government in Sierra Leone. The army in Sierra 
Leone defied the coup, but the following year, the army itself overthrew the 
government. Despite elections in 1996, the conflict within Sierra Leone, and with the 
RUF, continued. 
In June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The mission monitored and advised efforts to disarm 
combatants and restructure the nation's armed forces. All UNOMSIL personnel were 
evacuated in December 1998, after a rebel alliance gained control of more than half 
of the country and its capital, Freetown. However, in July 1999 all parties to the 
conflict signed an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a government of 
national unity. In October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of 
UNAMSIL, a larger mission of 6,000 military personnel to assist the government in 
carrying out provisions of the Lome peace agreement. 
In May 2000, RUF rebels attacked UN personnel and Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR) camps. A number of UN peacekeepers and journalists were 
killed, and more than 200 others were detained by the rebels. UK forces were 
deployed to the capital, Freetown, to evacuate UK citizens and to secure the airport 
for the arrival of UN reinforcement troops. As a result of this unrest, UNAMSIL was 
increased to 13,000 military personnel in May 2000. Although most of the British 
troops pulled out of Sierra Leone on 15`h June 2000, a Short-Term Training Team 
remained to assist the army in Sierra Leone in basic training and the development of 
a new Officer Corps. In August 2000, a group of rebels captured 11 members of the 
remaining Royal Irish Regiment and one Sierra Leone army liaison officer. Five 
officers were released and the remaining six were rescued by UK forces in 
September; an operation during which one British soldier died. 
The Security Council again increased the authorised strength of UNAMSIL in March 
2001 to 17,500 military personnel. The mission is ongoing. 
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Model overview and hypotheses 
The hierarchical model 
The goal of this study was to examine the structure of attitudes towards a peace 
operation. According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,1990), constructs are grouped 
together according to their level of generality. Based on Hurwitz and Peffley's 
model, the level above the specific issue, attitudes towards Sierra Leone, consists of 
three general postures: internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism. 
The mission in Sierra Leone was characterised by the involvement of British troops 
in a UN operation, using the minimum of force. It was therefore expected that 
internationalism and multi-lateralism would be positively correlated with attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone. Due to its military connotation and implication of the use of 
force, it is furthermore hypothesised that militarism will be negatively, if at all, 
associated with attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
In the structural model (Model,; see Figure 4.1), core values are assumed to 
constrain postures. In this study, only nationalism and patriotism were assessed as 
core values. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) have argued that attachment to a nation is 
negatively related to internationalism since it fosters a self-centred view of the world. 
By contrast, it is positively related to militarism because national interests can be 
pursued through an assertive foreign policy stance. The link between nationalism and 
multi-lateralism has not yet been assessed by existing research. However, since 
research has shown that nationalism is associated with "own-nation-first" opinions 
(e. g. Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), it could be hypothesised that it will be 
negatively related to multi-lateralism, which stresses co-operation with different 
nations and organisations. 
By contrast, patriotism has been related more strongly with peace-loving attitudes 
and internationally-oriented opinions, and it was therefore hypothesised that 
patriotism was positively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, whilst 
being negatively related to militarism. 
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According to Hurwitz and Peffley, the direction of causation in the model is assumed 
to be uni-directional and top-down. Nationalism and patriotism therefore directly 
affect the three postures, which in turn directly affect attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
(see Figure 4.1). 
The validity of a hierarchical model is measured using the statistical technique of 
structural equation modelling. One standard approach employed in structural 
equation modelling is to test alternative models in addition to the hypothesised model 
to eliminate the possibility that any other model might fit the data better (e. g. 
MacCallum & Austin, 2000). In addition to the paths of the hypothesised model, the 
alternative model (Model2; see Figure 4.2) also contains paths directly from 
demographics to foreign policy postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone as well 
as from core values to attitudes towards Sierra Leone. These paths also made 
theoretical sense since numerous studies have indicated direct links between gender 
and foreign policy attitudes (e. g. Fite, Genest & Wilcox, 1990; Howell & Day, 
2000), and national identity and foreign policy attitudes (e. g. Conover & Feldman, 
1987; Mueller-Peters, 1998). 
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Figure 4.1. Hypothesised structural model (Modell) 
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A second alternative model (Model3) was also tested in which no structural 
distinction was made between core values and postures, that is, all the variables 
directly affected attitudes towards Sierra Leone. This was done to explore whether 
the hierarchical model provided a better explanation of specific attitudes than a 
single-layered model. 
Figure 4.2. Alternative structural model (Modele) 
Extending the hierarchical model: Contextual effects 
Based on existing research, which has shown that perceptions of casualties and 
mission success affect attitudes towards a military operation, the contextual 
constructs of perceived risk and outcome perceptions should conceptually precede 
attitudes towards a specific mission. These constructs were therefore situated at a 
higher level of abstraction from the general postures and directly influenced attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone (ModelEl; see Figure 4.3). There is no empirical evidence as to 
how these contextual variables should relate to the three postures, and no concise 
predictions were therefore made. 
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Figure 4.3. Hypothesised extended hierarchical model (ModelEl) 
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Figure 4.4. Hypothesised extended hierarchical model (ModelE2) 
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However, a final possibility was also explored. It could be argued that perceptions of 
casualties and mission success are contingent on levels of previous attitudes towards 
a specific mission. Previous research on the relationship between mission support, 
casualties and perceived success have been based on correlational analyses, which do 
not allow for causal inferences to be made. The possibility that these contextual 
factors were consequences of attitudes towards Sierra Leone and not their 
determinants was therefore also assessed using structural equation modelling 
(ModelE2; see Figure 4.4). 
METHOD 
Timing of data collection and procedure 
In order to examine possible changes in attitudes over time, a time-series survey 
design was employed. Participants were interviewed in both Aldershot and Guildford 
town centre at three different time points, each corresponding to events in Sierra 
Leone. Table 4.1 outlines the dates of data collection and events in Sierra Leone. 
Table 4.1: Time of sampling and political events in Sierra Leone 
Time 1 30 June -4 July 2000 
British Army had pulled out of Sierra Leone two 
weeks earlier 
Time 2 28-29 August 2000 11 British soldiers of the Training Team were 
taken hostage on the 27 August 2000 
Time 3 12 -13 September 2000 
One British soldier died on 10 September 2000 
whilst trying to free British hostages 
It should be noted that the first survey was carried out at the end of June 2000; two 
weeks after British troops had pulled out of Sierra Leone. This timing was deemed 
appropriate because the British intervention in Sierra Leone would have forced 
people to think about issues relating to peace operations, improving the chances that 
their opinions would be informed or reasoned. 
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Potential respondents were asked if they would be willing to participate in a survey. 
It was explained that the survey would take approximately 10 minutes to complete 
and that they could refuse to answer any questions to which they did not want to 
respond. It was also explained that there were no "correct" answers to the questions. 
Participants were thanked for their time, and any questions about the study were 
answered. Participants were also asked whether they would like to receive a 
summary of the findings from this study. If they did, they were asked to indicate their 
name and address. It was pointed out to them that providing this information did not 
affect their anonymity which would be preserved at all times. 
Sample composition 
90 British nationals in both Aldershot and Guildford were sampled at each time- 
point, with individuals in Aldershot or Guildford town centre being approached for 
an interview. The final sample constituted 540 participants. 
This type of convenience sample is self-selected and thus may not be representative 
of the larger population of citizens of Guildford and Aldershot across a variety of 
demographic characteristics, such as age, social class or education level. However, 
such convenience samples can be strengthened by comparing the sample 
composition to those of a defined population across a wide range of variables 
(Wilkinson, 1999). 
Table 4.2 compares the Guildford and Aldershot total study sample to 2001 Census 
data (Office for National Statistics, 2002) on four demographic variables - gender, 
age, educational level and social class - and indicates the deviation of the sample 
from the Census figures for each demographic sub-section in a separate column of 
percentages. 
The Guildford sample over-represented men, those aged between 18-24 and 45-59, 
those who had A-levels, and those who worked in professional occupations (Class 2) 
and personal service occupations (Class 6), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 
and over, those with no qualifications, and those working as managers (Class 1), and 
machine process operatives (Class 8). 
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Table 4.2. Demographic composition of unweighted sample data for Guildford 
and Aldershot compared to 2001 Census data 
Guildford Guildford 
Diff. 
Sample/ 
Aldershot 
Study Rushmoor 
Diff. 
Sample/ 
sample Census census sample 
Census 
4' d t census (N = 270) Data (N = 270) a a 
Gender Male 55.8% 49.0% 6.80% 53.2% 49.0% 4.20% 
Female 44.2% 51.0% 6.80% 46.8% 51.0% 4.20% 
Age 18-24 13.5% 11.65% 1.85% 12.7% 9.52% 3.18% 
25-29 12.4% 13.34% 0.94% 15.5% 15.92% 0.58% 
30-44 33.7% 33.64% 0.06% 32.3% 30.34% 2.04% 
45-59 25.3% 22.23% 3.07% 24.9% 22.86% 2.04% 
60- over 15.1% 19.14% 4.04% 14.6% 15.33% 0.70% 
Edu. Degree 30.1% 30.57% 0.47% 18.3% 20.57% 2.27% 
A level 17.5% 11.50% 6.00% 20.1% 23.08% 2.98% 
Olevel 32.5% 33.66% 1.16% 38.3% 26.25% 12.05% 
Other 4.1% 5.96% 1.86% 3.5% 7.38% 3.88% 
No qual. 15.8% 18.3% 2.50% 19.8% 22.73% 2.93% 
class. 
4.2 
Manag. 15.8% 19.28% 3.48% 9.1% 14.88% 5.78% 
2- 
Profess. 18.6% 16.40% 
2.20% 7.8% 9.87% 2.07% 
3- 17.7% 17.00% 0.70% 15.2% 17.59% 2.38% Technic. 
4 12.3% 13.42% 1.12% 18.1% 15.11% 2.99% Admin. 
5- 7.3% 9.24% 1.94% 12.3% 11.31% 0.99% Skilled 
6- 8.3% 5.49% 2.81% 10.3% 6.42% 3.88% Service 
7 8.5% 6.80% 1.70% 11.2% 7.46% 3.74% Sales 
8 1.2% 3.89% 2.69% 3.4% 6.35% 2.95% Machine 
9- 10.3% 8.48% 1.82% 12.6% 11.08% 1.52% Element. 
4.1 No Aldershot specific data was available. Rushmoor Borough Council data, of which Aldershot is 
one of the main constituents, was therefore taken as approximate data. 
4.2 See Table 4.3 for a detailed description of the nine categories of Social Class based on Occupation 
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The Aldershot sample over-represented men, those aged between 18-24,30-44, and 
49-59, those who had O-levels, and those who worked in administrative occupations 
(Class 4), personal service occupations (Class 6) and sales occupations (Class 7), 
whilst it under-represented those with degrees, other qualifications and no 
qualifications, and those who worked as managers (Class 1), in professional 
occupations (Class 2), associate professional occupations (Class 3) and process 
operatives (Class 8). 
These biases were corrected mathematically with the use of post-stratification 
weights. Using SPSS, the post-stratification weights were computed and weight 
variables were created. All the analyses in this chapter were based on weighted 
sample data4 3. 
Once the data had been weighted, there were no significant differences between the 
two locations in terms of gender and age. However, there were significant 
differences regarding highest educational level achieved (x2 = 34.22, df = 4, p= 
0.003), with Guildford respondents having significantly more higher degrees or 0- 
levels than respondents from Aldershot. Similarly, the Guildford sample had 
significantly more respondents in managerial or professional occupations than the 
Aldershot sample (x2 = 25.11, df = 8, p=0.024). These differences in degree rates 
and occupation are to be expected when one considers that Guildford is an affluent 
University town, which is located on the "commuter-belt". 
It should be noted that Guildford and Aldershot had been chosen to reflect locations 
with different types of social or cultural context: a town with a strong military history 
- Aldershot, and a town without any military connections - Guildford. Indeed, 
significant differences between the two locations in terms of military background 
emerged, with significantly more respondents in Aldershot than in Guildford having 
served in the Armed Forces (x2 = 5.33, df = 1, p=0.045), having family members in 
the Armed Forces (x2 = 32.40, df = 1, p=0.01) or having friends in the Armed 
Forces (x2 = 44.76, df = 1, p=0.001). 
4'3 It should be noted that the analyses in this and the following empirical chapters were conducted on 
both weighted and unweighted data, which indicated remarkably similar structural relationships 
between the two types of data. 
66 
Chapter 4 An exploratory analysis of the hierarchical model 
Measures 
The following measures were included in the interview questionnaire (see Appendix 
A for details of the interview materials). Most of them involve only a few items. This 
was unavoidable since a wide range of variables needed to be assessed, with a street- 
survey approach constraining the number of questions that could reasonably be 
asked. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations of the study variables 
for the sample as a whole appear in Table 4.4 in the Results Section. 
"National attachment" 
Based on Kosterman & Feshbach' (1989) and Lilli and Diehl2 (1999), six items were 
used to tap attachment to Britain: "I am proud to be British"", "Being British is an 
important part of my identity2", "Being British is important to me because it makes 
me feel different from other people2", "I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of 
any other country in the world"", "Generally, the more influence Britain has on other 
nations, the better off they are"", and "In a sense I am emotionally attached to Britain 
and emotionally affected by its actions2". Respondents rated these items on a five- 
point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 5= Strongly agree). Principal component 
analysis indicated two factors, which corresponded to the distinction frequently made 
between "nationalism" and "patriotism", and a composite variable for each was 
therefore created. Higher scores indicate a belief in British superiority and greater 
pride in Britain, respectively. 
"Internationalism " 
Based on Holsti (1996), the degree to which an individual favoured involvement in 
international affairs was assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly 
disagree; 5= Strongly agree): "International co-operation should be encouraged to 
solve common problems, such as world hunger or world peace" and "Britain 
shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at 
home" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of "internationalism" was created 
from these two variables, with higher scores indicating stronger support for 
international involvement. 
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"Militarism" 
In line with Holsti (1996) and Chittick and colleagues (1995), a militaristic or 
assertive position towards foreign affairs was examined by two items (five-point 
Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree; 5= Strongly agree): "In dealing with other 
nations, our government should be strong and tough" and "The best way to ensure 
peace is to negotiate with other nations" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of 
"militarism" was created from these two items. Higher scores on this factor indicate 
a greater belief in assertive foreign policy solutions. 
"Multi-lateralism " 
Following Chittick and colleagues (1995,2001), attitudes towards multi-lateral 
international ventures were assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1= 
Strongly disagree; 5= Strongly agree): "To make a change in the world, Britain 
needs to work together with international organisations, such as the UN or NATO" 
and "Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together with other 
nations" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of "multi-lateralism" was created 
from these two items. Higher scores indicate a greater willingness to co-operate 
internationally. 
"Perceived risk" 
Perceptions of the risk of harm to British peacekeepers in Sierra Leone was assessed 
by three items (five-point Likert scale: 1= Very unlikely; 5= Very likely): 
Likelihood of peacekeepers being "Injured", "Killed", and "Taken hostage". These 
three items were combined into one scale "perceived risk", with higher scores 
indicating more perceived risk of harm. 
"Outcome perception " 
Perceptions of a successful or unsuccessful outcome of the mission in Sierra Leone 
were assessed by one item that differed in its wording slightly across the three 
sampling times (five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree; 5= Strongly agree): 
Ti "British troops in Sierra Leone have succeeded in implementing the peace 
agreement", T2 "British troops in Sierra Leone will succeed in restoring peace in 
Sierra Leone", and T3 "British troops in Sierra Leone have succeeded in restoring 
peace in Sierra Leone". 
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"Attitudes towards Sierra Leone" 
Attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone were assessed by two items (five-point 
Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree; 5= Strongly agree): "The decision to participate 
in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one" and "I approve of British troops 
being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone". A composite variable of "attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone" was created from these two items. High scores indicate more 
positive attitudes towards this mission. 
"Demographics " 
The interview questionnaire also contained several demographic variables. These 
included gender and age. Highest education level achieved was classified into five 
categories: Degree (including PhD), A-level or equivalent, O-level or equivalent, 
Other, No qualifications. 
Using the Standard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000; Office for National 
Statistics, 2000), occupations were classified into nine major categories, referred to 
as social classes, following the rules laid down by the SOC to derive The Social 
Class based on Occupation (Registrar General's Social Class: SC). These nine major 
categories are designed to group together occupations with a similar level of 
occupational skill, and are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Social class based on occupation 
1 Managers and Senior Officials 
2 Professional Occupations 
3 Associate Professional and Technical Occupations 
4 Administrative and Secretarial Occupations 
5 Skilled Trades Occupations 
6 Personal Service Occupations 
7 Sales and Customer Service Occupations 
8 Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 
9 Elementary Occupations 
Other measures included the presence of children (Yes/No). Several studies have 
shown that media exposure influences public attitudes towards the military and 
military interventions (e. g. Hofstetter & Moore, 1979; Wanta & Hu, 1993). Interest 
in current affairs (five-point Likert scale: 1= "Not at all interested" to 5= "Very 
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interested"), and the newspaper most frequently read (The Daily Telegraph, The 
Guardian, The Independent, The Times, The Financial Times, The Daily Mail, The 
Sun, The Daily Express, and Other) were therefore also assessed. Three questions 
about a military background were also included, with responses being made on a 
Yes-No category: "Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? ", "During the last 30 
years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? ", and "Do you 
have friends serving in the Armed Forces? ". Finally, participants were also asked 
their political party affiliation (Labour, Liberal, Conservative, and Other) and their 
political ideology concerning foreign policy issues (five-point Likert scale: 1= very 
liberal to 5= very conservative)4 4. 
Analyses 
Each proposed model was tested with structural equation modelling (SEM) using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix in LISREL 8.52 
(Joreskog & Sörbom, 2002). The error terms were based on the reliabilities of the 
respective scales. A "two-step approach" to SEM generation involves estimating a 
measurement model before a structural model is tested (e. g. Anderson & Gerbin, 
1988). However, this approach is inappropriate when concepts have fewer than three 
indicators, as was the case in the present study (cf. Hayduk, 1996). 
Since "Outcome perception" was assessed by only one item across the three time- 
points, the reliability for this variable could not be calculated. A reliability 
coefficient of 0.80 was therefore conservatively estimated for this measure. The 
assumed values of the reliabilities in this study would affect parameter estimates as 
well as standard errors. In order to adjust for measurement error, the error variance 
for each scale was set to one minus the reliability times the observed variance of the 
scale (see Cohen, Cohen, Teresi, Marchi & Velez, 1990; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). 
The paths from latent variables to their indicators were set to one (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1996)4'5. 
4.4 For the methodological advantages and limitations of using a one-dimensional measure of political 
ideology, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith (2002). 
4.5 An alternative approach to defining the paths from the latent variables to their indicators entails 
setting them to the square roots of the scale's reliability (e. g. Jöreskog & S6rbom, 1996). Both 
approaches were tested in this study, which yielded identical results. 
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The fit of each model was evaluated using the chi-square test, the Goodness-of-Fit 
Index (GFI), the Adjusted-Goodness-of-Fit index (AGFI), and the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The chi-square test is an inferential test of the 
null hypothesis that the population covariance matrix for the observed variables 
equals the population covariance matrix. A satisfactory fit of the model is thus 
obtained when the chi-square test is non-significant, indicating that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected (Bollen, 1989). 
However, a chi-square is only a good significance test when used with large samples, 
when the distributional assumptions are reasonably approximated, and when the 
model is perfectly specified (J6reskog & Sörbom, 1993, but see also Hayduk, 1996). 
Therefore, three additional overall model fit indices are reported. The GFI compares 
the ability of a model to reproduce the variance-covariance matrix to the ability of no 
model at all to do so (Thompson, 2000), whilst the AGFI measures how well the 
model reproduces the sample covariance matrix, accounting for degrees of freedom 
in a way that rewards parsimony (Bollen, 1989). The RMSEA focuses on an 
estimated population fit (Steiger & Lind, 1980, cited in Bollen, 1989). The GFI and 
AGFI indicate a good fit when they are greater than 0.90 and the RMSEA is less than 
0.08 (Thompson, 2000). 
Parsimony is considered to be important in assessing model fit (e. g. Hu & Bentler, 
1995). Alternative nested models4'6 were evaluated using chi-square difference tests. 
Alternative un-nested models were evaluated using the Expected Cross Validation 
Index (ECVI; Browne & Cudeck, 1989), which is a measure of the discrepancy 
between the model-implied covariance matrix in the analysed sample and the 
covariance matrix that would be expected in another sample of the same size 
(Joreskog & Sörbom, 1993). The smallest ECVI estimate indicates the model with 
the best fit. 
Path coefficients and squared multiple correlations (R) values were also used to 
evaluate the predictive power of the model since they provide different information 
from comparisons based on fit indices. Fit indices provide information on the 
4.6 A model (M 1) is nested within another model (M2) if M1 can be derived from M2 by removing one 
or more linkages. 
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predictive utility of a model, whilst R2 comparisons indicate the power of a model to 
reproduce observed covariance/correlation matrices (Bollen, 1989). 
Before the analyses, the distributional properties of the data were explored. Using 
PRELIS 2.5, the data were first screened for outliers and missing values. 38 missing 
values were identified, which were imputed, that is, substituted by real values for 
missing values, using PRELIS 2.5 mean substitution, following guidelines by du Toit 
and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskorg, 2001). 
Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of the 
data were then determined. To satisfy the assumption of normality, Kline (1998; see 
also West, Finch & Curran, 1995) suggests absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for 
skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. The skew of the items in this study ranged from - 
2.121 to 2.331, whilst the values of kurtosis ranged from -3.089 to 2.114, indicating 
that the responses were normally distributed. Since one can have multivariate non- 
normality even when all the individual variables are normally distributed, 
multivariate kurtosis (Mardia's statistic) was also assessed, which equalled PK = 
1.091. Whilst there is no standard cut-off for this index, Kline (1998) recommended 
that multivariate normality can be assumed if this value is less than 3. 
RESULTS 
Attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
Just over half the respondents (53%) strongly agreed or agreed that "the decision to 
participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one". Half of the 
respondents (55%) also strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: "I approve of 
British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone". 
An interesting picture emerged when attitudes towards Sierra Leone were assessed 
across the three time-points. At Ti, half of the respondents (50%) strongly agreed or 
agreed that participating in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good decision. 
56% of respondents agreed with this statement at T2, when British soldiers had been 
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taken hostage. 54% of respondents agreed with it at T3, when a British soldier had 
been killed in Sierra Leone. Half of the respondents (51%) also strongly agreed or 
agreed that they approved with British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra 
Leone at Ti. 58% of respondents agreed with this statement at T2, and 55% agreed 
with it at T3. 
Assessing the stability of public attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
The above analyses indicated some variability in responses over time. A one-way 
analysis of variance was conducted to assess whether attitudes towards the mission in 
Sierra Leone changed significantly across time-points, and whether attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone differed significantly between the two locations. The ANOVA for these 
specific attitudes by time-point was just insignificant (F(2,537) = 2.43, p= . 068). 
Similarly, a ANOVA for location was insignificant (F(1,538) = 0.43, p= . 721), 
indicating that attitudes did not differ significantly between Guildford and Aldershot. 
There was also no significant interaction effect between location and time. 
These ANOVA results thus indicated that attitudes towards Sierra Leone were not 
significantly reactive to political events. Consequently, the analyses reported in the 
following sections pertain to the sample as a whole, unless otherwise stated. 
Descriptive data 
Table 4.4 presents descriptive data for the measures, their reliabilities and the 
correlations between measures relating to attitudes towards the mission in Sierra 
Leone. Examination of the correlations indicates that attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
were significantly correlated with the three postures: internationalism, militarism and 
multi-lateralism. 
Attitudes towards Sierra Leone were also significantly correlated with perceived risk, 
outcome perceptions, nationalism and patriotism. Of the demographic variables, only 
gender, education and political ideology were significantly correlated with attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone. The three postures were inter-correlated and were generally 
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also highly correlated with nationalism, patriotism, gender, education and political 
ideology. 
Of the contextual variables, perceived risk was also strongly correlated with 
internationalism, militarism, nationalism and some demographic variables, whilst 
outcome perceptions were significantly related to internationalism, patriotism, 
nationalism, education and political ideology. 
The correlations thus present a complex web of relationships and inter-relationships. 
The following sections present analyses in which these relationships were tested 
simultaneously and mediation effects were assessed. 
Exploring the hierarchical structure in predicting specific foreign policy 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
The question about the inter-relationship of the constructs raised by the simple 
correlations was specifically addressed through a structural equation model (SEM) 
using LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sorbom, 2002). Because of the exploratory nature 
of the following analyses, the sample was randomly split into two sub-samples to 
allow for a more robust approach to SEM generation. Following Cudeck and Browne 
(1983), a model was first estimated on the first sub-sample (calibration sample, N= 
270), and the specification with the estimated parameter values was then cross- 
validated with the second sub-sample (validation sample, N= 270)4'7. 
Calibration sample 
LISREL analysis was used to test the conceptual model (Modell) outlined in Figure 
4.1 in the calibration sample (N = 270), with attitudes towards the Sierra Leone 
mission as the criterion variable. The extent to which the effects of demographic and 
national attachment variables had unmediated effects on peacekeeping attitudes was 
also examined by testing an alternative model (Modele, see Figure 4.2) that allowed 
4.1 An alternative method to robust SEM generation is the "two-step" approach in which a 
measurement model is tested before a structural model is estimated (cf. Anderson & Gerbin, 1988). As 
discussed previously, this approach is inappropriate when concepts have fewer than three indicators 
(for a more detailed discussion of the shortcomings of this approach see Hayduk, 1996). 
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each variable in turn to influence directly attitudes towards Sierra Leone. Finally, to 
test whether a distinction between core values and postures needed to be evoked for 
understanding attitudes, a second alternative model was also estimated in which core 
values and postures were situated at the same level of abstraction. 
The data fitted the conceptual model (Modell) well (x2 = 8.12, df = 10, p= . 27) and 
the other measures indicated a good fit (GFI = . 988, AGFI = . 985, RMSEA = . 03, 
ECVI = . 04). Internationalism and multi-lateralism 
had significant positive direct 
effects on attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whilst militarism had a direct negative 
effect on attitudes towards this mission (see Figure 4.5). 
Nationalism had a significant negative effect on internationalism and multi- 
lateralism, and a positive effect on militarism. Patriotism had a significant positive 
effect on internationalism and multi-lateralism, and a negative effect on militarism. 
Gender, political ideology4'8 and education were the only demographic variables to 
have direct significant effects on nationalism and patriotism (see Table 4.5 for the 
magnitude of effects of other demographic variables). Overall, this model explained 
37 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
The alternative conceptual model (Model2) tested in the calibration sample retained 
all the parameters of the initial model and added paths from demographics to foreign 
policy postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone, and paths from nationalism and 
patriotism to attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
None of the demographic variables in Modele had a direct significant effect on 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone. However, gender showed a significant negative path 
to internationalism and a significant positive path to militarism. Political ideology 
did not significantly affect the three postures, indicating that its effects are mediated 
by the core values of nationalism and patriotism. 
4.8 In political research, political ideology is variably used either as a socio-demographic variable or as 
a core value (cf. Herron & Jenkins-Smith, 2002). In the present analysis, political ideology was 
modelled both as a socio-demographic variable and as a core value. SEM analyses indicated that 
modelling it as socio-demographic variable provided a better fit to the data than modelling it as a core 
value. 
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Finally, education had significant positive paths to internationalism and multi- 
lateralism. Table 4.5 presents the standardised total effects, which include both the 
direct and indirect effects of one variable unto another. It shows that of the two core 
values, nationalism had a greater (negative) total effect on attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone than patriotism. 
The alternative conceptual model (Model2, see Figure 4.6) provided a good fit to the 
data (x2 = 1.00, df = 1, p= . 43, GFI = . 998, 
AGFI = . 995, RMSEA = . 02, ECVI = 
. 05). This model explained 40 percent of the total variance 
in attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone. However, this alternative model (Model2) did not fit the data significantly 
better than the hypothesised basic model (Modell, 0x2 = 7.12, df = 9, p= . 064). 
Consequently, the more parsimonious conceptual model (Modell) as outlined in 
Figure 4.5 was retained. 
Finally, a second alternative conceptual model (Model3) tested in the calibration 
sample placed core values, i. e. nationalism and patriotism, and the three postures, i. e. 
internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism, on the same level of abstraction. 
This model (see Figure 4.7) did not fit not fit the data very well (x2 = 37.13, df = 22, 
p= . 03, GFI = . 678, AGFI = . 685, RMSEA = . 10, ECVI = . 11), explaining only 31 
percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone. Overall, this model fit 
the data less well than the hypothesised conceptual model (Model,; ECVI = . 11 vs. 
ECVI = . 04, respectively), and the conceptual model (Model, 
) shown in Figure 4.5 
was therefore retained". 
Validation sample 
On the basis of these results, the fit of the conceptual model (Modell) in Figure 4.5 
with the estimated parameter values was then evaluated in the cross-validation 
sample (N = 270). Results suggested that this model provided a good fit to the data of 
the cross-validation sample (see Table 4.6). It should be noted that the parameter 
estimates and R2 statistics for this model are identical to those reported in Figure 4.5. 
a'9 Because it could be argued that Militarism and Multi-lateralism are dependent on whether or not 
Britain should be involved internationally (see Rathbun, 2003), a model was also tested in which 
internationalism preceded and therefore shaped militarism and multi-lateralism. This model did not fit 
the data well ()? = 30.57, df = 22, p= .O1, GFI =. 554, AGFI =. 555, RMSEA =. I 1, ECVI =. 12). 
81 
Chapter 4 An exploratory analysis of the hierarchical structure 
Table 4.6. Fit indices for the hypothesised structural model in the calibration 
and validation sample 
Model xZ df N P GFI AGFI RMSEA 
Conceptual model (Model l) - 8.12 10 270 . 27 . 988 . 985 . 03 Calibration sample 
Conceptual model (Modell)- 8.95 10 270 . 21 . 981 . 980 . 03 Validation sample 
Time-series analysis 
Although ANOVA results indicated that attitudes towards Sierra Leone did not differ 
significantly over time, the possibility that the structure differed at different time 
points was also investigated. The conceptual model (Modell) was first estimated with 
Time 1 (N = 180) data, and the stability of the solution was then tested by comparing 
it to that of T2 (N = 180) and T3 (N = 180). Finally, the temporal stability of the 
model was tested by means of a multiple group SEM in which each time-point was 
treated as a group. 
The conceptual model (Mode1T1) estimated in the previous section was first estimated 
with Ti data. The fit indices suggested a good overall fit (x2 = 9.31; df = 10, p= . 26; 
GFI = . 981; AGFI = . 981; RMSEA = . 039), thus confirming that the suggested 
structural relationship provide a good representation of the Ti data. 
This solution was then applied to T2 data and the same pattern was replicated. The 
same was true when it was applied to T3 data. Both models provided a good fit to the 
data (Modeuz = x2 = 9.79; df = 10, p =. 17; GFI = . 980; AGFI = . 980; RMSEA = 
. 043; and ModelT3 = x2 = 9.42; 
df = 10, p= . 10; GFI = . 981; AGFI = . 980; RMSEA = 
. 040, respectively). 
Following Bollen (1989), an assessment of the stability of the solution was then 
carried out by estimating and comparing a number of nested models with multiple 
group structural equation models and treating each wave as a group. These multi- 
group analyses consisted of five steps. In step 1, structural parameters were 
constrained to be equal between the groups. 
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This model was then gradually relaxed in the following steps, with each step's 
change in model fit being compared to the model in step 1. In step 2, factor loadings 
of the latent variables were allowed to vary over time. This step did not significantly 
change the goodness of fit (see Table 4.7). The model in step 1 was therefore 
retained, and it was concluded that these effects were equal over time. 
The correlations among the independent variables (step 3), the paths from core value 
to postures and from postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone (step 4), and the 
structural equation's residual variance (step 5) were then allowed to vary over time. 
As shown in Table 4.7, none of the steps produced a significant change in x2. The 
constrained model in step 1 was therefore retained, and it was concluded that the 
relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their antecedents, as well as 
the relationships between the determinants, were the same across the three time 
points. 
Table 4.7. Multi-group analysis of temporal stability of the influence of 
determinants on attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
Step xý Df Ax= df p 
1- Parameters equal 54.79 53 
2- Factor loadings of 52.45 47 2.34 6 Ns latent variables freed 
3- Correlations freed 50.08 42 4.71 11 Ns 
4- Structural paths 51.84 46 2.95 7 Ns freed 
5- Residual variances 53.95 50 0.84 3 Ns freed 
Assessing the effect of perceived risk and outcome perceptions on attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone 
The previous analyses have indicated the utility of the hierarchical model in 
explaining part of the variance in attitudes towards the mission in Sierra Leone 
(37%). The aim of the following analyses was to assert the additional exploratory 
power of two contextual variables, namely perceived risk of casualties and mission 
outcome perceptions, on attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
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Again using a split-sample technique, two models were evaluated, which differed in 
the placement of the two contextual variables in the model. Firstly, an extended 
model (ModelEl) was evaluated in the calibration sample (N = 270) in which 
perceived risk and outcome perceptions were situated between postures and attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone, thereby treating them as causes of specific attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone (see Figure 4.3). This model provided a good fit to the data (x2 = 13.20, 
df = 15, p =. 23, GFI =. 986, AGFI =. 984, RMSEA =. 03, ECVI =. 06). 
In this model, perceived risk was negatively affected by internationalism and 
militarism, whilst outcome perceptions were positively affected by internationalism 
and multi-lateralism. In turn, perceived risk negatively affected attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone, whereas outcome perceptions positively affected attitudes towards this 
mission (see Figure 4.8; see Table 4.8 for the total effects in this model). Overall, 
this model explained 42 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone. 
The alternative extended model (ModelE2), in which perceived risk and outcome 
perceptions were treated to be the consequences of specific mission attitudes rather 
than its causes (see Figure 4.4) was also tested. This model also provided a very 
good fit (x2 = 10.82, df = 12, p =. 25, GFI =. 982, AGFI =. 980, RMSEA =. 04, ECVI 
= . 08). Figure 4.9 shows that attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone negatively affected 
perceived risk, whilst outcome perceptions were positively affected by attitudes 
towards this mission. Overall, this model explained 40 percent of the total variance in 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
The ModelEl shown in Figure 4.8 fit the data marginally better than did the 
alternative extended model (ModeIE2) in Figure 4.9 (ECVI = . 06 versus ECVI = . 08, 
respectively). 
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Table 4.9. Fit indices for the extended structural models in the calibration and 
validation sample 
Model df N P GFI AGFI RAISEA ECVI 
Extended model (RtodelEl) 
- Calibration sample 
1320 15 270 . 23 . 986 . 984 . 03 0.6 
Extended model (AtodelEl) 
- Validation sample 
13.90 15 270 . 21 . 986 . 983 . 04 0.7 
Alternative extended 
model (ModelE2) - 10.82 12 270 . 25 . 982 . 980 . 04 0.8 Calibration sample 
Alternative extended 
model (Models)- 10.95 12 270 . 24 . 984 . 983 . 05 0.8 Validation sample 
Both of these models were tested in the validation sample (N = 270). Table 4.9 
shows that both of these models also showed a good fit to the data of the validation 
sample. However, the extended model (ModelE, ), in which the contextual variables 
were indicators of attitudes towards Sierra Leone, had better fit indices than did the 
alternative extended model (ModelE2), in which the contextual variables were the 
consequences of attitudes towards this mission. 
DISCUSSION 
Hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes 
A hierarchical model guided the examination of the determinants of attitudes towards 
the mission in Sierra Leone. Overall, the results from the three structural equation 
models were supportive of Hurwitz and Peffley's (1987) hierarchical model as a 
model of the determinants of attitudes towards the peace operation in Sierra Leone. 
A "strict" hierarchical structure provided a better, more parsimonious fit of the data 
than did a model that also included direct of ects from core values to specific 
attitudes. Furthermore, the hierarchical model also provided a better fit than a model 
in which both core values and postures were situated at the same level of abstraction. 
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A split-sample approach, in which the structure found in one half of the sample was 
validated in the second half, further strengthened these results. Overall, the 
hierarchical model explained 37% of the variance in attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
This finding is consistent with other applications of the model to foreign policy 
concerns (e. g. Bartels, 1994; Belmont & Mueller, 1998; Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; 
Juhasz, 2001). However, this is the first instance in which this model has been 
applied to a peacekeeping context and a British population. 
The direction and relative strength of the relationships confirmed the initial 
predictions. Internationalism and multi-lateralism were positively associated with 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whilst militarism had a negative effect on mission- 
specific attitudes. Respondents who believed that Britain should be involved in 
international affairs, and who believed that Britain should act multi-laterally to solve 
international problems, therefore held more positive attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
than their counterparts. Respondents who believed that military force should not be 
used to settle international problems were also more likely to hold positive attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone than did respondents who believed in the use of force as a 
foreign policy means. 
The effect of core values 
The three postures were shaped by the two core values - nationalism and patriotism. 
Both internationalism and multi-lateralism were positively influenced by patriotism, 
whilst internationalism was also negatively affected by nationalism. In line with 
Adorno et al (1950, p. 107), 
The genuine patriot, it would appear, can appreciate the values and ways of 
other nations, and can be permissive toward much that he cannot personally 
accept for himself. He is free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and 
imperialistic striving for power. 
Militarism, in turn, was directly positively influenced by nationalism and negatively 
affected by patriotism, a finding that parallels that of Hurwitz and Peffely (1987), 
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who found strong partial correlations between militarism and nationalism. Research 
on inter-group aggression (e. g. Struch & Schwartz, 1989) indicates that aggression 
may be related to in-group bias. Thus, there are individuals who are internationally 
oriented and who do not support hawkish policies whilst also being strongly attached 
to their country (see also Feshbach, 1987). 
These findings are also consistent with recent research that has attempted to re- 
conceptualise forms of national attachments, which suggests that national attachment 
may take one of two forms. The first is characterised by an outward looking concern 
with the role of the national group in the international context and a degree of 
concern about whether the nation has an adequate voice in the international arena. 
The second is characterised by an inward-oriented, protective interest in the 
maintenance of a unique culture identity (see Davis, 1999; Nigbur & Cinnirella, 
unpublished). 
The results from this study not only support previous research on the strong 
relationship between national attachment and foreign policy attitudes, but also extend 
the findings of such studies. Previous studies have typically only examined the direct 
link between national attachment and political attitudes (e. g. Kosterman & Feshbach, 
1989; Mueller-Peters, 1998). This study also investigated the indirect ways through 
which national attachment may exert its influence, and indicated the value of 
considering how the link between these values and foreign policy attitudes may be 
mediated by other variables. 
The effects of demographic factors 
It is also of interest that only three demographic variables, namely gender, education 
and political ideology, played a significant role in the structural models. Overall, 
education was negatively associated with nationalism but not significantly related to 
patriotism, a finding that is similar to that of Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001). 
Education showed significant positive total effects on internationalism and multi- 
lateralism, and negative total effects on militarism. This finding is in line with 
previous reports that increasing levels of education are associated with a greater 
belief in internationalism and less support for militaristic policies (e. g. Holsti, 1996). 
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Overall, education was positively associated (in terms of its total effects) with 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
It is interesting to note that social class did not significantly affect any of the 
constructs in the model, with the exception of nationalism. However, social class 
may affect an individuals' educational level (Tuch, Sigelman & MacDonald, 1999). 
Indeed, education and social class were correlated (r = . 53), and the impact of social 
class in the model could therefore have been indirect. 
Nationalism was significantly related to gender, with men being more nationalistic 
than women. This finding is contrary to previous research that has found no 
significant gender difference in nationalism (e. g. Blank et al., 2001). Gender was also 
positively associated with militarism and negatively related to internationalism (in 
terms of total effects), indicating that women were more likely to be involved 
internationally and opposed to the use of force than men. Gender was also positively 
related to attitudes towards Sierra Leone (in terms of total effects), which suggests 
that women held more positive attitudes towards this mission than men. 
These findings are in line with numerous previous studies that have shown that 
gender is an important predictor in foreign policy attitudes (e. g. Bendyna, Finucane, 
Kirby, O'Donnell, & Wilcox, 1996; Fite, Genest & Wilcox, 1990; Lester, 1994; but 
also see Finlay & Love, 1998). In particular, these studies have shown that women 
are less supportive of the use of military force than men, and several competing 
theories have been proposed to explain this gender gap (e. g. Clark & Clark, 1999; 
Howell & Day, 2000). However, gender did not directly affect such attitudes (see 
Figure 4.6) -a finding that is consistent with Wittkopf (1990), who found that gender 
differences largely disappear when gender is assessed in combination with other 
variables. 
Although political ideology was strongly related to attitudes towards Sierra Leone in 
the simple correlations, its impact in the hierarchical model was weak. Consistent 
with previous studies (e. g. Blank et al., 2001), political ideology was positively 
related to nationalism, but not patriotism, indicating that respondents who rated 
themselves to be conservative were more likely to show nationalistic tendencies than 
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liberals. Political ideology was also positively associated with militarism and 
negatively related to multi-lateralism, suggesting that the more conservative 
respondents were more likely to believe in militaristic, unilateral foreign policy 
solutions than their liberal counterparts (see Holsti, 1996). 
Similarly, political ideology was negatively associated with attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone (in terms of total effects), which indicates that liberal respondents held more 
positive attitudes towards this mission than did conservative participants. However, 
political ideology had no significant direct effect on these attitudes (see Figure 4.6). 
This finding suggests that ideology only seems to matter when other important 
correlates are not assessed (Bartels, 1994). 
Based on previous findings that having a personal association with the military, such 
as family or friends in the Armed Forces, has an impact on attitudes towards the use 
of force in international conflicts (e. g. Bendyna, Finucane, Kirby, O'Donnel & 
Wilcox, 1996), it is perhaps surprising that these variables had no effect on attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone in the present study (r = . -. 12, see Table 4.4). However, Table 
4.5 showed that having served in the Armed Forces had a significant total effect on 
militarism and multi-lateralism, whereas having a family member in the Armed 
Forces also had a significant (but weak) total effect on militarism. Thus, in line with 
previous research (e. g. Bendyna et al., 1996), respondents who had served in the 
Armed Forces were more likely to believe in multi-lateral, military interventions than 
respondents without such personal military associations. Similarly, respondents who 
had family members who had served or were serving in the Armed Forces were more 
likely to endorse militaristic foreign policy solutions than participants with no such 
family background. 
The importance of contextual influences 
Finally, there was also evidence to support the addition of measures of perceived risk 
and outcome perceptions in the hierarchical model. Although there were theoretical 
cases to be made for both possibilities, structural equation analyses suggested that a 
model in which perceived risk and outcome perceptions shaped attitudes towards 
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Sierra Leone provided a better fit to the data (in terms of ECVI values) than did a 
model in which attitudes towards Sierra Leone influenced these factors. 
Consistent with previous research (e. g. Everts, 2001b; Larson, 1996), respondents 
who perceived the mission in Sierra Leone to be successful and who believed that 
harm occurring to soldiers in Sierra Leone was unlikely held more positive attitudes 
towards this mission. 
However, the present study has added to previous research by exploring the bases of 
these perceptions. SEM results indicated that the contextual variables were 
differentially influenced by the three postures. Outcome perceptions were positively 
affected by internationalism and multi-lateralism, indicating that respondents who 
believed that Britain should be involved in world politics in a multi-lateral manner 
were more likely to perceive the operation in Sierra Leone to be successful. By 
contrast, perceived risk was negatively related to internationalism and militarism, 
suggesting that the more respondents believed that Britain should be involved in 
world affairs, and that interventions should be non-militaristic in nature, the less 
likely they were to perceive risks of harm to British soldiers in Sierra Leone. The 
relationship between such contextual factors and specific attitudes therefore warrants 
further investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the results supported the assumptions of a hierarchical organisation of 
foreign policy attitudes. Attitudes towards Sierra Leone were shaped by more general 
predispositions: postures (internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism) and core 
values (nationalism and patriotism). Core values, in turn, were influenced by 
demographic factors (gender, age and political ideology). SEM results indicated that 
this hierarchical model provided a better fit than models in which no distinction was 
made between postures and core values or in which core values were allowed to 
influence attitudes towards Sierra Leone directly. 
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However, a further criticism of the hierarchical model is that it postulates that the 
effects in the model are top-down. As argued by Nincic (1992), the assumption that 
specific foreign policy attitudes are influenced by higher-order attitudes is 
problematic in that it is conceivable that specific attitudes may influence more 
abstract attitudes. This issue will be explored in the next chapter, which reports 
longitudinal data on attitudes towards Sierra Leone. 
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AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW? 
A TEST OF THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF 
SUPPORT FOR SIERRA LEONE USING PANEL DATA 
The previous chapter indicated that a hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes, 
where general orientations (i. e. postures and core values) are assumed to determine 
more specific policy attitudes, provided a good fit of attitudes towards a peace 
operation in Sierra Leone. 
As already discussed in Chapter Two, the hierarchical model of constraint is not 
without its criticisms in that the causal direction has been assumed rather than tested. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to test the direction of causality within the 
hierarchical model of international attitudes. 
Whilst the analyses in the previous chapter relied on cross-sectional data, the 
analyses in this chapter are based on panel data consisting of three waves of 
interviews. Although the sample size was compromised using the panelling 
approach, these data allowed for the utility of the hierarchical structure to be tested 
and for the causal ordering of core values, postures and specific policy attitudes to be 
untangled. 
Chapter 5 An alternative view? 
Top-down or bottom-up processes within the hierarchical model? 
Central to the hierarchical model of Hurwitz and Peffley (and other hierarchical 
models such as Feldman, 1988) is the premise that general assumptions, such as core 
values and postures, influence specific policy preferences in a top-down (theory- 
driven) fashion, that is, from more abstract levels to specific ones. This premise is 
based on information-processing research (e. g. Fiske & Taylor, 1991), which 
suggests that individuals have a limited capacity for storing and retrieving 
information, and consequently need to simplify the environment by relying on 
cognitive shortcuts. 
Indeed, Tetlock and McGuire (1986) found that the use of top-down processes or 
cognitive shortcuts is particularly probable when the information to be processed is 
highly complex. This is because it is more economical to derive specific judgements 
from more general principles than to attend to every specific event, especially when 
the environment is complex, such as in foreign policy. Thus, top-down processes are 
"the norm for international belief systems, given the great complexity of the domain 
and the sheer volume of international information" (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993, p. 66). 
McCann (1997) investigated the causal flow of the influence between core values 
and specific attitudes. Analysing the effects of core values and issue preferences 
from 1990 on core values and issue preferences in 1992, he found that core values in 
1990 structured specific issue preferences in 1992, whilst specific issue positions in 
1990 had no effect on core values in 1992. Thus, according to McCann's findings, 
core values `caused' policy preferences and not vice versa. 
However, the argument that specific attitudes are always influenced by a higher- 
order (i. e. abstract) attitude has been criticised. For example, Nincic (1992) has 
argued that it is conceivable that the main determinant of an attitude is not 
necessarily from a higher but from the same or lower level of abstraction. If an 
individual has to evaluate the use of military force in a specific context, he/she might 
be influenced greatly by contemporary (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993) or historic events 
(Juhasz, 2001). Thus, beliefs about the use of military force in foreign policy at the 
postural level may be affected by specific international events. It is therefore possible 
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that the flow of causality within the model is bottom-up (data-driven), that is, from 
more specific levels to abstract ones. 
Indeed, Peffley and Hurwitz (1992) argued that values and postures might be a 
product of both theory-driven and data-driven processes. According to the authors, 
an individual's postures evolve over a long period of time and become quasi- 
theoretical assumptions that help bring order to a complex environment. However, 
"people are not prisoners to their extant expectations" (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992, p. 
436), and they argue that when new data is communicated by a trusted source that 
does not match up with one's theories, then values and postures may be revised. This 
view is in line with many models in social psychology in which attitudes and 
behaviour continually interact and reinforce one another (e. g. Kelman, 1979). 
Brewer and colleagues (2002) reported that preferences measured at one time-point 
could affect core values at another time-point. They assessed a number of core 
values, such as patriotism and social trust, and factors associated with system 
support, such as confidence in the Armed Forces and presidential support, at two 
time-points. Using structural equation modelling, they found that general orientations 
affected more specific forms of system support. However, they also reported an 
instance in which system support at one time-point shaped general predispositions at 
another time-point. More specifically, they found that confidence in the military in 
wave 1 had a significant effect on patriotism in wave 2, and concluded that citizens 
who rallied around the military also rallied around the flag, and not just the other 
way round. 
An individual's core values and postures may therefore respond to new political 
information, especially information that is conveyed by trusted others. Because 
research into the hierarchical model has predominantly relied on cross-sectional data, 
the possibility of revisions of core values and postures has rarely been examined. 
Furthermore, the studies that have investigated possible shifts in general attitudes 
using panel data have predominantly focused on either core values or postures. These 
studies are outlined in the following two sections. It should be noted, however, that 
to date no study has examined the extent to which both core values and postures may 
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be subject to change as a result of new information or changes in specific policy 
attitudes. 
Stability of core values 
One of the central assertions of the hierarchical model is that core values are 
relatively stable over time. Indeed, several authors make stability a defining 
characteristic of core values (e. g. Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987,1990; Zaller, 1991). A 
number of studies have explored not only how core values are linked to specific 
judgements but have also investigated the extent to which these core values are stable 
over time (e. g. Conover & Feldman, 1984; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; 
Jackson, 1983; Judd & Milburn, 1980; Pollock, 1994; Pollock, Lilie & Vittes, 1993; 
Sears, Huddy & Schaffer, 1986). 
However, there is evidence that core values may shift as a result of conflicting new 
information as shown in two studies of social attitudes. Pollock (1994) investigated 
public opinion on AIDS before and after "Magic" Johnson announced that he had 
contracted HIV. Pollock (1994) found that after "Magic" Johnson's announcement, 
heterosexual moral values defined a new basis of polarisation on AIDS-related 
policies, which supplanted the importance of moral evaluations of homosexuality 
that until then had been the primary determinants of public opinions on any AIDS- 
related issue. 
Similarly, Brewer (2003) explored the bases of an increase in support for gay rights 
policies amongst the American public in the 1990s. Investigating public attitudes 
towards gay policy between 1992 and 2000, a time span characterised by increased 
exposure to openly gay and lesbian peers and media figures, Brewer found not only 
that shifts in the levels of predispositions, such as less moral traditionalism, produced 
changes in gay policy opinions, but also that the underlying structure of opinion 
changed during the study period. For example, whilst the effect of egalitarianism 
remained almost constant between 1992,1996 and 2000, respondents in 2000 were 
less likely to base their opinion on moral traditionalism than they were in 1992 and 
1996. Thus, Brewer concluded that not only did Americans change in what they 
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thought about the issue (i. e. becoming more positive), but they also revised how they 
thought about it. 
However, foreign policy studies have rarely reported such dramatic shifts, which 
define or redefine how the public responds to an issue. This is despite the fact that 
foreign policy is also subjected to "critical moments" (Carmines & Stimson, 1989), 
such as wars or other international disputes (e. g. Holsti, 1996). Jackson (1983), for 
example, not only found that fundamental values such as a concern for greater 
equality influenced policy-specific judgements, but also that these fundamental 
values were stable over the four years of the study. 
There is some evidence for a change of core values in response to evolving political 
environments. McCann (1997) analysed American National Election Studies (ANES) 
panel data from 1990 and 1992, which measured two values - egalitarianism and 
moral traditionalism, as well as candidate choice in the 1992 presidential campaign. 
Using structural equation modelling, he found that individuals who supported 
Clinton became significantly more favourably disposed towards egalitarianism over 
time, whilst becoming less supportive of moral traditionalism. This dynamic was 
reversed for individuals who lined up behind Bush. A preference for Bush led to 
greater support for traditionalism between 1990 and 1992 and to less commitment to 
egalitarianism. 
Recent evidence also suggests that the stability of American values was affected by 
the September 11`h attacks. For example, Olivas-Lujan, Harzig & McCoy (2004) 
reported an amplification of cosmopolitan and power values in American students 
following the attacks. However, without the use of longitudinal data it is unclear 
whether this change in core values is sustained or whether values will return to their 
pre-event level. 
Stability of postures 
Whilst McCann (1997) and others investigated the stability of core values and found 
some evidence for a core value shift over time, other studies have explored the 
stability of postures, such as internationalism or militarism (e. g. Holsti, 1996). 
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For example, using two-wave panel data from 1986 and 1987, Peffley and Hurwitz 
(1993) investigated the extent to which postures constrained more specific policy 
attitudes or whether specific policy attitudes influenced postures. At both time- 
points, 301 respondents were asked identical questions that assessed their position 
regarding two postures - militarism and containment, and three policy attitudes - 
Central American policy, defence spending policy and nuclear arms policy. 
According to Converse (1964), the more stable an attitude is, the more central it is to 
an individual's belief structure (see also Rokeach, 1973). LISREL analyses of the 
over-time consistency of the postural and policy constructs indicated that postures 
were consistently more stable than specific policy attitudes, and Peffley and Hurwitz 
(1993) thus argued that this finding provided initial evidence that postures are more 
central to an individual's belief system than are specific policy attitudes. 
To examine the sources of stability in postures and policy attitudes across the two 
time-points, Peffley and Hurwitz tested six structural equation models, which were 
generated by pairing each of the two postures with each of the three policy attitudes. 
Overall, they found that postures were important predictors of two of the three policy 
attitudes, namely defence spending and Central American policy, whilst these policy 
attitudes were insignificant predictors of the two postures (see Figure S. 1). 
For example, the effect of militarism and, to a lesser extent, containment at Time 1 
on attitudes towards defence spending at Time 2 was significant (ß = . 495 and . 243, 
respectively), whilst defence-spending attitudes at Time 1 had an insignificant effect 
on militarism and containment at Time 2 (ß = -. 125 and . 060, respectively). An 
exception to this pattern was found regarding nuclear arms policies, where neither 
prior postures nor prior policy attitudes were an important source of stability or 
predictor of the other. 
According to Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), these findings are more consistent with a 
top-down model of constraint in which prior postures influence specific policy 
attitudes than with a bottom-up model in which prior specific policy attitudes affect 
postures. 
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Figure 5.1. Structural model of determinants of defence spending attitudes at 
two time-points (based on Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993) 
Aims of the study and hypotheses 
In this study, the stability and sources of consistency of core values, postures and 
specific policy attitudes were examined with reference to Britain's mission in Sierra 
Leone. Unlike Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), who studied construct stability and 
direction of causality during a period of relative international stability, this study was 
conducted when the international environment was in a relative state of flux. More 
specifically, respondents were interviewed before and after dramatic events in Sierra 
Leone. According to Peffley and Hurwitz (1993, p. 67), if the change in the 
international environment is strong enough to lead to revisions in either general 
assumptions or specific policy preferences, then such a quasi-experimental design 
might be used to determine whether attitude change at one level of abstraction 
promotes attitudinal change at another level. 
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According to the hierarchical top-down model, prior core values should account for a 
good portion of the stability in postures, which, in turn, should account for a good 
portion of the stability in policy attitudes. By contrast, the bottom-up model predicts 
the opposite - that prior policy attitudes should explain any stability observed in 
postures, which, in turn, might explain any stability observed in core values. It 
should be noted that an intermediate position is also possible in which both core 
values and specific policy attitudes account for any stability observed in postures. 
Based on Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), a conceptual model of the over-time 
relationships between attitudes at different levels of abstraction is depicted in Figure 
5.2. The paths labelled "a", "b" and "c" in the model are coefficients that measure the 
stability in the same attitude over time. The paths marked "e" in the model indicate 
the paths predicted by a top-down model that assumes that postures are likely to be a 
source of stability in support for Sierra Leone. By contrast, the paths labelled "d" in 
the model represent the bottom-up paths that assume that prior attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone are likely to be a source of consistency in attitudes at the postural level. 
Figure 5.2. Conceptual model of top-down and bottom-up influences of core 
values, postures and support for Sierra Leone 
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In an extension of Peffley and Hurwitz's model, the causal flow between core values 
and the three postures is also included in the model. The paths labelled "g" in the 
model indicate the paths predicted by the top-down model that assume that core 
values are a likely source of stability at the postural level. On the other hand, the 
paths labelled "f' represent the bottom-up paths that assumes that attitudes at the 
postural level might be a stability factor for core values. 
According to the hierarchical top-down model, paths "e", "g", "a", "b" and "c" 
should be significant, whilst the bottom-up model suggests that paths "d", 'T as well 
as "a", "b" and "c" should be significant. 
METHOD 
Sample composition 
A three-wave panel survey was conducted in Guildford in 2000, with each wave of 
interviews corresponding to events in Sierra Leone as outlined in Chapter 4. On 5/6 
July 2000,90 respondents were approached for an interview in Guildford. Of these 
respondents, 86 (95%) volunteered to participate in another interview on 30/31 
August. 80 (93%) of these respondents also participated in the final wave of 
interviews, conducted on 14/15 September 2000. The analyses in this chapter were 
based on the 80 (89%) respondents for which three-wave data was available. 
To determine whether attrition across time-points was selective, the responses of 
respondents who participated in all three interviews were compared to those who 
participated only in the first two interviews and with those who completed only the 
first interview. Comparisons were made on demographic characteristics as well as 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone. The three groups of respondents did not differ 
significantly from one another on any of these measures, with one exception. At T2, 
respondents who were subsequently not re-interviewed were less likely to support the 
mission in Sierra Leone, F(1,84) = 33.56, p <. 05. 
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The interview took about 10 minutes to complete and the respondents could refuse to 
answer any questions to which they did not want to respond. It was also explained 
that there were no "correct" answers to the questions and that their responses would 
be treated confidentially. After the first interview respondents provided their names 
and address so that they could be approached for further interviews. It was made 
clear that providing this information did not affect their anonymity, which would be 
preserved at all times. Participants were also asked whether they would like to 
receive a summary of the findings from this study. 
This type of sample is self-selected and thus may not be representative of the larger 
population of citizens in Guildford across a variety of demographic characteristics, 
such as age or social class. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, comparing the sample 
composition to those of a defined population across a wide range of key variables 
can strengthen a convenience sample. This was done by weighting the Guildford 
interview sample to 2001 Census data for Guildford (see Appendix B for a detailed 
table). 
The sample over-represented men, those aged 30-44 and 45-59, those who had A- 
levels and other qualifications, those who worked in professional (Class 2), personal 
service (Class 6) and elementary occupations (Class 9). By contrast, the sample 
under-represented those who had no educational qualifications, those aged over 60, 
and those who worked in managerial occupations (Class 1). 
The sample was thus weighted on these demographic variables to achieve a more 
accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter are 
based on weighted sample data. 
Measures 
In each wave of the survey, respondents were asked identical questions. The 
interview schedule was identical to that discussed in Chapter 4, and included 
questions about national attachment, internationalism, militarism, multi-lateralism 
and attitudes towards Sierra Leone. In addition, several demographic variables were 
assessed at time-point 1 (see Appendix A for details of the interview materials). 
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Details of the means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas for the constructs at 
each time-point is given in Table 5.1 in the Results section. 
"National attachment" 
Based on Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) and Lilli and Diehl (1999), six items were 
used to tap attachment to Britain (five-point Likert scale: 1= "Strongly disagree" -5 
= Strongly agree"): "I am proud to be British", "Being British is an important part of 
my identity", "Being British is important to me because it makes me feel different 
from other people", "I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country 
in the world", and "In a sense I am emotionally attached to Britain and emotionally 
affected by its actions". Principal component analyses indicated two factors, which 
were related to the theoretical distinction that has been made between nationalism 
and patriotism. A composite variable of each of these constructs was therefore 
created for each time-point, with higher scores on these scales indicating higher 
nationalistic and patriotic beliefs. 
"Internationalism " 
Based on Holsti (1996) the degree to which an individual favours involvement in 
international affairs was assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1= "Strongly 
disagree" -5= Strongly agree"): "International co-operation should be encouraged 
to solve common problems, such as world hunger or world peace" and "Britain 
shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate on taking care of problems at 
home" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of "internationalism" was created 
from these two variables for each time point, with higher scores indicating stronger 
support for international involvement. 
"Militarism " 
In line with Holsti (1996) and Chittick and colleagues (1995), a militaristic or 
assertive position towards foreign affairs was examined by two items (five-point 
Likert scale: 1= "Strongly disagree" -5= Strongly agree"): "In dealing with other 
nations, our government should be strong and tough" and "The best way to ensure 
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peace is to negotiate with other nations" (reversed scoring). A composite variable of 
"militarism" with high internal consistency was created from these two items for 
each time point, with higher scores indicating a greater belief in assertive foreign 
policy actions. 
"Multi-lateralism " 
Following Chittick and colleagues (1995,2001), attitudes towards multi-lateral 
international ventures were assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1= 
"Strongly disagree" -5= Strongly agree"): "To make a change in the world, Britain 
needs to work together with international organisations, such as the UN or NATO" 
and "Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together with other 
nations" (reversed scoring). For each time point, the internal consistency of these two 
items was high, and a "multi-lateralism" scale was created from them. Higher scores 
on these items indicate a greater willingness to co-operate internationally. 
"Support for Sierra Leone" 
Support for the mission in Sierra Leone was assessed by two items (five-point Likert 
scale: 1= "Strongly disagree" -5= Strongly agree"): "The decision to participate in 
the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one" and "I approve of British troops 
being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone". The internal consistency of the support 
for Sierra Leone scale was high for each time-point. 
"Demographics " 
The interview questionnaire also contained several demographic variables that were 
assessed at Ti. These included gender, age, and highest education level achieved 
(Degree, including PhD; A-level or equivalent; O-level or equivalent; No 
qualifications; Other). Using the Standard Occupational Classification 2000 
(SOC2000; Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 2000), occupations were 
classified into nine major categories as outlined in Chapter 4. Also included were 
questions regarding the presence of children (Yes/No), and the newspaper most 
frequently read (The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times, 
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The Financial Times, The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Daily Express, The Mirror, 
Daily Star and Other). Three questions about a military background were also 
included, with responses being made in a Yes-No format: "Have you ever served in 
the Armed Forces? ", "During the last 30 years has someone from your family served 
in the Armed Forces? ", and "Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? ". 
Finally, participants were asked their political party affiliation (Labour, Liberal, 
Conservative, and Other) and their political ideology concerning foreign policy 
issues (1= very liberal to 5= very conservative). 
Analysis 
The models tested in this model were estimated with structural equation modelling 
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix in LISREL 
8.52 (Joreskog & Sörbom, 2002). The reliabilities of the respective scales were used 
in this study as indicators for the constructs instead of using all of a scale's items. As 
already discussed in the previous chapter, this was done because estimating a model 
with latent variables that have fewer than three indicators can lead to problems of 
underestimation (cf. Hayduk, 1996). Furthermore, in order to adjust for measurement 
error, the paths from the latent variables to their indicators were set to one, whilst the 
error variance for each scale was set to one minus the reliability times the observed 
variance of the scale (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). 
The data were screened for outliers and missing values. 10 missing values were 
identified, which were substituted by the mean following the guidelines of du Toit 
and du Toit (2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate properties of 
the data were then explored, which indicated that the distribution of the variables in 
this study was multivariate normal with univariate skewness values ranging from - 
1.113 to 1.232 and kurtosis values ranging from -1.138 to 1.321. Mardia's statistics 
of multivariate normality was PK = 1.04, which also indicated that the assumption of 
multivariate normality was tenable 5.1. 
s'' Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst 
there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can 
be assumed if this value is less than 3. 
107 
Chapter 5 An alternative view? 
RESULTS 
The results are divided into four sections. Firstly, attitudes towards the mission in 
Sierra Leone were explored in general descriptive terms (percentages), followed by 
analyses that examined the stability of the constructs in the model over time. 
Structural equation models of attitudes towards Sierra Leone were then estimated for 
each time-point, and since each time-point was treated as a group, the stability of this 
solution was assessed using multi-group modelling. Finally, to examine the direction 
of causality within the hierarchical model, a three-wave panel analysis was 
conducted to assess the inter-relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
and their determinants. 
Attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
Just over half the respondents (53%) strongly agreed or agreed that "the decision to 
participate in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good one. A similar percentage 
of respondents (55%) also strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: "I approve 
of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone". 
Interesting differences emerged when attitudes towards Sierra Leone were assessed 
across the three time-points. At Ti, 49% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed 
that participating in the UN mission in Sierra Leone was a good decision. 57% 
agreed with this statement at T2, when British soldiers had been taken hostage, 
whilst 54% agreed with this statement at T3, when a British soldier had been killed 
in Sierra Leone. Similarly, 50% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they 
approved with British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone at Ti. 59% 
agreed with this statement at T2, whilst 55% agreed with it at T3. 
Mean stability and change 
The previous analyses indicated some variability in attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
over time. The analyses in this section were therefore concerned with assessing the 
stability of the constructs across the three time-points. 
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A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were any 
significant time differences in attitudes towards Sierra Leone, postures or core 
values. The results indicated a significant time effect only for attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone (Wilks' A= . 64, F(2,538) = 12.68, p= . 01). The first three columns in Table 
5.1 indicate the means of the constructs for each time-point, whilst the last three 
columns consist of the results of an analysis of change in means using repeated 
measures t-tests. A value of >1.96 is statistically significant (p < . 05). The t-tests 
indicated a significant increase of support for Sierra Leone between Ti and T2, and a 
significant decrease in support between 72 and T3. The change between Ti and T3 
was also significant. By contrast, no such significant time differences were found for 
the three postures or core values. 
The test-retest correlations (three columns in the centre of Table 5.1) show that the 
constructs have good test-retest reliabilities, ranging from . 62 to . 77, which indicates 
that the measured attitudes were relatively insensitive to change. However, the test- 
retest correlations for attitudes towards Sierra Leone were low (ranging from . 41 to 
. 44). Thus, the test-retest correlations 
for the three postures, nationalism and 
patriotism were higher than those for attitudes towards Sierra Leone, which suggests 
that postures and core values were more stable over time than were attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone. 
Table 5.1. Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, stabilities and mean 
changes (N = 80)5.2 
Tl T2 T3 ra-(2 ra-u r11-u tu-a tt243 ttl-u 
Sierra Leone 3.64 3.91 3.80 0.42 0.41 0.44 -4.19 -2.01 -3.00 
SD 1.19 1.00 1.01 
a 0.90 0.89 0.90 
Postures 
Internationalism 3.77 3.82 3.79 0.71 0.73 0.73 1.34 1.29 0.85 
SD 0.83 0.86 0.89 
5.2 One traditional approach for dealing with multiple comparisons is the Bonferroni correction. 
Instead of using p<0.05 as the criterion to reject the null hypothesis, the significance value is divided 
by the number of outcomes assessed. The principal problem with this type of correction is an 
increased risk of Type II error, i. e. reporting no significant differences when reliable effects in fact 
exist. A better solution in exploratory analyses, such as the ones reported in this study, is to recognise 
that multiple measures will increase the risk of Type I error (i. e. reporting significant differences when 
there are none) and to treat any unpredicted findings from the study as preliminary until confirmed in 
further studies. 
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Tl T2 T3 rtl ,2 rj2-c3 rll-, 3 tt1-c2 tt2-u to-t3 
a 0.92 0.90 0.90 
Militarism 2.85 2.88 2.87 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.91 0.92 0.91 
SD 0.93 0.99 0.95 
a 0.84 0.88 0.86 
Multi-lateralism 3.71 3.73 3.69 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.96 1.42 1.11 
SD 0.88 0.88 0.86 
a 0.91 0.89 0.90 
Core values 
Nationalism 2.91 2.92 2.90 0.74 0.71 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.80 
SD 0.91 0.90 0.90 
a 0.85 0.87 0.87 
Patriotism 3.89 3.90 3.90 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.83 0.85 0.90 
SD 0.74 0.81 0.79 
a 0.91 0.90 0.91 
Note: Significant values at p<0.05 are in bold 
Structural equation modelling - Temporal models 
An empirical hierarchical model linking the proposed determinants and attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone was developed in three steps using LISREL 8.52 (covariance 
matrix) with maximum likelihood estimation. First, significant antecedents were 
identified by means of the Ti survey. Applying it to the T2 and T3 data, the 
reliability of this solution was then tested. Finally, the temporal stability of the final 
model was tested by means of a multiple group SEM in which each time-point was 
treated as a group. 
Structural model at Ti 
The hierarchical structural model relating attitudes towards Sierra Leone to foreign 
policy postures, nationalism, patriotism and demographic variables at Ti is shown in 
Figure 5.3. The fit indices suggest a good overall fit (x2 = 8.01; df = 10, p =. 24; GFI 
= . 983; AGFI = . 980; RMSEA = . 04 1), thus confirming that the suggested structural 
relationships provided a good representation of the data 5.3 . 
5.3 As in the previous chapter, two alternative models were also estimated. The first alternative model 
included the same parameters as the hierarchical model, but also included direct effects from core 
values to attitudes towards Sierra Leone as well as direct effects from the demographic variables to the 
three postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone. This model fit the data well (x2 = 1.32; df = 1, p= 
. 11; GFI = . 992; AGFI = . 990; RMSEA = . 02). However, as in the previous chapter, this model 
did 
not fit significantly better than the hierarchical model (ßx2 = 7.31, df = 9, p= . 060), and the more 
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Figure 5.3. Structural hierarchical model at Ti 
Gender 
33 
-. 19 
Attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone 
(R2 -. 40) 
Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. RI values 
are indicated in parenthesis. 
Structural models at T2 and T3 
(R2 -. 28) 
The hierarchical model shown in Figure 5.3 was then applied to T2 data and the 
same pattern was replicated (see Figure 5.4). The same was true when it was applied 
to T3 data (see Figure 5.5). Both models provided a good fit of the data (T2: x2 = 
8.67; df = 10, p= . 23; GFI = . 979; AGFI = . 
978; RMSEA = . 045; and T3: x2 = 7.95; 
df = 10, p =. 26; GFI =. 982; AGFI =. 979; RMSEA =. 043, respectively). 
parsimonious hierarchical model was therefore retained. Similarly, a second alternative model in 
which core values and postures were situated at the same level of abstraction was also estimated. 
However, this model provided a poor fit of the data (x2 = 29.8; df = 22, p= . 004; GFI = . 612; 
AGFI = 
. 608; RMSEA = . 16). Overall, these 
findings confirm those of the previous chapter that attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone are determined by foreign policy postures, which in turn are influenced by core 
values. 
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Figure 5.4. Structural hierarchical model at T2 
Gender 
. 30 
-. 18 
. 29ý 
Political 
ideology 
K0 
-. 32 
. 31 
Education 
Internationalism 
(R2-. 37) 
ý . 42 
Nationalism . 31 
(R2 . 40) 
'34 
Militarism -. 19 
-. 31 
(R2 - . 32) Patriotism 
is . 
(R2 -. 38) 
\ 
. 30 
Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths are in bold. R2 values 
are indicated in parenthesis. 
Figure 5.5. Structural hierarchical model at T3 
Gender 
. 29 
". 18 
. 29ý 
Political ideology 
. 1ý 
-"32 
29 EEducation 
(R2-. 27) 
32 
Intemationalism 
(R= -. 39) 
-. 30 
. 45 
Nationalism 
(R2-. 39) . 
31 
-. 29 
Patriotism \ 
(R2 J8) 
. 2'. 
Note: Paths are standardised coefficients. Significant paths arc in bold. R2 
values are indicated in parenthesis. 
Militarism 
(R3 -. 33) 
(R= -. 28) 
33 
Attitudes 
towards Sierra 
Leone 
(R2-38) 
Attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone 
(R2 - . 40) 
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Following Bollen (1989), the stability of the solution was then assessed by estimating 
and comparing a number of nested models with multiple group structural equation 
models and treating each wave as a group. These multi-group analyses consisted of 
five steps. In step 1, structural parameters were constrained to be equal at all time- 
points. This model was then gradually relaxed in the following steps, with each 
step's change in model fit being compared to the model in step 1. In step 2, factor 
loadings of the latent variables were allowed to vary over time. This step did not 
significantly change the goodness of fit (see Table 5.2). The model in step 1 was 
therefore retained, and it was concluded that these effects were equal over time. 
Table 5.2. Multi-group analysis of temporal stability of the influence of 
determinants on mission support (N = 80 *3) 
Step x2 Df A2 df p 
1- Parameters equal 57.41 53 
2- Factor loadings of 53.10 47 4.31 6 Ns latent variables freed 
3- Correlations freed 51.62 42 5.79 11 Ns 
4- Structural paths 54.08 46 3.33 7 Ns freed 
5- Residual variances 57.21 50 0.20 3 Ns freed 
The correlations among the independent variables (step 3), the paths from core 
values to postures, and from postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone (step 4), and 
the structural equation's residual variance (step 5) were then allowed to vary over 
time. As shown in Table 5.2, none of the steps produced a significant change in x2. 
The constrained model in step 1 was therefore retained, and it was concluded that the 
relationships between attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their antecedents, as well as 
the relationships between the determinants, were characterised by temporal stability. 
Panel analysis 
Whilst the previous analysis has shown that the relationships were temporally stable 
at a cross-sectional level, the analyses in this section not only control for the 
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temporal stability of the constructs but also for possible cross-lagged effects between 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone and their antecedents. To do this, the three data sets 
were combined in a three-wave panel analysis of the relationship between attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone and their cross-sectional determinants. According to Finkel 
(1995), cross-lagged effects models typically provide strong indication of the causal 
direction among variables. 
It is customary in panel analysis to allow unique error variances of the same 
constructs measured at different times to correlate (e. g. Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). 
This is because of the potential effects of memory or other re-test effects (Jöreskog, 
2002). However, errors of constructs measured at the same time point are still 
assumed to be uncorrelated, as are the equation errors (e. g. Maruyama, 1998). 
The basic model tested here included the cross-sectional paths from nationalism and 
patriotism to postures, and from postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone as well as 
the first-order stabilities, i. e. the effects of a variable measured at T,, on itself at T+1. 
This model did not fit the data (x2 = 138.15, df = 75, p= . 012, GFI = . 671, AGFI = 
. 670, RMSEA =. 33). 
It was then checked whether the cross-sectional as well as the longitudinal paths 
from national attachment and postures to attitudes towards Sierra Leone or their 
stabilities differed between T2 and T3. Restricting these paths (e. g. paths "a", "b" 
and "c" in the conceptual model, Figure 5.1) to be equal led to an insignificant 
increase in x2 (Ax2 = 3.53, df =12, p =. 37), which favours the restricted model. 
The possibility that any of the equation errors were serially correlated within the 
model was then assessed. Allowing any of the equation errors in the model to 
correlate did not significantly change x2 (Ax2 = 1.13, df = 15, p= . 25), and the 
uncorrelated error term restriction was therefore retained. 
The possibility that equation errors within the same time-point were correlated was 
assessed. Allowing equation errors to correlate for each time-point did not lead to a 
significant change in x2 (Ax2 = 0.92, df = 11, p= . 28), and the uncorrelated error term 
restriction was retained. 
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Possible cross-lagged effects between core values and postures were then assessed. 
Several cross-lagged effects were identified (see Table 5.3). Nationalism at Ti 
significantly influenced internationalism and militarism at T2, whilst nationalism at 
T2 significantly influenced internationalism and militarism at T3 (paths "g" in the 
conceptual model). Nationalism did not significantly affect multi-lateralism at 
subsequent time-points. Similarly, none of the paths in the reverse direction were 
significant (paths "f" in the conceptual model). Addition of these paths to the model 
led to an overall significant decrease in x2 (A 2= 25.95, df = 4), whilst restricting 
these cross-lagged paths to be equal led to an insignificant increase in x2 (0x2 = 0.79, 
df = 4). Overall, the model showed an acceptable fit of the data after these paths were 
included (x2 = 110.52, df = 59, p =. 033, GFI =. 874, AGFI =. 873, RMSEA =. 081). 
By contrast, patriotism at Ti significantly influenced internationalism, militarism and 
multi-lateralism T2, whilst patriotism at T2 significantly influenced internationalism, 
militarism and multi-lateralism at T3 (paths "g" in the conceptual model). None of 
the paths in the reverse direction were significant (paths 'f' in the conceptual 
model). Addition of these paths to the model led to an overall significant decrease in 
x2 (Ax2 = 29.19, df = 6), whilst restricting these cross-lagged paths to be equal led to 
an insignificant increase in x2 (0x2 = 0.79, df = 6). Adding these paths to the model 
produced a good fit to the data, x2 = 82.22, df = 59, p= . 041, GFI = . 911, AGFI = 
. 911, RMSEA =. 063. 
Table 5.3. Differences in x2 tests associated with estimatin 
between core values and postures 
g cross-lagged effects 
Step x df Ax Adf P 
Basic model 139.63 61 
Cross-lagged effects: 
Nationalism - Postures 
Nationalism T1- 
Internationalism T2 134.07 60 5.56 1 0.03 
Nationalism T2 - 
Internationalism T3 128.02 59 6.05 1 0.03 
Nationalism T1- 
Militarism T2 120.91 58 7.11 1 0.02 
Nationalism T2 - 
Militarism T3 113.68 57 7.23 1 0.02 
Nationalism T1- 
Multi-lateralism T2 111.76 56 1.92 1 Ns 
Nationalism T2 - 
Multi-lateralism T3 109.73 55 2.03 1 Ns 
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Step x df e Adf p 
Significant cross-lagged effects 110 52 59 0 79 4 Ns 
of nationalism equated . . 
Cross-lagged effects : Patriotism 
- Postures 
Patriotism T1- 49 105 58 5.03 1 0.03 Internationalism T2 . 
Patriotism T2 - 48 99 57 6.01 1 0.03 Internationalism T3 . 
Patriotism T1- 95 17 56 4.31 1 0.04 Militarism T2 . 
Patriotism T2 - 90 95 55 4.22 1 0.04 Militarism T3 . 
Patriotism T1- 85 97 54 4.98 1 0.03 Multi-lateralism T2 . 
Patriotism T2 - 81 33 53 4.64 1 0.03 Multi-lateralism T3 . 
Significant cross-lagged paths 82 22 59 0.89 6 Ns 
restricted to be equal . 
Cross-lagged effects: Postures - 
Nationalism 
Internationalism T1- 82 01 58 0.21 1 Ns Nationalism T2 . 
Internationalism T2 - 81 48 57 0.53 1 Ns Nationalism T3 . 
Militarism T1- 
81 35 56 0.13 1 Ns Nationalism T2 . 
Militarism T2 - 81 15 55 0.20 1 Ns Nationalism T3 . 
Multi-lateralism T1- 80 83 54 0.32 1 Ns Nationalism T2 . 
Multi-lateralism T2 - 80 56 53 0.27 1 Ns Nationalism 3 . 
Cross-lagged effects: Postures - 
Patriotism 
Internationalism T1- 78 79 52 0.78 1 Ns Patriotism T2 . 
Internationalism T2 - 79 15 51 0.63 1 Ns Patriotism T3 . 
Militarism T1- 78 79 50 0 36 1 Ns Patriotism T2 . . 
Militarism T2 - 78 58 49 0.21 1 Ns Patriotism T3 . 
Multi-lateralism T1- 
78 14 48 0 44 1 Ns Patriotism T2 . . 
Multi-lateralism T2 - 77 75 47 0 39 1 Ns Patriotism T3 . . 
Exploring potential cross-lagged effects between the three postures and attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone showed that internationalism and multi-lateralism but not 
militarism at Ti significantly influenced attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T2, whilst 
116 
Chapter 5 An alternative view? 
internationalism and multi-lateralism but not militarism at T2 significantly affected 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T3 (paths "e" in the conceptual model, see Table 
5.4). Including these paths in the model led to a significant drop in x2 (0x2 = 22.22, df 
= 4), whilst restricting these cross-lagged paths to be equal led to an insignificant 
increase in x2 (Ox2 = 0.43, df = 4). After adding these paths the model produced a 
good fit to the data, x2 = 55.84, df = 45, p= . 048, GFI = . 971, AGFI = . 971, RMSEA 
= . 032. 
Table 5.4. Differences in x2 tests associated with estimatin 
between postures and Sierra Leone 
g cross-lagged effects 
Step x df Ax Adf P 
Model (carried over) 77.75 47 
Cross-lagged effects: Postures - 
Sierra Leone 
Internationalism T1- 
Sierra Leone T2 71.99 46 5.76 1 0.03 
Internationalism T2 - 
Sierra Leone T3 66.48 45 5.51 1 0.03 
Militarism Ti - 
Sierra Leone T2 65.59 44 0.89 1 Ns 
Militarism T2 - 
Sierra Leone T3 65.36 43 0.23 1 Ns 
Multi-lateralism TI - 
Sierra Leone T2 60.44 42 4.92 1 0.03 
Multi-lateralism T2 - 
Sierra Leone T3 55.41 41 5.03 1 0.03 
Significant cross-lagged effects 
of postures equated 
55.84 45 0.43 4 Ns 
Cross-lagged effects: Sierra 
Leone - Postures 
Sierra Leone T1- 
Internationalism T2 49.81 44 6.03 1 0.05 
Sierra Leone T2 - 
Internationalism T3 43.77 43 6.04 1 0.05 
Sierra Leone Ti - 
Militarism T2 42.46 42 1.31 1 Ns 
Sierra Leone T2 - 
Militarism T3 41.34 41 1.12 1 Ns 
Sierra Leone T1- 
Multi-lateralism T2 40.36 40 0.98 1 Ns 
Sierra Leone T2 - Multi-lateralism T3 39.55 39 0.81 1 Ns 
Significant cross-lagged paths 
restricted to be equal 40.15 41 0.6 2 Ns 
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Finally, possible significant cross-lagged effects between attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone and their determinants were then explored (see Table 5.4). Two significant 
cross-lagged effects originating in attitudes towards Sierra Leone were identified. 
When everything else was accounted for, attitudes towards Sierra Leone at Ti 
significantly influenced internationalism at T2, and attitudes towards Sierra Leone at 
T2 significantly influenced internationalism at T3 (paths "d" in the conceptual 
model). Adding these two paths to the model led to a significant overall drop in x2 
(Ax2 = 12.07, df = 2), whilst restricting these two cross-lagged paths to be equal led 
to an insignificant increase in x2 (Ox2 = 0.6, df = 2). These final changes produced a 
model that fit the data well, x2 = 40.15, df = 41, p= . 19, GFI = . 993, AGFI = . 993, 
RMSEA = . 030. Whilst these two cross-lagged effects were significant, a model in 
which these paths were not included also fit the data well: x2 = 52.27, df = 41, p= 
. 048, GFI =. 987, AGFI =. 986, RMSEA =. 043. 
The final model is shown in Figure 5.6. For ease of interpretation the first-order 
stabilities and demographic data were omitted from the figure. However, 
demographic variables were included in the estimation to remove some of the most 
likely sources of spurious associations between the constructs in the model. 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, two models of attitudes towards international policies were investigated 
that yielded different expectations regarding the source of stability of attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone. According to the top-down model, attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone should be influenced by more general principles, such as postures and core 
values. As a result of their greater centrality within an individual's belief system, 
postures and core values should be more stable than specific policy attitudes 
(Converse, 1964; Sears, 1983). More importantly, they should also be an important 
source of stability of specific attitudes (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993). By contrast, the 
bottom-up model predicts that such specific attitudes should influence more general 
principles. 
118 
Chapter 5 An alternative view? 
Figure 5.6. Cross-lagged effects of support for Sierra Leone, 3-wave panel 
model (N = 80) 
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Overall, the results in this study are more supportive of a top-down hierarchical 
model than a bottom-up one. Firstly, core values and postures had stronger test-retest 
correlations over time than did specific attitudes towards Sierra Leone, which 
suggests a greater stability over time and greater resistance to change. However, 
zero-order test-retest correlations are not pure measures of attitude stability (e. g. 
Alwin, 1989; cited in Krosnick, 1991) since these correlations reflect not only the 
amount of attitude change at a given time but also the amount of random 
measurement error. 
Secondly, high attitudinal stability was also revealed across the cross-sectional 
structural equation models estimated for each time-point. Not only was the structure 
similar to that reported in the previous study, but the models across the three time- 
points were also identical in structure. Across the three models, attitudes towards 
Sierra Leone were directly influenced by the three postures, which, in turn, were 
influenced by nationalism and patriotism. Indeed, further analysis using multi-group 
modelling indicated that the estimated relationships between attitudes towards Sierra 
Leone and their determinants, as well as the relationships between these antecedents, 
were characterised by significant temporal stability. 
However, the most supportive evidence for the top-down model was found when the 
three individual surveys were combined in a panel analysis. This analysis indicated 
that the constructs in the model were found to be stable over time (paths "a", "b" and 
"c" in the conceptual model, see Table 5.3 and Figure 5.7) 
The analysis of cross-lagged effects indicated that nationalism at one time-point 
significantly influenced internationalism and militarism at the subsequent time-point 
(path "g" in the conceptual model). Similarly, patriotism at one time-point 
significantly affected all three postures at the subsequent time-point. No such 
significant cross-lagged effects were found for the reverse, bottom-up influences of 
postures on nationalism and patriotism (path "f' in the conceptual model). 
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Figure 5.7. Conceptual model of top-down and bottom-up influences on core 
values, postures and attitudes towards Sierra Leone 
A similar dynamic was also found regarding two of the three postures. As predicted 
by the top-down model, the effects of internationalism and multi-lateralism at Ti on 
attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T2 were positive and significant (. 33 and . 22, 
respectively; path "e" in the conceptual model), as were the effects of 
internationalism and multi-lateralism at T2 on attitudes towards Sierra Leone at T3 
(. 37 & . 24, respectively). In line with the top-down model of foreign policy attitudes, 
much of the over-time consistency in support for Sierra Leone was therefore due to 
prior postures, whilst prior levels of core values were, in turn, a major source of 
consistency in attitudes at the postural level. 
However, the cross-lagged effects in this study provided evidence for one significant 
bottom-up relationship, which indicates that at least some of the assumed stable 
determinants adjust to attitudes towards Sierra Leone. The significant positive paths 
from attitudes towards Sierra Leone at one time-point to internationalism at the next 
time-point (path "d" in the conceptual model) suggest that the more respondents 
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supported the mission in Sierra Leone, the more likely they were to become more 
internationally-oriented in their foreign policy beliefs in the future. 
Thus, internationalism shaped attitudes towards Sierra Leone, whilst attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone also shaped internationalism. However, the results indicate that 
the former effects were the more dominant ones. Indeed, a model in which these two 
significant paths were omitted also fit the data well, which further suggests that the 
significance of these paths in the model is peripheral. 
Overall, there is therefore some tentative evidence that specific attitudes may shape 
attitudes at the postural level, a finding that is contrary to Peffley and Hurwitz 
(1993). This discrepancy in findings could be due to the different international 
environments at the time of sampling. Peffley and Hurwitz carried out their study 
when the international environment was relatively stable, whilst the present research 
was conducted when the target political situation was in a state of flux. Indeed, 
results indicated a significant change in attitudes towards the Sierra Leone mission, 
with mission support being lowest at TI, highest at T2 and in-between at T3. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, in line with Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) and their earlier formulations 
(Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987,1990), international attitudes - exemplified by attitudes 
towards Sierra Leone in the present study - are best accounted for by a hierarchical, 
top-down structure. However, unlike Peffley and Hurwitz (1993), this study also 
found some possible evidence for a bottom-up influence of specific issues on 
postures, as argued for by Nincic (1992) and others. It therefore appears that 
constructs at the postural level are the product mainly of top-down (theory-driven) 
processes, with some potential secondary bottom-up (data-driven) influences. 
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THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE 
THE CASE OF THE ERRF 
This chapter continues the exploration of the hierarchical structure by assessing the 
potential effects of knowledge on the relationships within the model. Several studies 
(e. g. Converse, 1964; Fiske, Kinder & Larter, 1983; Zaller, 1992) have suggested 
that individuals with greater political knowledge 6.1 have attitudes that are more stable 
than have individuals with less political expertise. Although the hierarchical model 
argues that most individuals utilise core values and postures to form specific policy 
attitudes (see Chapter 2), an alternative view is that the influence of core values and 
postures on specific attitudes is itself a function of political expertise. These 
competing theories have rarely been tested, and one of the aims of this study was to 
explore this issue using multi-group structural equation analyses. 
Another aim of this study was to extend the core value analysis. The previous two 
chapters have highlighted the importance of nationalism and patriotism, which 
directly influenced postures, and through them attitudes towards Sierra Leone. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, numerous political-psychological studies have argued that, 
like nationalism and patriotism, trust is a stable orientation that may serve as a basis 
for forming other evaluations (e. g. Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). The 
6.1 In this research, the terms "political knowledge", "political information", "political awareness" and 
"political expertise" are used interchangeably. According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, p. 10), 
political knowledge is "the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term 
memory". Political knowledge is often distinguished from expertise, which refers to "especially good 
performance in some domain" (Krosnick, 1990, p. 3), unless the performance domain is restricted to 
the retrieval of factual political information from long-term memory. 
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assessment of the effects of trust on attitudes towards peace operations was therefore 
also of interest. 
Political knowledge 
According to Zaller (1992, p. 125), "political awareness deserves to rank alongside 
party identification and ideology as one of the central constructs of the public 
opinion field". A large body of research indicates a strong relationship between 
knowledge and the processing of new information (e. g. Patterson, 1980, Price and 
Zaller, 1990,1993), in that more knowledgeable individuals think about politics 
differently than the less informed (e. g. Fiske & Kinder, 1981, Judd & Downing, 
1990; Judd, Milburn & Krosnick, 1981). Informed individuals identify larger, 
meaningful patterns in information, encode information in more abstract ways, and 
process information in a deeper, more analytical fashion (Krosnick, 1990). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a debate in the literature as to whether or not the 
hierarchical model posited by Hurwitz and Peffley is influenced by political 
knowledge. According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987,1990), most individuals use 
core values and postures to inform their policy judgements. Specifically, they argue 
that such general assumptions are so widely recognised and understood that 
everybody uses them to form specific opinions (see also Feldman, 1988). 
However, it has also been argued that individuals must be at least somewhat 
informed to translate broader beliefs into specific policy preferences (e. g. Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Juhasz, 2000; Zaller, 1992). The most extreme position was 
taken by Zaller (1991,1992), who has argued that the more politically aware or 
knowledgeable individuals are, the more their specific policy attitudes depend on 
core values. Zaller (1992) suggested that individuals have so many different 
temporary constructions of opinions, which reflect the different considerations that 
are salient at different times. As a result, only the well-informed are able to 
consistently constrain their attitudes in accordance with organised and integrated sets 
of beliefs (see also Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). A similar claim was also made by 
Converse (1964), who argued that the level of consistency in a person's belief system 
is largely a function of the information that individual possesses. 
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There is some empirical support for this claim. Using ideological self-identification 
as a proxy measure for core values, Zaller (1992) found that political awareness 
promoted the use of core values and that the specific issue preferences of the less 
informed were unconstrained by such orientations (see Goren, 2001b for a discussion 
of the methodology). 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) also suggested that an individual's reliance on core 
values becomes stronger as political knowledge increases. They found that high 
political knowledge led to greater attitude stability over time and to higher levels of 
internal consistency amongst specific issue attitudes. Similarly, McCann (1997) 
reported that respondents who expressed great interest in the presidential election or 
had a college degree espoused values that were markedly more consistent than those 
of less interested or less educated respondents. 
Although several studies have investigated the impact of political knowledge on 
deductive reasoning (e. g. Bartels, 1996; Kuklinski, Metlay & Kay, 1982; Pollock, 
Lilie & Vittes, 1993; Sears, Huddie & Schaffer, 1986; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 
1991), only two studies have compared these two competing explanations and 
reported empirical support for each. Using regression analysis, Goren (2001a) 
analysed 1986 and 1992 National Election Study (NES) surveys on social welfare 
issues that included several core values, such as economic individualism and moral 
conservatism, as well as a political quiz. He found that political knowledge 
strengthened the relationship between core values and a variety of policy 
preferences, such as affirmative action and gay rights. Although the performance of 
uninformed respondents did not match that of the informed, Goren also reported that 
a lack of political knowledge did not preclude deductive reasoning. 
Goren (2001a) therefore concluded that Zaller and others correctly assume that 
knowledge enhances the use of core values, but they incorrectly predict that 
uninformed individuals do not reason deductively. Similarly, whilst the hierarchical 
model correctly assumes that most individuals rely on core values to inform their 
judgements about specific issues, it incorrectly predicts that the impact of core values 
on policy judgements is constant for most individuals. 
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The issue was addressed again by Goren in a later study. Exploring the effect of 
political knowledge on welfare and foreign policy issues, Goren (2004) found that 
individuals relied on core beliefs in the social welfare domain and the foreign policy 
domain regardless of their level of political expertise. He thus concluded that 
individuals rely equally on domain-specific core values when taking positions on 
many specific issues. 
Thus, the empirical evidence as to whether or not the relationship between core 
values and specific attitudes is a function of political knowledge remains largely 
equivocal. However, according to Goren (2001b, p. 20), "if only the politically 
sophisticated deduce issue attitudes from core principles, then the segment of the 
public capable of rendering meaningful and politically consequential issue attitudes 
is seriously diminished. " It was therefore one of the aims of this study to examine the 
role political knowledge plays in moderating attitudes towards a contemporary 
British foreign policy issues, namely the implementation of the ERRF, in the 
hierarchical model. 
Political and social trust 
As outlined in Chapter 3, besides nationalism and patriotism, there are theoretical 
and empirical reasons for examining two other core values, namely social trust and 
political trust. To recap from Chapter 3, social trust has been defined as a generalised 
belief that one can trust strangers (Uslaner, 2002), whilst political trust has been 
referred to as a belief that the government does what is right (e. g. Miller & Listhaug, 
1990). Although social and political trust are related, they are differentially related to 
foreign policy postures and specific policy issues. 
Social trust and foreign policy postures 
Beliefs about human nature have been examined in a variety of contexts, and several 
studies have suggested a relationship between social trust, also referred to as 
interpersonal trust or generalised trust in others, and foreign policy attitudes (e. g. 
Bartels, 1994; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Sniderman & 
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Citrin, 1971). Yet, only a few studies have explored in detail the link between of 
interpersonal trust and international attitudes. 
According to Putnam (1993, p. 180), interpersonal trust is important in the study of 
political attitudes because it "lubricates cooperation". A similar link between social 
trust and internationalism was made by Uslaner (2002, p. 215), who argued that 
individuals with high levels of social trust should be more likely to endorse 
international involvement because "people with faith in others are more likely to 
cooperate with others because they do not see their interests as incompatible with 
those of others". Similarly, Popkin and Dimock (2000, p. 225) observed that 
interpersonal trust should be related to "beliefs about the likelihood of international 
cooperation". 
On the basis of these observations, Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) suggested that 
social trust should be related to internationalism in general and co-operative 
internationalism in particular. Based on Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Brewer and 
Steenbergen (2002) argued that individuals would use cognitive shortcuts in lieu of 
factual information (see also Nincic, 1992), and proposed that individuals would turn 
to their beliefs about human nature when making judgements of foreign policy 
issues. More specifically, they suggested that in place of specific knowledge, 
individuals would translate their general trust in the people around them into specific 
trust in international actors. 
Individuals who trust others may therefore assume that foreign nations and their 
leaders have good intentions, and, consequently, may conclude that international co- 
operation and intervention will lead to positive results. By contrast, individuals who 
are cynical about human nature may infer that foreign nations and their leaders 
cannot be trusted, and, consequently, may conclude that one's country should not be 
involved in solving other people's problems. 
Using 1996 and 1998 American National Election Studies data, Brewer and 
Steenbergen (2002) found that individuals with a cynical view of human nature were 
indeed more likely to endorse isolationism than were respondents who were trusting 
of human nature. A similar effect was found regarding co-operative internationalism 
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(e. g. support for humanitarian aid or financial assistance). Cynical individuals were 
less likely than their trusting counterparts to support policies of co-operative 
internationalism. However, contrary to Bartels (1994), social trust was unrelated to a 
measure of militarism, and only weakly and non-robustly related to militaristic 
policy issues, which showed a greater relationship with trust in the government. 
Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) thus concluded that beliefs about human nature are 
potent predictors of foreign policy attitudes, albeit only in certain domains. 
Interpersonal trust had the greatest influence in decisions of whether or not to get 
involved with other nations (internationalism), whilst it failed to show such a 
relationship with the decision of the how to get involved (militarism). 
Both Bartels (1994) and Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) found a strong relationship 
between foreign policy postures and trust in others. However, in both studies, foreign 
policy postures were outcome variables and assessed by agreement with foreign 
policy issues that were conceptually related to these postures. The question thus 
arises whether this relationship would still hold when interpersonal trust, foreign 
policy postures and attitudes towards a foreign policy issue were assessed in a 
hierarchical model. 
The effects of social trust in a hierarchical model were recently explored by Brewer 
& Gross (2003), who found that social trust did not directly affect specific policies 
towards giving humanitarian aid or the use of force against Iraq. Rather, it exerted its 
influence indirectly through international trust and a general measure of 
internationalism. However, when the total effects were considered, social trust 
significantly and positively affected willingness to give humanitarian aid but had no 
significant total effect on the willingness to use force in Iraq. These findings thus 
replicate those of Brewer and Steenbergen that social trust is a potent predictor of 
foreign policy attitudes, albeit only in certain domains. 
Although previous studies have assessed the influence of interpersonal trust on two 
of the postures, namely internationalism and militarism, no study has so far explored 
its relationship with multi-lateralism. One aim of this study was therefore to fill this 
empirical gap. Furthermore, none of the above studies have investigated the effect of 
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knowledge on the link between social trust and foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, 
Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) speculated that the effects of social trust on foreign 
policy opinions may depend in part on the information individuals receive. In lieu of 
investigating the overall impact of knowledge on the hierarchical model, this study 
also explored the potential moderating effects of political information on this 
relationship. 
Political trust and foreign policy postures 
Similar to social trust, political trust has been related to political attitudes and 
behaviour in a variety of contexts (for a review see Levi & Stoker, 2000), including 
the foreign policy domain (e. g. Popkin & Dimock, 2000). However, its role in 
shaping foreign policy dimensions has remained largely unexplored. 
According to Popkin and Dimock (2000), individuals use political trust for judging 
whether they favour internationalism or isolationism. Compared to the politically 
distrustful, politically trusting individuals are said to be more confident that the 
government can act effectively in international affairs. Consequently, such 
individuals should be more willing to see the government involve itself with other 
nations' problems, both co-operatively and militarily. 
Although the effects of political trust on co-operative internationalism or militarism 
were not directly assessed by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), they found that 
political trust was positively related to attitudes towards defence spending and warm 
feelings towards the military. 
In a study by Brewer and Gross (2003), political trust did not directly affect foreign 
policy issues. Rather, its influence was indirect through international trust and a 
general measure of internationalism. However, an examination of the total effects 
showed that political trust significantly and positively affected both willingness to 
use force in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, willingness to give humanitarian aid. 
Overall, these findings are in line with Popkin and Dimock's (2000) argument that 
politically trusting individuals are more likely to favour both co-operative and 
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militaristic foreign policies than are their politically cynical counterparts. However, 
as in the case of social trust, the effect of political trust on multi-lateralism still 
remained to be examined. Similarly, the impact of knowledge on the relationship 
between political trust and specific policy attitudes needed to be explored. 
The context - The European Rapid Reaction Force and its implementation 
The shortcomings of previous research as noted above were assessed with regard to 
attitudes towards the European Rapid Reaction Forces (ERRF), which was to be 
implemented by 2003. 
During the British-French summit in St. -Malo in December 1998, a Joint declaration 
on a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was achieved. Until 
then, the United Kingdom had been the country most opposed to the inclusion of 
defence issues among the EU's competencies (Heisbourg, 2000). However, this 
summit and the conflict in Kosovo, which highlighted Europe's inefficiency in 
dealing with internal conflicts, led to the decision of the Cologne European Council 
in June 1999 to develop, "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (cited in 
Rutten, 2001, p. 41). 
In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council established the European Rapid 
Reaction Force (ERRF) of 50-60,000 personnel. This force was to be implemented 
by 2003, but its institution has been delayed due to a European-wide dissent over the 
particulars of the structure of this force. Once operational, the force will be capable 
of deploying within 60 days for a period of a least a year for humanitarian, 
peacekeeping and peace-building missions. 
What is already known about attitudes towards the ERRF? 
What do Europeans in general, and British people in particular, think of the 
implementation of the ERRF? According to a MORI survey (2000) of over 1000 
adults in Britain, most respondents (55%) believed that Tony Blair was right in 
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committing the British Armed Forces to be involved in the ERRF, whilst 38 percent 
thought that he was wrong to do this. When asked about the consequences, however, 
the majority believed that British Forces should not fight under a non-British 
commander (51%), should not wear a different uniform (62%) and should not get 
involved in conflicts in which there was no direct interest (51 %). 
A Eurobarometer survey (N° 54.1) conducted between November and December 
2000 provides additional information on this subject. When asked about the rapid 
reaction force, 73% of Europeans from 15 countries believed that the decision to set 
up this European defence force was very good (23%) or rather good (50%), whilst 
16% had no opinion. Therefore, across Europe, only 11% disagreed with the 
establishment (Manigart, 2001b). Alongside the Republic of Ireland (55%), the 
United Kingdom was the least in favour of setting up this force: 60% of British 
respondents agreed that the decision was a very good or a rather good one, whilst 
19% did not express an opinion. 
These data indicate that the majority of British respondents were not against the 
implementation of the ERRF. Indeed, the majority of respondents in each survey 
welcomed the implementation of this European force (MORI = 55% and 
Eurobarometer = 60% in favour)6'2. 
Aims of the study and hypotheses 
This study aimed to extend the core value analysis by exploring the role of social and 
political trust in shaping attitudes towards the ERRF in the hierarchical model. 
Another goal was to assess the impact of knowledge on the hierarchical structure. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter leads to the following predictions: 
6.2 The Eurobarometer data also provided one important qualification to this finding. At the EU level 
attitudes towards the ERRF were positively related to attitudes towards European Integration. There 
was also further evidence that attitudes towards the ERRF may have been shaped by more general 
attitudes towards the British Armed Forces. Both of these constructs were also assessed in this study. 
Analyses showed that respondents who held more positive attitudes towards European Integration 
were also more likely to hold more positive attitudes towards the ERRF than participants who 
believed the contrary. This finding is supportive of Eurobarometer results. Similarly, respondents who 
endorsed modern, peacekeeping roles of the Armed Forces were also more supportive of the ERRF 
than participants who believed more in the traditional military roles. For further details see Appendix 
C. Including these constructs in the analyses did not add to the explanation of attitudes towards the 
ERRF. 
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The effect of core values on postures 
Previous research has shown that individual differences in foreign policy postures, 
such as internationalism and militarism may in part depend on one's level of 
interpersonal and political trust. Since previous research has related social trust to co- 
operative strategies and political trust to interventionist policies (e. g. Brewer & 
Steenbergen, 2002; Popkin and Dimock, 2000), a significant relationship between 
social trust and internationalism, and between political trust, militarism and 
internationalism was therefore expected. Based on Brewer and Gross (2003) and 
Brewer and Steenbergen (2002, but see Bartels, 1994), social trust was predicted to 
be only weakly, if at all, associated with militarism. 
The effects of social and political trust on multi-lateralism have not yet been 
explored. Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) have argued that socially trusting 
individuals may infer that other nations are friendly and co-operative. Socially 
trusting respondents may thus infer that other nations and their leaders have good 
intentions and that co-operative interventions will lead to a positive result. One 
would therefore expect a significant relationship between the two. Because 
politically trusting individuals may also assume that the government can work 
together effectively with other nations, a positive relationship between political trust 
and multi-lateralism was also predicted. 
Past research and the previous two empirical studies have shown that nationalism 
was associated more with "hawkish" attitudes and "own-country" focused opinions. 
It was therefore hypothesised that nationalism should be negatively related to 
internationalism and multi-lateralism. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) have argued that 
national interest can be pursued through an assertive foreign policy stance, and a 
positive relationship between nationalism and militarism was therefore expected. 
By contrast, the previous two empirical studies have associated patriotism with 
peace-loving attitudes and internationally-oriented opinions, and it was therefore 
hypothesised that patriotism was positively related to internationalism and multi- 
lateralism, whilst being negatively related to militarism. 
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Postures and attitudes towards the ERRF 
Since the concept of the ERRF includes a willingness to co-operate internationally 
and multi-laterally with other European countries, a significant (positive) relationship 
between internationalism and multi-lateralism was hypothesised. The ERRF's remit 
will be to carry out humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-building missions, and a 
significant (negative) relationship with militarism was therefore also expected. 
Contextual variables and attitudes towards the ERRF 
Chapter 4 had included two contextual factors, namely outcome perceptions and 
perceived risk, in its analyses. In the present study, these were extended to include 
also "perceptions of moral responsibility" and "monetary considerations". In 
discussion of the ERRF, the media has frequently evoked the concept of moral duty 
(e. g. Guardian, April 11 2001; Daily Telegraph, April 11 2001). Feelings of 
responsibility have also been found to shape attitudes towards the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo (Haenze, 2001). A historical analysis of British military 
interventions (Lowenheim, 2003) reported that issues of moral prestige and moral 
credibility were crucial elements of Britain's decision for humanitarian interventions. 
Similarly, the media has frequently emphasised the financial dimension of Britain's 
participation in the ERRF (The Sun, April 12 2001; The Times, April 11,2001). 
It was therefore expected that perceptions of the potential success of the ERRF and 
Britain's moral duty to intervene in European conflicts would be significantly 
(positively) related to attitudes towards the ERRF. It was also hypothesised that 
perceptions of potential risk to soldiers keeping the peace in Europe and perceptions 
of British money being "misspent" would be significantly (negatively) associated 
with ERRF attitudes. The results of Chapter 4 were inconclusive as to whether these 
contextual factors are predictors of specific attitudes or the consequences. The issue 
of placement of these constructs was therefore also addressed. 
Political knowledge 
Finally, the possibility that political knowledge moderates the influence of core 
values and postures within the model was also examined. Based on Hurwitz and 
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Peffley's claim that individuals rely on core values and postures to shape their more 
specific attitudes independent of their degree of political knowledge, it was 
hypothesised that attitudes towards the ERRF would be structured in similar ways in 
both politically informed and uninformed respondents. This prediction was tested 
using multi-group structural equation analysis. 
METHOD 
Sample composition 
A sample of 322 British respondents from the general public participated in this 
postal survey, which was carried out in Guilford at the end of March 2001. Of the 
600 questionnaires that had been distributed, 326 were returned, of which four had to 
be discarded because of incomplete information. Overall, the return rate for this 
survey was 54%. 
As in the previous chapters, an attempt was made to strengthen this convenience 
sample by weighting it to representative area data. Comparisons of the sample data 
with Guildford Census data (see Appendix D for details) indicated that the sample 
over-represented men, respondents aged 18-24 and 45-59, those with A-levels and 
other qualifications, and those in associate professional (Class 3) and personal 
service occupations (Level 6). Conversely, it under-represented those aged 30-44, 
those with no qualifications and those in managerial occupations (Class 1). 
Using SPSS, the sample was weighted on these variables to achieve a more accurate 
representation of the overall population. All the analyses in this chapter were 
conducted after the sample had been weighted. 
Measures 
Details of the means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas for the constructs in 
this study are provided in Table 6.1 of the Results section. See Appendix E for the 
complete set of items used in this survey. 
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"Nationalism and Patriotism " 
Nationalism and patriotism were assessed by 20 items adapted to the British context 
from Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) nationalism and patriotism scales. 
Participants were asked to rate all 20 items on a five-point scale ranging from 
"Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". Factor analysis indicated two factors, 
corresponding to the distinction made between nationalism and patriotism. Two 
scales were created, with higher scores indicating higher nationalism and higher 
patriotism, respectively. 
"Social Trust" 
Five items were assessed to tap social trust, which were adapted from a pre-existing 
scale (Wrightsman, 1991; five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= 
Strongly agree): "Generally, most people can be trusted"; "Most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got the chance"; "Most people can be counted on to do 
what they say they will do"; "In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious 
until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy"; "Most people would 
tell a lie if they could gain by it". Factor analysis indicated only one component, 
which explained 48 percent of the variance. One scale was created from these five 
items, with higher scores representing higher levels of social trust. 
"Political trust" 
Political trust, or trust in the government, was assessed by five items taken from 
standardised measures of American political trust (cf. Miller & Listhaug, 1990; five- 
point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree): "I trust the 
government to do what is right", "The government is run for the benefit of all 
people", "People in the government waste a lot of the money that we pay in taxes" 
and "The government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves". In addition, the following item was included (five-point Likert scale: 1 
= None -5=A lot): "How much confidence do you have in your government? ". 
Factor analysis of the five items yielded a single dimension that accounted for 43 
percent of the variance. The five items were combined to form a scale, with higher 
scores indicating higher levels of political trust. 
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`Political knowledge quiz , 6.3 
Political knowledge was assessed by 10 items taken from British Election Studies 
(BES). These items assessed factual knowledge and were answered on a "True", 
"False" and "Don't know" scale. Items included: "Britain's electoral system is based 
on proportional representation (False)", "Women are not allowed to sit in the House 
of Lords (False)", "British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen (True)", and 
"The longest time allowed between general elections is four years (False)". For each 
individual, the number of correct answers were summed to obtain an overall political 
knowledge score (minimum =0 to maximum = 10, but see Mondak, 1999 for a 
critical review of this methodology). 
"Internationalism "44 
The degree to which individuals favour involvement and co-operation in 
international affairs was assessed by five items based on previous work (e. g. 
Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999; Holsti, 1996; Holsti & Rosenau, 1993; five-point 
Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree): "In today's world, every 
country has to take care of itself', "Britain should help improve the standard of living 
in less developed countries", "Britain should put pressure on countries which 
systematically violate basic human rights", "Britain needs to play an active role in 
solving problems around the world" and "Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs 
but concentrate on taking care of problems at home" (reversed scoring). Only one 
factor emerged from a factor analysis. These items were formed into a scale, with 
higher scores indicating greater willingness to co-operate in international affairs. 
"Militarism " 
Militarism was assessed by four items based on Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and 
Holsti and Rosenau (1993; five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= 
6.3 The questions taken from the BES political knowledge quiz tap propositional knowledge, i. e. 
respondents are asked to indicate whether the proposition "Britain's electoral system is based on 
proportional representation" is true, false or they don't know. Although the questions in this quiz may 
neglect other important aspects of political knowledge, such as the ability to interpret information and 
engage in political argument or whether or not particular values are important, propositional 
knowledge forms a necessary element of political knowledge (Frazer & Macdonald, 2003). For a 
detailed discussion of such quizzes see Johns (2002). 
6.4 All the items of internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism were subjected to a global factor 
analysis, which indicated three factors that corresponded to the distinction amongst the factors made 
here. 
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Strongly agree), including: "In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough", "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength", "The 
best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with other nations" (reversed scoring) and 
"In general, the use of military force only makes problems worse (reverse scoring)". 
Factor analysis showed only one factor, and the four items were combined to form a 
scale in which higher scores indicate a greater belief in militaristic foreign policy 
solutions. 
"Multi-lateralism " 
Multi-lateralism was measured by four items based on Chittick and colleagues (1995, 
2001; five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree), including: 
"To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or 
international organisation, such as the UN or NATO", "It is vital to enlist the co- 
operation of the UN in settling international disputes", "Britain's power in the world 
is diminished by working together with other nations or international organisations" 
(reversed scoring) and "International co-operation should be encouraged to solve 
common problems, such as world hunger or world peace". Factor analysis indicated 
only one factor and these items were combined into a scale. Higher scores on this 
scale represent a greater willingness to work together with other nations and 
international organisations. 
"Perceived risk" 
Perceptions of the risk of potential harm to British peacekeepers on ERRF peace 
missions were assessed by three items (five-point Likert scale: 1= Very unlikely to 5 
= Very likely): The likelihood of British peacekeepers being "Injured", "Killed" or 
"Taken hostage". One component emerged from a factor analysis, and higher scores 
on this scale indicate a high perceived risk of harm to peacekeepers. 
"Outcome perceptions " 
General perceptions of the success or lack of success of future ERRF missions were 
assessed by two items, which were adapted from the previous questionnaires (five- 
point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree): "ERRF troops will 
succeed in implementing a peace agreement in a country in conflict" and "ERRF 
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troops will not succeed in establishing lasting peace in a country in conflict" 
(reversed scoring). A composite variable was created, with higher scores on this 
scale indicating greater perceptions of success. 
"Moral Responsibility " 
Perceptions of moral responsibility to partake in peace operations were assessed by 
two items (5-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree): "As 
part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in European conflicts" and "As 
a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to intervene in countries that 
experience conflict". Higher scores on this scale indicate greater perceptions of 
moral duty. 
"Monetary considerations " 
The willingness to see governmental money being spent on peace operations was 
assessed by two items (five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly 
agree): "The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries would be better 
spent at home" and "British peace operations are a waste of money". Higher scores 
on this composite variable suggest greater opposition to money being spent on peace 
operations. 
"Attitudes towards the ERRF" 
Support for the ERRF was assessed by four items (five-point Likert scale: 1= 
Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree): "To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the participation of British troops in the European Rapid Reaction force that will 
perform peacekeeping duties in European conflicts? ", "I approve of British troops 
being used as part of an ERRF to bring peace to Europe", "The ERRF will make us 
less able to defend our national interests" and "Blair's decision to commit Britain to 
joining the ERRF was a good one". Higher scores on this scale indicate greater 
support for the EERF. 
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"Demographic Variables" 
The questionnaire also contained several demographic variables that have already 
been described in Chapter 4. 
Analyses 
The models in this study were estimated using LISREL 8.52 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
2002), using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix. This 
study contained more than 30 indicators. Typically, LISREL models with more than 
30 indicators representing the latent variables are difficult to estimate (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1996). Consequently, path models were used that incorporated the 
reliabilities of the respective scales to reduce the number of parameters estimated to a 
more reasonable level. In order to adjust for measurement error, the paths from latent 
variables to their indicators were set to one, whilst the error variances for each scale 
were set to one minus the reliability times the observed variance of the scale (see 
Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). 
Data screening indicated 20 missing values, which were substituted by the mean 
following the guidelines of du Toit and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskorg, 2001). 
Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of the 
data were then determined, which indicated that the distribution was multivariate 
normal with a univariate skewness ranging from -2.131 to 2.194 and a kurtosis 
ranging from -1.742 to 2.2396.5. Further analysis also indicated that the data were 
multivariate normal (Mardia's statistic was PK = 1.104). 
RESULTS 
The results are divided into three sections. The first presents descriptive and 
correlational data for the constructs used in the structural equation models. The 
second section investigates the relationship between the general predispositions in 
this study and attitudes towards the ERRF. Additionally, this section explores the 
6.5 Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst 
there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can 
be assumed if this value is less than 3. 
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placement of the four contextual variables within the model. The final section 
assesses the impact of political knowledge within the hierarchical model. 
General descriptive data 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive data for measures and correlations between measures 
relating to attitudes towards the ERRF. Almost six out of ten respondents (58%) in 
this sample strongly agreed or agreed with the statement "Tony Blair's decision to 
commit Britain to joining a European Reaction Force was a good one", whilst 57 
percent also strongly agreed or agreed with British troops being used as part of the 
ERRF to bring peace to Europe. Most respondents (57%) also agreed with the 
participation of British troops in the European Rapid Reaction force that will perform 
peacekeeping duties in European conflicts, whilst 46 percent agreed with the 
statement that the ERRF will make us less able to defend our national interests". 
Attitudes towards the ERRF were highly correlated with internationalism, multi- 
lateralism and outcome perceptions, and, to a lesser extent, militarism, perceptions of 
moral responsibility and monetary considerations (see Table 6.1). Of the core values, 
social trust was significantly related to attitudes towards the ERRF, political trust and 
patriotism. Nationalism was only weakly associated with attitudes towards the 
ERRF. None of the demographics were significantly correlated with attitudes 
towards the ERRF. 
Of the four contextual variables, outcome perceptions were significantly related to 
internationalism, multi-lateralism and social trust, amongst others. Perceptions of 
moral responsibility were highly related to internationalism, political trust, 
nationalism and social trust, whilst monetary considerations were highly correlated 
with political trust, nationalism and internationalism. 
Of the three postures, internationalism was strongly related to social trust and 
political trust. Militarism and multi-lateralism were highly associated with political 
trust. 
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Assessing attitudes towards the ERRF 
The correlations in Table 6.1 represent a complex set of relationships and 
interrelationships. This section presents analyses in which the relationships between 
nationalism, patriotism, social and political trust, and attitudes towards the ERRF in 
the hierarchical model were assessed in detail. 
As in the previous chapters, a hierarchical model was tested in which variables at 
more abstract levels were allowed to influence variables at the subsequent level in 
the model. The first model (Model, ) to be tested situated the four contextual 
variables - outcome perception, perceived risk, perceptions of responsibility and 
monetary considerations - at a level between postures and attitudes towards the 
ERRF. This model indicated that attitudes towards the ERRF were affected directly 
by outcome perceptions, perceived risk, perceptions of responsibility and monetary 
considerations (see Figure 6.1). For reasons of clarity, the effects of demographic 
variables on core values were omitted from the figure, but their impact on the 
variables in the model is provided in Table 6.2. 
Outcome perceptions were directly positively affected by internationalism and multi- 
lateralism; perceptions of responsibility were positively influenced by all three 
postures; whilst monetary considerations were negatively affected by both 
internationalism and militarism. 
Social trust showed a substantial direct (positive) path to internationalism and multi- 
lateralism, whilst it had no significant effect on militarism. Political trust had a direct 
(negative) path to militarism, and positive paths to both internationalism and multi- 
lateralism. Patriotism also had a positive path to both internationalism and multi- 
lateralism, whilst showing no significant path to militarism. Finally, nationalism 
showed a significant positive path to militarism and a just significant negative path to 
internationalism, whilst it was unrelated to multi-lateralism. 
Of the demographic variables, age had a negative path to social trust, whilst 
education and interest in current affairs were positive influences on social trust. By 
contrast, gender had a positive effect on political trust, indicating that male 
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respondents were more politically trusting than females. Education, social class, age 
and interest in current affairs were positively related to political trust, whilst it was 
negatively affected by political ideology. Nationalism was positively related to 
gender, political ideology and age, and negatively affected by education, social class 
and interest in current affairs. Patriotism, on the other hand, was negatively related to 
gender and age. 
Perceived risk was not significantly related to any of the constructs in the model (see 
Table 6.2), and modification indices indicate that the fit of the model could be 
improved if this construct was excluded from the model. Having excluded this 
variable, the model was re-estimated, which showed an acceptable fit (x2 = 57.74, df 
= 52, p =. 039, N= 322, GFI =. 891, AGFI =. 890, RMSEA =. 074, ECVI =. 07). 
To test whether an alternative model (Modele) would provide a better fit to the data, 
the model was re-estimated with the contextual variables as consequences of 
attitudes towards the ERRF rather than their causes (see Figure 6.2). In this model, 
internationalism and multi-lateralism strongly (positively) influenced attitudes 
towards the ERRF, whilst militarism had a small negative influence on ERRF 
attitudes. Attitudes towards the ERRF, in turn, positively influenced outcome 
perceptions and perceptions of responsibility and negatively affected monetary 
considerations. 
This model showed a good fit to the data (x2 = 51.07, df = 53, p =. 12, N= 322, GFI 
= . 941, AGFI = . 941, RMSEA = . 031, ECVI = . 05). An inspection of ECVI values 
indicates that the alternative model (Modele) fit the data significantly better than did 
the original conceptualisation (Model,, ECVI = . 05 versus . 07), and the alternative 
model was therefore accepted. 
The standardised total effects (see Table 6.2), which include both the direct and 
indirect effects of one variable onto another, indicated that of the core values, social 
trust had the greatest total effect on attitudes towards the ERRF, followed by political 
trust. 
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The role of political knowledge -A multi-group structural equation analysis 
The analyses in this section address the second aim of this study - namely the role of 
political knowledge. Table 6.3 shows the percentage of respondents who gave the 
`correct' answer to each item in the political knowledge quiz6'6. 
Table 6.3. Percentage correct answers to 10 questions of the political knowledge 
quiz 
correct answer 
`No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay a 78 deposit' (True) 
'The number of members of parliament is about 77 100' (False) 
'Britain has separate elections for the European 75 Parliament and the British Parliament' (True) 
'Women are not allowed to sit in the House of 74 
Lords' (False) 
'Britain's electoral system is based on proportional 70 
representation' (False) 
"MPs from different parties are on parliamentary 70 
committees' (True) 
'The longest time allowed between general elections 62 is four years' (False) 
'Minister of State are senior to Secretaries of State 32 
in the government' (False) 
`British Prime Ministers are appointed by the 31 
Queen' (True) 
`No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in 21 
two different places' (False) 
In an effort to provide an overall look at the effects of political knowledge within the 
hierarchical structure, a multi-group structural equation analysis was conducted in 
which the structure of support for the ERRF was investigated separately for 
respondents with high and low levels of political knowledge. For this purpose, the 
sample was divided into a low political knowledge group, consisting of respondents 
who answered incorrectly at least half of the questions in the political quiz (N = 127), 
and a high political knowledge group, consisting of respondents who answered 
correctly at least half of the questions (N = 186). 
Before the multi-group model was tested, it was first checked whether the constructs 
were equally reliable within the two knowledge groups (see Goren 2001b). The 
6.6 The analyses in this section are based on 313 respondents, omitting 4 respondents who did not to 
answer any of the 10 knowledge questions, and 5 who replied `don't know' to all. 
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reliabilities for each construct are given in Table 6.4, which shows that, with the 
exception of nationalism and militarism, the constructs were slightly more reliable in 
the politically informed group than in the uninformed one. In the absence of a formal 
test of the hypothesis that the reliability estimates differ significantly between the 
groups (see Goren, 2001b), the magnitude of these differences was estimated by 
calculating the ratio between the reliabilities of both samples. Interpreted cautiously, 
the table shows that there were little discernable differences between the reliabilities 
between the two groups. 
Table 6.4. Construct reliabilities by knowledge group 
Construct Low knowledge 
group 
High knowledge 
group 
Ratio 
Patriotism . 88 . 92 1.05 
Nationalism . 89 . 83 1.07 Political Trust . 87 . 91 1.05 Social Trust . 90 . 92 1.02 Attitudes towards AF . 89 . 89 1.00 Attitudes towards Europe . 88 . 93 1.06 Multi-lateralism . 86 . 90 1.05 
Militarism . 87 . 84 1.04 Internationalism . 88 . 92 1.05 
ERRF . 86 . 89 1.03 Monetary considerations . 90 . 90 1.00 
Responsibility . 81 . 84 1.04 Outcome perceptions . 92 . 93 
1.01 
Having established that the constructs are approximately equally reliable for the two 
groups, the following analyses explored whether the high and low knowledge groups 
relied on general predispositions to the same degree to form their attitudes towards 
the ERRF. Table 6.5 shows the structural coefficients and model-fit statistics. 
According to Goren (2004), if Hurwitz and Peffley are right in assuming that both 
informed and uninformed respondents use general predispositions in similar ways, 
then the coefficients should be statistically significant in each group, and be 
statistically insignificant between the two groups. By contrast, if knowledge 
moderates the use of general principles, then the coefficients should be larger in the 
high knowledge group, and the differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients 
between the high and low knowledge group should be statistically significant. 
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The statistical difference between the two groups can be determined using 
modification indices, which indicate the effect freeing a parameter has in a model in 
which the factor loadings are constrained to be equal between the two groups 
(restricted model)6.7. The structural parameters were constrained to be equal between 
the groups to test the initial premise that both informed and uniformed respondents 
use core values and postures in similar ways to derive their specific foreign policy 
opinions. The difference in chi-squares (Ax2) between the restricted model and the 
freed sub-model can be used as a test of whether the coefficient in question varies 
significantly between the two groups, which is equivalent to testing for interactions 
in an OLS regression. A statistically insignificant ixe will support the conclusion that 
constraining factor loadings to be equal between the high and low knowledge group 
does not affect model fit (Bentler, 1995). 
As shown in Table 6.5, the internationalism coefficient was significant in both 
groups, and individuals in both groups relied the same amount on internationalism to 
shape their attitudes towards the ERRF (Ax2 = . 075, df = 1, p= . 32). Militarism was 
significantly related to attitudes towards the ERRF in both groups. However, the 
coefficients did not differ significantly (ixe = 0.89, df = 1, p= . 27), suggesting that 
both groups used militarism to the same degree. Similarly, the multi-lateralism 
coefficient was significant in both the high and low knowledge group, the chi-square 
difference was not significant (ixe = 0.96, df = 1, p= . 26), indicating that the 
coefficients were statistically equivalent between the two groups. 
Both social and political trust were significantly associated with attitudes towards the 
ERRF in both groups, but the coefficients did not differ significantly between the 
two groups (0x2 = 2.71, df = 1, p= . 072; and Axe = 2.65, df = 1, p= . 086, 
respectively). Nationalism was only significantly related to ERRF attitudes in the 
low knowledge group, a difference that was statistically not significant using the 
Bonferroni correction (0x2 = 5.89, df = 1, p= . 034). Finally, patriotism was 
significantly related to attitudes towards the ERRF in both groups and the 
coefficients did not differ significantly (0x2 = 0.74, df = 1, p= . 30). Model 
fit was 
6.7 The Bonferroni correction is used in these analyses to control for Type I errors across pairwise 
comparisons. This method tests each comparison at p=0.05 divided by the number of comparisons. 
In the present study, each comparison was therefore tested at 0.05/7, or 0.007, level. 
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good for both groups. Overall, these results support Hurwitz and Peffley's claim in 
all instances, and suggest that individuals rely on general principles regardless of 
their level of knowledge. 
Table 6.5. Structural equation model for attitudes towards the ERRF by level 
of political knowledge 
Attitudes towards the ERRF 
Low High 
Coefficients 
Internationalism . 468** . 501** 
Militarism -. 321** -. 162* 
Multi-lateralism . 314** . 456** Social trust . 168* . 365** 
Political trust . 197* . 341** 
Nationalism . 293** . 097. Patriotism . 229** . 302** 
Model Fit: 
x2 28.21 * 25.76* 
Df 17 17 
GFI . 90 . 93 AGFI . 89 . 93 RMSEA . 044 . 039 
N 127 186 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
DISCUSSION 
Consistent with public opinion polls, support for the ERRF was high in the present 
study. Overall, almost six out of ten respondents agreed that Tony Blair was right in 
committing British troops to form part of the European force, and that British troops 
should be used as part of the ERRF to solve European conflicts and to bring peace to 
Europe. Fewer respondents believed that the ERRF would interfere with national 
interests. 
As expected, attitudes towards the ERRF were significantly influenced by the three 
postures. Respondents who believed that Britain should be involved in international 
affairs and should collaborate with other nations or institutions to solve international 
problems were more supportive of the ERRF than were respondents who believed 
the contrary. Similarly, participants who believed that military force should be used 
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to solve international problems were less likely to hold positive attitudes towards the 
ERRF than respondents who preferred diplomatic actions. 
The analyses also indicated that attitudes towards the ERRF shaped, rather than were 
influenced by, how respondents perceived the possible success of the ERRF, whether 
Britain had a moral obligation to become involved in international disputes and 
whether or not peace operations were a waste of money. Respondents who supported 
the ERRF were more likely to perceive a British responsibility in solving conflicts, to 
see future missions as successful and money well spent than participants who did not 
hold positive views of the ERRF. Although a panel study would provide more 
conclusive evidence for the direction of causality than the present cross-sectional 
design, present results indicate that these contextual factors are better conceptualised 
as consequences of support rather than as indicators for support. 
Political and social trust 
In line with a growing literature (e. g. Bartels, 1994; Brewer & Gross, 2003), the 
results of this study showed that social trust shapes opinions about international 
affairs. Of the core values, social trust emerged as the most potent predictor (in terms 
of its total effect) of attitudes towards the ERRF. Its influence was not direct, but 
mediated by internationalism and multi-lateralism. Thus, respondents who generally 
trusted others were more likely than those who mistrusted others to believe that 
Britain should play a role in international politics and should co-operate with other 
nations or institutions to bring about change in the world. 
Contrary to Bartels (1994), but consistent with findings by Brewer and Steenbergen 
(2002) and Brewer and Gross (2003), social trust was not significantly related to 
militarism in this study. Social trust had the greatest influence in decisions of 
whether or not to get involved in international affairs and whether or not to 
collaborate with other nations to solve international issues, whilst it had no effect on 
whether or not force should be used to solve international problems. This finding 
supported the claim that social trust is an important predictor of foreign policy 
dimensions only in certain areas of foreign policy (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). 
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The finding that social trust significantly affected multi-lateralism also added to 
those of Bartels (1994), Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) and Brewer and Gross 
(2003), who only assessed its impact on internationalism and militarism. Overall, the 
results in this study were similar to those of Brewer and Steenbergen (2002) and 
Bartels (1994), who found that postures depended in part on an individual's level of 
interpersonal trust. 
Social trust itself was significantly affected by several demographic variables. In line 
with previous research (e. g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Rahn & Transue, 1998; Putman, 
1995), age was negatively associated with levels of social trust, indicating that 
younger respondents were more mistrustful than respondents from older generations. 
The reasons for this link are not clearly understood (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). 
Congruent with previous research (e. g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997), social trust was also 
positively related to education, suggesting that better educated respondents were 
more trusting of others than their lesser educated counterparts. 
In keeping with previous research (Popkin & Dimock, 2000), the results of this study 
also indicated that political trust shaped foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, it 
consistently emerged to be a better predictor of postures and attitudes towards the 
ERRF (in terms of its total effects) than either patriotism or nationalism. Although 
political trust was significantly related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, its 
effects were smaller than those of social trust. However, unlike social trust, political 
trust had the greatest influences on whether or not force should be used to solve 
international problems. Politically trusting respondents were thus more likely than 
politically cynical ones to believe that negotiation and not force should be used in 
international conflicts. 
Although the finding that political trust was significantly related to militarism is 
consistent with previous research (e. g. Brewer & Gross, 2003), the sign of the 
relationship is not. For example, Brewer and Gross (2003) found that political trust 
was overall positively related to willing to use force, whilst a similar finding was also 
made by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002). These findings, however, were based on 
U. S. samples. One possible explanation for this discrepancy may be a difference in 
the degree to which British and American citizens espouse military action as a means 
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to solve international conflicts. A general finding from U. S. studies is that American 
citizens are supportive of military force as a means to an end in foreign policy (e. g. 
Bartels, 1994). Similarly, these differences may be indicative of the different 
governmental stances on foreign policy solutions between Britain and the U. S. 
Political trust was directly affected by age and education. Consistent with previous 
research (e. g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997), political trust was negatively related to age, 
indicating that younger respondents in the sample were more politically cynical than 
older participants. By contrast, education had a significant positive effect on levels of 
political trust, suggesting that more educated respondents were more politically 
trusting than their less educated counterparts. 
Yet, there is empirical evidence that the two are inter-related (r = . 45 in the present 
study), although the causal relationship between them is still a matter of intense 
debate. Investigating the effects of social and political trust on civic engagement (the 
so-called "social capital" dynamic), Brehm and Rahn (1997) found that the observed 
association between political trust and social trust was largely due to the influence 
the former had on the latter. That is, whether or not individuals were socially trusting 
was strongly influenced by whether or not they were politically trusting. Thus, a 
trustworthy government may influence the development of social trust and co- 
operation (Levi & Stoker, 2000; but see Brewer & Sigelman, 2002). 
Patriotism and nationalism were also related to the three postures in the expected 
ways. Patriotic respondents were more willing to see Britain involved internationally 
and multi-laterally than less patriotic participants. By contrast, nationalistic 
respondents were more likely to believe that Britain should use force to solve 
international problems and should concentrate on problems at home than less 
nationalistic participants. Overall, these findings support the claim that nationalistic 
sentiments hinder international co-operation by being own-country focused (e. g. 
Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), whilst patriotic feelings do not pose an obstacle to 
becoming involved in foreign affairs (e. g. Mueller-Peters, 1998). 
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Political knowledge 
Finally, present results showed that both politically informed and uninformed 
respondents used core values and postures to form their specific opinions about the 
ERRF. There was some indication that politically uninformed respondents were more 
likely to rely on militarism to form their attitudes towards the ERRF than informed 
participants. However, this test was insignificant using a Bonferroni correction. 
These findings are consistent with Goren (2001a, b, 2004), who reported that political 
expertise did not systematically enhance the impact of general principles on policy 
preferences. However, the present study also added to the findings of Goren (2004) 
in the foreign policy domain. Goren (2004), p. 474), who had only assessed 
militarism in his study, asked whether political awareness enhanced the use of 
internationalism when people form foreign policy preferences. Similarly, Brewer and 
Steenbergen (2002) wondered whether political knowledge would affect the 
relationship between social trust and specific policy attitudes. Present findings 
indicate that the answer to both these question would be: no, it does not. Political 
knowledge did not significantly increase reliance on any of the three postures or the 
four core values assessed in this study. Present findings therefore support the 
assumption of Hurwitz and Peffley that political knowledge does not affect the use of 
general predispositions, and oppose theories that argue that political expertise 
facilitates political reasoning (e. g. Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
Some researchers have suggested that individuals are not political generalists but 
political specialists who are knowledgeable only about political issues in which they 
have a direct interest (e. g. Iyengar, 1990; Johns, 2002; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, 
Berent & Carnot, 1993). Therefore, the use of a general political knowledge measure 
may not have revealed the true impact of political knowledge on attitudes towards 
the ERRF. Instead, a different picture may have emerged if specific knowledge about 
the ERRF had been assessed. The possibility of a differential impact of policy- 
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specific and general political knowledge on political attitudes will be addressed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE REVISITED 
THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN 
The previous chapter showed that political and social trust, patriotism and 
nationalism consistently biased general foreign policy postures and, through them, 
attitudes towards the ERRF. Using a measure of general political knowledge the 
previous study also showed that politically informed and uninformed respondents 
both relied on general principles to derive their attitudes towards the ERRF. 
One aim of this study was to explore further the impact of political knowledge on 
attitudes towards the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that if specific foreign policy knowledge had 
been assessed, the impact of knowledge on the hierarchical structure of attitudes 
towards the ERRF might have been more pronounced. The impact of specific 
political knowledge about the ISAF on attitudes towards this mission was therefore 
examined in this study. 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that apart from core values, national images of a target 
country are also powerful predictors of specific foreign policy opinions. However, 
existing research has relied almost exclusively on "enemy images". It is argued in 
this chapter that present political concerns warrant an investigation into two different 
types of national images, namely images of the nation's government and images of 
the nation's populace, which were explored empirically. 
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General versus policy-specific political knowledge 
The effects of general versus specific political knowledge on policy attitudes have 
been a matter of debate, which has largely centred on the issue as to whether or not 
specific-policy knowledge plays an important role in shaping political policy 
preferences. 
According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), the U. S. public is not made up of 
information specialists. Rather, they argue that there is a tendency for different types 
of political knowledge to be correlated with one another. As a result of the strong 
correlations between types of political knowledge, individuals with high levels of 
general political knowledge might be more likely to possess specific information 
about a particular policy (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; see also Althaus, 1998). 
This is because individuals with high levels of general political knowledge may be 
more able or motivated to seek out policy-specific information (see also Fiske, Lau 
& Smith, 1990; but see Zaller, 1992). However, Kuklinski, Quirk, Schwieder and 
Rich (1998) have shown that even individuals with high levels of general political 
knowledge may be ignorant of policy-specific information. 
Juhasz (2001) proposed that individuals rely more on general principles when they 
know relatively little about a specific political situation. Investigating differences 
between East and West Germans, Juhasz found considerably stronger relationships 
between core values, postures and specific attitudes in East Germany compared to 
those in the West, which he argued might be due to individuals in the former East 
being more used to taking cognitive shortcuts as a result of their lower level of 
information. A similar suggestion was also made by Kuklinski, Metlay & Kay 
(1982), who reported that domain-specific knowledge was negatively associated with 
using core beliefs. 
Furthermore, Gilens (2001) reported that knowledge of policy-specific information 
about the amount of federal budget allocated to foreign aid had a stronger effect on 
policy attitudes than did general political knowledge. More specifically, Gilens found 
that the consequences of policy-specific ignorance and the effects of policy-relevant 
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information were greatest for individuals with the highest level of general political 
knowledge. These findings led him to conclude that, 
what separates actual political preferences from hypothetical 
`enlightened preferences' is due to ignorance of specific policy-relevant 
facts, not a lack of general political knowledge or the cognitive skills or 
orientations that measures of general political information reflect. (2001, 
p. 380) 
Overall, both Kuklinski and colleagues (1998) and Gilens (2001) suggested that the 
effect of policy-relevant information is not captured sufficiently by measures of 
general political knowledge. A measure of specific political knowledge of 
Afghanistan was therefore devised in this study, and the differential impact of 
general and specific political knowledge on attitudes towards the ISAF was assessed 
in a multi-group structural equation model. 
Images and the hierarchical model 
Chapter 3 briefly reviewed research on the importance of images in structuring 
foreign policy attitudes. Research on individuals' attitudes towards specific foreign 
countries and foreign policies has shown that images are significantly influenced by 
the individuals' values and predispositions (e. g. Mueller, 1973; Hurwitz & Peffley, 
1990; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993; Holsti, 1996). 
Following this long line of research, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990; see also Peffley & 
Hurwitz, 1992; Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson, 1993) also extended the hierarchical 
model to include `public images' as another determinant of foreign policy beliefs. 
The revised model (see Figure 7.1) posits that public images, which serve to simplify 
a complex international environment and to guide responses towards particular 
countries, are super-ordinate to postures, but are themselves constrained by core 
values. 
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Figure 7.1. Extended hierarchical model of foreign policy beliefs 
Core values 
)( 
Images 
)( 
Postures Specific policy 
attitudes 
Following Boulding (1959) and others, Hurwitz and Peffley argued that two 
dimensions underlie such images: perceptions of threat and perceptions of trust. 
Perceptions of threat refer to perceptions of the military power of the target country 
as well as perceptions as to whether it seeks to expand its influence. By contrast, 
perceptions of trust include opinions as to whether the target country is trustworthy 
or deceitful. 
Assessing the effects of Soviet public images on attitudes towards defence spending 
and nuclear policy within the hierarchical model, they found that the two dimensions 
of trust and threat were closely related to foreign policy attitudes both at the postural 
and policy-specific level (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990). At the specific policy level, trust 
perceptions were a significant predictor of attitudes towards defence spending and 
nuclear policy, whilst threat perceptions were significant determinants of attitudes 
towards military policies and Contra policies. Threat and, to a lesser extent, trust 
perceptions were also important determinants of militarism and containment. 
Although trust and threat perceptions had direct effects on specific policy issues, 
these effects were less strong than their direct effects on postures. 
A similar dynamic emerged regarding post-Cold War foreign policy issues, when the 
relations between the superpowers began to change. Individuals' general beliefs 
about the nature of the Soviet Union, and their position on militarism, were key 
organising principles that constrained more specific foreign policy attitudes (Peffley 
& Hurwitz, 1992). By examining how public images structure foreign beliefs within 
the hierarchical model outside the U. S., Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993) found 
that images of salient nations (e. g. Cuba, Nicaragua and the U. S. ) were a better 
predictor of specific policy issues in Costa Rica than was militarism, which was 
generally only weakly related to any of the measures in that study. 
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Such findings are not unequivocal. Investigating the role of public enemy images and 
ideology in elite belief systems, Murray and Cowden (1999) found that public 
images played a limited role, whilst ideology played a significantly more central role 
in structuring elites' foreign policy attitudes. It should be noted, however, that 
Murray and Cowden tested this model within an elite sample, whilst Hurwitz and 
Peffley used mass publics in their studies. Previous research has shown that elite 
samples are structured more along political ideology lines than the mass public (e. g. 
Jennings, 1992; Rosati & Creed, 1997), and therefore the discrepancy in findings 
may not be surprising. 
The majority of the research into images, however, was carried out during the Cold 
War when "enemy images", particularly of the Soviet Union, were prevalent 
(Hermann & Fischerkeller, 1995). The question thus arises to what extent national 
images of foreign countries have remained a key factor in organising attitudes in the 
post-Cold era where nations cannot easily be classified in terms of bipolar conflict 
(Chanley, 1999). Similarly, to what extent are national images viable when the 
country itself is divided? For example, would a national image of Sierra Leone be 
able to capture the potentially different public images of the Sierra Leone 
government and the rebels it was fighting? Similarly, to what extent is the concept of 
national images practical when there is an apparent rift between a nation's 
government and its populace 7.1? Would it be more constructive to assess two types of 
images, one of the nation's government and one of the nation's populace, when the 
population is seen as suffering at the hands of the government, as was the portrayal 
of pre-war Afghanistan? It is this latter question that was addressed in this study. 
In this study, national images were not conceptualised as being comprised solely of 
threat and trust perceptions. Instead, images were examined by a more global 
assessment (see Hurwitz et al., 1993), which also included perceptions of strength 
7.1 In an early version of their analysis of the impact of USSR images on foreign policy attitudes, 
Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) included a separate image composed only of items pertaining to 
Gorbachev. Further analysis, however, indicated that respondents' assessment of Gorbachev and the 
Soviet Union were indistinguishable. Similarly, they argued that when individuals evaluate the image 
of another country, they make global judgements of that nation, taking into account both the 
government and its current leadership. It is argued here that a separation between images of the 
government and a nation's populace may be conceptually warranted in situations where there is an 
apparent political rift between a nation's leadership and its people. 
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and weakness, trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, co-operation and non-co- 
operation, democratic and non-democratic, and peacefulness and belligerence. By 
assessing a broader range of characteristics, elements of images identified by Cottom 
(1977), Hermann (1986) and others were also included in an abstract sense. The 
image components of perceived power and motives identified by Hermann (1986), 
for example, were assessed by individuals' ratings of the perceived strength, co- 
operation and peacefulness of the Afghan government and the Afghan population. 
Humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism 
In addition to images, this study also explored a wider range of core values, namely 
humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism. Humanitarianism is a 
construct that has not received a lot of attention in research on international attitudes. 
It refers to a degree of compassion that individuals exercise in their relations with 
others, and involves a concern for the well-being of others as well as a willingness to 
help others. 
Humanitarianism has frequently been equated with egalitarianism (e. g. Katz & Hass, 
1988), which refers to the extent to which individuals believe that individuals in 
society should have access to the same economic, political and social opportunities. 
However, there are conceptual reasons why they should be distinct constructs. For 
example, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) have argued that egalitarianism refers to 
beliefs about the equality of societal resources that are held independent of an 
individual's social relationships, whilst humanitarianism involves a definition of 
oneself in relation to others. Indeed, research indicates that the two constructs are not 
only conceptually but also empirically distinct. 
Apart from being only weakly correlated with each other (e. g. Feldman and 
Steenbergen, 2001), humanitarianism and egalitarianism have also been differentially 
related to policy preferences. Humanitarianism was found to be a consistently better 
predictor of attitudes towards government spending on social security, people on 
welfare and poverty relief than egalitarianism. Humanitarianism was also negatively 
related to support for policies of tougher sentencing of criminals. Together, these 
findings suggest that compassion makes humanitarians sympathetic to the plight of 
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others, such as the poor and criminals, and provides a motivation for providing 
assistance through support for social welfare policies (Steenbergen, 1996). 
Therefore, humanitarianism may be best conceived as a core value that is distinct 
from egalitarianism (Steenbergen, 1996). Although this construct has been applied 
predominantly in studies of welfare policies, there are several reasons why 
humanitarianism may also be important for understading attitudes towards peace 
operations and other humanitarian foreign policy concerns, such as foreign aid or 
enforcement of human rights. If humanitarianism entails a general concern for the 
well-being of others and a willingness to help others, then foreign policy 
interventions designed to improve the well-being of others in foreign countries 
should evoke compassion in humanitarians. For example, peace operations generally 
emphasise the plight of the population in a war-torn country with respect to living 
conditions, human rights violations, and so on. One would therefore expect that such 
situations arouse the compassion of humanitarians. 
Indeed, there is some tentative evidence that humanitarianism also includes a 
concern for the plight of remote others. Investigating the determinants of attitudes 
towards foreign aid, Steenbergen (1996) found that although egalitarianism was the 
strongest predictor of support for foreign aid, increased levels of humanitarianism 
were also associated with stronger support for providing aid to foreign countries. The 
relevance of humanitarianism with respect to other foreign policy issues therefore 
merited closer investigation. Similarly, the differential relationship between 
humanitarianism, egalitarianism and attitudes towards peace operations needed to be 
explored in greater detail. 
One more core value was included in this study, namely moral traditionalism, which 
refers the extent to which an individual prefers traditional patterns of family and 
social morality (Conover & Feldman, 1984). Although moral traditionalism is a 
powerful predictor of domestic policy concerns, such as re-distributional welfare 
policies and vote choice (e. g. Feldman, 1988), research indicates that it may not 
figure prominently in foreign policy issues when assessed in tandem with other 
variables (e. g. Bartels, 1994). Its relevance to understanding attitudes towards peace 
operations was therefore also investigated. 
162 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
The context - Afghan Stabilisation Force 
Whilst there was some international involvement in Afghanistan after the Soviet 
Invasion in 1979, it was the September 11th 2001 attacks on the United States that 
brought Afghanistan back into the minds of the international community. In 
conjunction with military interventions, the multi-national, European-led 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorised by the UN Security 
Council in December 2001 to support a larger UN mission, UNAMA. The ISAF's 
main goals included assisting the Afghan interim government and providing security 
and stability in the capital, Kabul. 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK signed 
a joint Memorandum of Understanding in January, which formalised their 
contributions to the force (for a detailed analysis of the UNAMA mission and the 
political situation in Afghanistan see The Afghanistan Report in A Review of Peace 
Operations: A Case for Change, 2003). 
It should be noted that unlike previous UN peace operations around the world, the 
mission's main mandate was not to monitor a peace agreement between two 
belligerent parties but rather to impose peace that was externally mediated amongst 
victors in a war. 
The first British troops of the force began arriving in Afghanistan shortly afterwards 
to prepare for the arrival of the main body of the ISAF. The force began to deploy on 
28`h December 2001 and consisted of over 4,800 troops from a number of states. 
Britain was leading the force until June 2002 and provided 1,800 troops. In June 
2002, the Turkish Army took charge of the force. 
During its first six months of operation, the ISAF mounted joint patrols with Afghan 
security forces in and around Kabul, disposed of nearly 3 million munitions, trained 
the I" Battalion of the new Afghan National Guard and completed over 200 
humanitarian aid projects (Ministry of Defence, 2002). 
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The ISAF also provided humanitarian assistance to the Afghan authorities after an 
avalanche struck a tunnel in February 2002. Similarly, following an earthquake in 
March 2002, ISAF transport aircraft were involved in providing the delivery of 
emergency supplies and medical personnel. 
In March 2002, two German and three Danish soldiers from the ISAF were killed in 
Kabul, whilst a British soldier died in April 2002, following an incident during a 
security patrol in Kabul. Both UNAMA and ISAF are ongoing. 
Study aims and hypotheses 
In addition to the general predictions made in the previous chapter, the following 
hypotheses were made based on the literature reviewed here: 
Core Values 
The core value analysis was extended to explore the effects of humanitarianism, 
egalitarianism and moral traditionalism within the hierarchical model of attitudes 
towards the ISAF. Based on the findings of Steenbergen (1996; Feldman & 
Steenbergen, 2001) that humanitarianism is linked to a concern for the plight of 
others, it was hypothesised that humanitarianism should be significantly related to 
attitudes towards the ISAF, whose aim it was not only to re-instate a democratic 
government but also to re-instate decent living conditions and reinforce basic human 
rights within Afghanistan. 
More specifically, it was hypothesised that humanitarianism would exert its effect 
mainly through internationalism within the hierarchical model. This link was 
predicted because a general compassion for the situation of other people should 
translate into a belief that it is in Britain's interest to be involved in solving 
international problems. Similarly, it was also predicted that humanitarianism would 
influence beliefs about multi-lateral ventures since Britain's co-operation with multi- 
national organisations, such as the UN or NATO, could be perceived as the most 
productive foreign policy means of alleviating poverty, human rights abuses and so 
on in foreign countries. 
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The relationship between humanitarianism and militarism, however, may be more 
equivocal. It could be argued that humanitarianism will be negatively associated with 
militarism because people who are sympathetic to the plight of others should not 
want to increase this plight by the use of force and the possibility of war being 
waged. Conversely, it could be argued that humanitarianism would be positively 
related to militarism because humanitarians may believe that only through coercive 
actions can the plight of others be improved. Finally, humanitarianism might not be 
associated at all with militarism as neither the use of force or negotiation would 
provide the assistance needed. 
National images 
A central purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of two types of national 
images within the hierarchical model of attitudes towards the ISAF: images of the 
Afghan government and images of the Afghan population. Based on Hurwitz and 
colleagues (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990; Hurwitz et al., 1993), it was hypothesised 
that both types of images would affect the three postures, whilst in turn being 
influenced by core values. 
General versus specific knowledge 
Previous research (e. g. Gilens, 2001) suggests that knowledge of policy-specific 
information has a stronger effect on policy attitudes than does general political 
knowledge. It was therefore predicted that if knowledge moderates the influence of 
core values and postures in the hierarchical model, then policy-specific knowledge 
would have a greater impact on the relationships than general political knowledge. In 
addition, Zaller and others have argued that political knowledge promotes the use of 
core values. It was therefore predicted that respondents with high policy-specific 
knowledge should rely more on the structural constructs to form their opinions about 
the ISAF than participants with low policy-specific knowledge. This prediction was 
tested using multi-group structural equation analysis. 
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METHOD 
Sample composition 
Data for this study were collected in a postal survey, which was carried out in 
Guildford in February 2002. A total of 600 questionnaires were sent out. 336 
respondents returned a completed questionnaire; a response rate of 41% 
Compared to Census data (see Appendix F for details), the sample over-represented 
male respondents, those aged 45-49, those with A-levels, and those in personal 
service (Class 6), sales (Class 7) and elementary occupations (Class 9), whilst it 
under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with other or no educational 
qualifications, and those in managerial (Class 1) and administrative occupations 
(Class 4). 
The sample was weighted on these demographic characteristics to address these 
biases and to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All 
the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted. 
Measures 
In addition to the factors assessed in the previous study, this study included the 
following measures (see Appendix G for the details of the items used in this survey). 
The descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations of the study variables are 
provided in Table 7.1 of the Results section. 
"Humanitarianism " 
Humanitarian beliefs were assessed by seven items taken from Steenbergen (1996; 
five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree): "One should 
always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself', "The dignity and well- 
being of all should be the most important concerns in any society", "One of the 
problems of today's society is that people are often not kind enough to others", "All 
people who are unable to provide for their own should be helped by others", "A 
person should always be concerned about the well-being of others", "It is better not 
to be too kind to people, because kindness will only be abused", and "People tend to 
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pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should". These seven items 
were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating greater concern for the 
welfare of others. 
"Egalitarianism " 
Egalitarianism was assessed by six items used in previous research (e. g. Feldman, 
1988; see also Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996; five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly 
disagree to 5= Strongly agree): "Our society should do whatever is necessary to 
make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed", "We have gone too 
far in pushing equal rights in this country (reversed scoring)"; "This country would 
be better off if we worried less about how equal people are (reversed scoring)", "It is 
not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others 
(reversed scoring)", "If people were treated more equally in this country we would 
have fewer problems", and "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't 
give everyone an equal chance". A composite variable was created from these six 
statements. Higher scores on this scale signify a greater belief in equal opportunities 
within society. 
"Moral traditionalism" 
Moral traditionalism was measured by five items adapted from previous research 
(e. g. Evans, Heath & Lalljee, 1996; and Conover & Feldman, 1985; five-point Likert 
scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5 Strongly agree): "The newer lifestyles are 
contributing to the breakdown of society", " Society should be more accepting of 
people whose values are different from most" (reversed scoring), "We should be 
more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards 
even if they are very different from our own (reversed scoring)", "This country 
would have fewer problems if there was more emphasis on traditional family ties", 
"The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behaviour to those 
changes (reversed scoring)". These five items were combined in a scale, with higher 
scores indicating greater adherence to traditional values and lifestyle. 
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"Perceived respect" 
In addition to assessing perceptions of risk, responsibility, outcome success and 
monetary issues, this study also explored perceptions of respect gained through 
participation in this mission. Two items were used to measure this contextual 
variable (five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree): "The 
expertise shown by British troops in Afghanistan has reinforced respect for Britain 
around the world" and "British troops in Afghanistan are respected by the local 
people". The items were combined, with higher scores indicating greater perceived 
respect for British troops in Afghanistan. 
"Images of Afghanistan " 
Individuals' perceptions of the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of the 
government and the population in Afghanistan was examined by two, nine semantic 
differential questions, which had to be answered on a five-point scale (Hurwitz, 
Peffley and Seligson, 1993): Trustworthy - Not Trustworthy (reversed scored); 
Dishonest - Honest, Repressive - Free, Friend - Enemy (reversed scored); 
Responsible - Irresponsible (reversed scored), Aggressive - Peaceful; Good - Bad 
(reversed scored), Authoritarian - Democratic, Threatening - Not Threatening. A 
tenth item was also added: Co-operative - Unco-operative (reversed scored). Two 
separate scales were created from these items, called "images of the Afghan 
government" and "images of the Afghan populace", respectively. Scale scores 
ranged from a minimum of 10 (low image) to a maximum of 50 (high image). 
"Knowledge about Afghanistan " 
To assess knowledge about the ISAF, five items were constructed that were based on 
media representations of this peace operation (see also Prior, 2002). Following 
"Some people know a lot about politics and foreign policy, others do not keep up 
with these issues. We would like to know how much you keep up with Britain's 
involvement in Afghanistan", respondents had to indicate which statement was true, 
false or whether they did not know. The five statements were as follows: "The U. S. 
is part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (False)", 
"The ISAF is confined to Afghanistan's capital Kabul (True)", "The ISAF is headed 
by British troops (True)", "The ISAF's role is to assist the Taliban in rebuilding the 
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new Afghanistan (False)", and "The ISAF operates under the auspices of NATO 
(False)". Right answers were coded as 1, and wrong and don't know answers were 
coded as 0. For each individual the sum of correct answers was computed (minimum 
=0- maximum = 5). 
"Attitudes towards the ISAF" 
Four items assessed attitudes towards the ISAF (five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly 
disagree -5= Strongly agree): "The decision to send British troops to Afghanistan 
on a peace mission was a good one", "I agree with British peacekeepers being 
deployed in Afghanistan to restore world peace", "I agree with British peacekeepers 
being a part of the ISAF to restore human rights in Afghanistan" and "British troops 
should not serve in Afghanistan in missions other than fighting a war" (reversed 
scoring). The four items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating 
greater agreement with Britain's involvement in the ISAF. 
Analyses 
The models in this study were estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
based on a covariance matrix, which incorporated the reliabilities of the respective 
scales to reduce the number of parameters to a reasonable level. In order to adjust for 
measurement error, the paths from latent variables to their indicators were set to one, 
whilst the error variances for each scale were set to the product of the scale's 
variance multiplied by one minus the scale's reliability (see Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
1996). 
The data were first screened for outliers and missing values. 23 missing values were 
identified, which were substituted by the mean following the guidelines of du Toit 
and du Toit (2001; see also JSreskorg, 2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and 
multivariate distributional properties of the data were then determined, which 
indicated that the distribution was multivariate normal with a univariate skewness 
ranging from -2.089 to 1.932 and a kurtosis ranging from -1.872 to 2.3407.2. Mardia's 
7.2 Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst 
there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can 
be assumed if this value is less than 3. 
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statistic was PK = 1.112, which also indicated that the assumption of multivariate 
normality was tenable. 
RESULTS 
General descriptive analyses 
Table 7.1 presents descriptive data for the measures used in this study and the 
correlations between these measures relating to support for the ISAF. Six out of ten 
respondents (61%) in this sample agreed with British troops being used as part of the 
ISAF to bring peace to Afghanistan, whilst 63 percent agreed with British troops 
being used as part of the ISAF to restore world peace. Six out of ten respondents 
(62%) also agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to restore 
human rights in Afghanistan. 34 percent of respondents agreed that British troops 
should not serve in Afghanistan in missions other than fighting a war. 
Table 7.1 also shows the correlations between the measures in this study and 
indicates that attitudes towards the ISAF were significantly correlated with most of 
the constructs in the model. Attitudes towards the ISAF were highly correlated with 
internationalism, militarism, multi-lateralism, perceived respect and outcome 
perceptions, and, to a lesser extent, perceptions of moral responsibility, perceived 
risk and monetary considerations. Of the core values, social trust and 
humanitarianism were significantly associated with attitudes towards the ISAF, 
political trust and patriotism. Nationalism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism 
were only weakly related to attitudes towards the ISAF. Of the demographic 
variables, only gender, education, political ideology and interest in current affairs 
were significantly associated with support for the ISAF. 
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Of the five contextual variables, outcome perceptions and perceived respect were 
most significantly related to internationalism, multi-lateralism and social trust. 
Perceived respect was also significantly associated with political trust. Perceptions of 
moral responsibility were most highly correlated with internationalism, 
humanitarianism and political trust, followed by social trust and nationalism, whilst 
monetary considerations were most strongly related to political trust, nationalism, 
humanitarianism and internationalism. Perceived risk was significantly related to 
militarism, humanitarianism and political trust. 
Of the three postures, internationalism was most strongly related to humanitarianism, 
political and social trust. Militarism was most highly associated with political trust 
and nationalism, whilst multi-lateralism was most strongly related to social trust, 
humanitarianism and political trust. Egalitarianism was correlated with 
internationalism, and weakly associated with militarism and multi-lateralism. Moral 
traditionalism was negatively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism, and 
positively correlated with militarism. 
The effects of humanitarianism, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism in the 
hierarchical model of attitudes towards the ISAF 
The previous analyses have shown that humanitarianism, social and political trust 
strongly related to the three postures and attitudes towards the ISAF in Afghanistan. 
By contrast, egalitarianism and moral traditionalism were only weakly associated 
with the three postures and ISAF attitudes. These findings begged the question as to 
whether these latter two constructs were significant predictors within the hierarchical 
model of support for the ISAF. Using structural equation modelling, the impact of 
these core values was assessed in detail. 
As in the previous chapters, a model was first estimated in which variables at more 
abstract levels influenced constructs at more specific levels, with the five contextual 
variables being modelled as the consequences of attitudes towards the ISAF rather 
than as its causes. In this model (Modell, see Figure 7.2), political trust, social trust, 
humanitarianism and patriotism had significant positive paths to internationalism. 
Militarism was positively affected by nationalism and political trust. Political and 
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social trust, humanitarianism and patriotism also had significant paths to multi- 
lateralism. Internationalism and multi-lateralism had significant positive paths to 
attitudes towards the ISAF. Contrary to expectations, militarism also had a 
significant positive effect on attitudes towards the ISAF. Attitudes towards the ISAF 
in turn positively affected outcome perceptions, perceived responsibility and 
perceived respect, and negatively influenced perceived risk and monetary 
considerations. 
Egalitarianism and moral traditionalism were only weak predictors of the three 
postures or attitudes towards the ISAF (see Table 7.2). Inspection of the modification 
indices suggested that the fit of the model could be improved if these variables were 
removed. Having excluded these constructs, the model was re-estimated, which 
showed an acceptable fit to the data (x2 = 63.67, df = 54, p= . 032, GFI = . 901, AGFI 
=. 900, RMSEA =. 066, ECVI =. I 1). 
As in the previous chapters, an alternative model (Modele) was tested, in which the 
five contextual variables were treated as indicators of attitudes towards the ISAF, and 
not their consequences. This model did not fit the data well (x2 = 92.18, df = 72, p= 
. 012, GFI = . 713, AGFI = . 712, RMSEA = . 071; ECVI = . 
16), and the model 
(Model, ) depicted in Figure 7.2 was therefore retained. Total effects for this model 
(Modell) are provided in Table 7.2. 
The effects of national images in the hierarchical model of attitudes towards the 
ISAF 
Another aim of this study was to assess the predictive power of two types of national 
images within the hierarchical model - images of the Afghan government and 
images of the Afghan population. According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1990), national 
images conceptually precede constructs at the postural level. A model (ModelIMAGEI) 
was therefore estimated in which the two types of national images were situated at a 
level of abstraction between core values and postures (see Figure 7.3). According to 
this model, images of the Afghan government showed negative paths to 
internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism, whilst images of the Afghan 
population positively affected internationalism and negatively influenced militarism. 
175 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
bA 
oA 
b 
Z 
ID 
ea 
.. n 
w 
O 
b 
O 
CC 
L. 
O 
ei 
V 
O 
rA 
.. r 
Cý 
bA 
öl 
Mý 
N 
ai 
oA 
n 
M 
II 
ö 
ý 
ö 
t} 
v 
M 
11 
ö 
.\ ej 
II II II 
Ti 
0 
N 
8K H2 w ý 
r ýo 
rl j r'1 
II 
Ei 
00 00 
O 
N 
H 
.O 
.ý 
a 
O 
H 
O 
ýC 
b 
4 
fi 
0 
y 
fi S 
_tl U 'ZS b 
Vý 
yd 
i 
Q 
U 
d 
F 
w 
C 
ö 
h 
176 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
rA 
to 
ea 
bA 
u 
Lýr 
va 
rr 
PC 
i. + 
0 
NN 
m 
ý0I 
10 
irr 
H 
r. + 
CC 
r. ý 
Q 
M 
ý{ M 
O 
M7 
I NI 
a4 II ý, NI Q NI N 
ä a 
'ý'! hM e a 
II 
ºw 
15 % 
Ir. , 
öp 
ö^ý' 
y yä 
fi m 
ý ý ry r} 0 f 
V 
ä ýo 
el 
! el 
O 
h 
ry r! `ý u 
Z9q ea 
q 
11 
ry d 
ti 
1 
"ä ö 
A 
d 
2h ä N ý Z 
177 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
GM 
CC 
". r 
b 
". r 
a 
ý4+ 
Ir 
10 
r. + 
ti 
0 
NÖ 
h t7 
Ö 
ý ý! 
^ 
pp ry II 
Ud 
> 
' 
C 
Cb 
' V 
P 
y 
ä 
O 
(yý y0. ß 
N 
z 
O 
11 
11 n 
M 
h 
ßßi 
aý b 
0 
8 
c 0 
cl 
cr 
el s. 
v 
1 
al a 
w 
N 
aý 
a oA 
w 
O 
N 
0 
n 4 
e n 
Ön 
a 
v` 
ýv 
b 
h 
ýn 
nv 
vý 
y 
ýs 
178 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
aý bA 
C43 
E 
eý 
C 
0 .., 
a 
aA c 
v 0 
u C 
cý G7 
aý b 
0 
aý 
ýv 0 
E 
eý u 
u ti. 
w. 
aý 
0 
C 
tom, 
aý 
.o w 
105. y 
u 
u 
0 
0 
b 
aý H 
.. r 
b 
it 
Cý 
10 
i: 
ri 
d 
nr 
p 
eý 
H 
"r- "Oo0 ON "T kn 
'IT ei 
en CN 
tn IO 
OO NM V) 
111-iNN't 
i 
eiNNPýOIý 
OýQINO1Oet Vnt- 
" . -ýtýf+ýONNN 
M 
v1ýnMC N0 N 
O OOON' N 
N ry 
00 N 00 0M er NN ~SIi-i 'i 
i3 
0 
ll--MýO42 V1 0U 
00 (7ý N rr 00 N 00 Nb 
--ý . --ý tý N to NNN el 
cd 
00 to M r+ OM CD 'n 
el 
,NN 
M~ NN 
N0000 V) IV MNO'YOs -M8 
ON CD ýoWt V°+0ON 00N14T 110 Net N. 0O --ý r; 
00N. rto00rrý""iOeý o0Mý--ýpý 
00 ö00l-N-N N OÖ ý 0-- U 
ýo tn of) 00 ON 0 CPS ON 00 0ý 00 r- 4) N en ON N000S0000O-NCD 5o 
--'f N-"ýN't NNOO--- 
i 
'rrs M^r±r«rx xdn. =m. rr+TMna'rioaw. c, pýar.; ý2%.: ý^: °r.,.. ., »»,. y, -gym .. }ti's°a`"^,, ý'' {ý? 
IN 1ý1 C1 N ti,; '0 
,. ': 
`M 00 ý er N V" 
bä '0 
S 
ON 
N Cs 
ý 
00 U 
et NN 00-'! ýý 
Va 11 +. 4J. an : w. rP 
w"hWi. S. N. '. wN. tla+s+YU: aA- e ". ' n ,ý 
'*MO V)5DON N-tIV 0011pNCSN00tn U 
W-1 IO© pp ON en Cs - ON O0MO- ON 
crd 
r1 ;tm O1% eý V1 mt 05 N [N N eh 00 ý-+ v1 rn (N 
`n 
ý' ONwv 'o'ýtCsONONO V1ONOIt'O- 
i 
'C3 
N tf f4 O, t- V1 1r '. D MNQ, 
en I OOCD en it MO/CNN00ON NOrnSO 
-- . --ý e+2 NNNNNNO -"ý - --ý OO . --ý -- i 
cä 
\ONCh CNN V1Nas en NCsON. "r5oCsr-0(21 
5 
NSON 'RT SON MNM0 ei 00NNMOM 
NNNtlN -+NNN -'NNNOOO -i l-+ 
-+ p 00 50 V) NM In NN ONM 54) 00 Rt NN (21, 
f4 ý-"ý M 00 M t/'f O ON $) It OS tN 00 0% 00 NN --ý M 
NNNNel N--ýNel NýýN. -ý-000- -- N 
U 
ae 
ö 
r-ý ö5 
0 
Cd 
Or. 
04 
, cn 00 
ý 
": cvrivvi%ý6 roöos- ý "., "., ý ". "" 0IM4w¢U o 
179 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
Images of the Afghan population did not significantly affect multi-lateralism. 
However, the strength of these paths did not exceed . 22. 
In turn, these images were influenced by some of the core values. Social trust had a 
direct (positive) path to images of the Afghan population and a negative path to 
images of the Afghan government. Political trust and, to a lesser extent, nationalism 
showed only significant direct (negative) paths to images of the Afghan government, 
whereas humanitarianism significantly influenced only images of the Afghan 
population. Patriotism was only weakly related to images of the Afghan population, 
whilst nationalism was only a weak influence on images of the Afghan government. 
This model (ModeliMAGEI) did not fit the data well (x2 = 105.03, df = 78, p= . 009, 
GFI = . 667, AGFI = . 659, RMSEA = . 
112, ECVI = . 21). Overall, this model 
(ModelIMAGEI) explained 41 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards the 
ISAF. It could be argued that the two types of images assessed in this study were 
themselves specific attitudes rather than longstanding predisposition. These images 
themselves could be shaped by postures rather than shaping them. This possibility 
was explored in a model (ModellMAGE2) in which images were situated at a level of 
abstraction between postures and specific attitudes towards the ISAF (see Figure 
7.4). This model also did not fit the data well (x2 = 97.18, df = 70, p= . 011, GFI = 
. 679, AGFI =. 
673, RMSEA =. 086, ECVI =. 16). 
Inspection of the modification indices indicated that the fit of the model could be 
significantly improved by adding direct paths from the core values to postures, and 
by adding direct paths from images to attitudes towards the ISAF. The model 
(ModelIMAGE3) was re-estimated with these paths included (see Figure 7.5), which 
provided a better fit to the data (x2 = 69.57, df = 55, p= . 024, GFI = . 889, AGFI = 
. 889, RMSEA = . 057, ECVI = . 09). In this model, core values 
directly affected the 
three postures and images. The three postures and two types of images directly 
influenced attitudes towards the ISAF, which in turn directly influenced the five 
contextual variables. 
Overall, this model (Modellr, oE3) fit the data better than did the conceptual model 
(Mode1JMAoEI) based on Hurwitz and Peffley (ECVI = 0.09 versus ECVI = . 21), and 
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the constructs explained 52 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards the 
ISAF (see Table 7.3 for total effects of the constructs in this model). 
The effects of specific knowledge on attitudes towards the ISAF 
Another aim of this study was to assess the impact of specific political knowledge 
within the hierarchical model. Partial correlations were first conducted to assess the 
impact of the two political knowledge measures, general and policy specific 
knowledge, on core values, postures and ISAF attitudes. 
Partial correlations? 3 were performed on general political knowledge and the model 
constructs. Because the two measures of knowledge were inter-related (r = . 51), this 
was followed by another set of analyses to assess the impact of specific political 
knowledge on the study variables when general political knowledge was corrected 
for. 
Table 7.4 indicates that when statistically corrected for by general political 
knowledge, specific political knowledge was more significantly related to the model 
constructs than was general political knowledge. In particular, specific political 
knowledge was more highly related than general knowledge to social trust, political 
trust and humanitarianism. General political knowledge was not significantly 
correlated with either images of the Afghan government or Afghan population, 
whereas policy-specific knowledge was significantly (albeit weakly) related to both 
these images. 
Table 7.4. Partial correlations between model constructs and (1) general 
political knowledge, and (2) specific political knowledge, corrected for general 
knowledge 
Construct General pol. knowledge Specific pol. Knowledge 
Social trust . 30* . 38** 
Political trust . 36* . 45** 
Humanitarianism . 34* . 39** 
Nationalism . 21 . 21 
Patriotism . 20 . 25* 
7.3 Five respondents who did not answer any of the knowledge questions and six respondents who 
replied 'don't know' to all knowledge questions were omitted from the analyses in this section, which 
are thus based on a sample of 325 participants. 
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Construct General pol. knowledge Specific pol. Knowledge 
Internationalism . 29* . 31* Militarism . 21 . 23 Multi-lateralism . 28* . 30* Attitudes towards ISAF . 26* . 39* Images of Afghan gov. . 18 . 32* Images of Afghan non. . 19 . 29* 
Note: *=p<. 05; **=p<. 01. 
On the basis of these results, a multi-group structural equation analysis was 
conducted in which the structure of support for the ISAF was investigated separately 
for respondents with high or low levels of policy-specific knowledge. For this 
purpose, the sample was divided into a high specific knowledge group who answered 
correctly at least four of the five question in the specific knowledge quiz (N = 117), 
and a low policy-specific knowledge group, consisting of respondents who had 
answered correctly a maximum of three questions (N = 208). 
It was first checked whether the constructs were equally reliable within the two 
knowledge groups (see Chapter 6). The reliabilities for each construct in the model 
are given in Table 7.5, which indicates that they were slightly more reliable in the 
politically informed group and in the uninformed one. The magnitude of these 
differences was estimated by calculating the ratio between the reliabilities of both 
samples (see Goren, 2001b), and the table shows that there were no discernible 
differences between the reliabilities from the two groups. It was therefore concluded 
that the reliabilities were approximately equal for the two groups. 
Table 7.5. Construct reliabilities by specific knowledge group 
Construct Low knowledge 
group 
High knowledge 
group 
Ratio 
Patriotism . 89 . 91 1.02 Nationalism . 89 . 85 1.05 Political Trust . 88 . 90 1.02 Social Trust . 90 . 92 1.02 Humanitarianism 
Multi-lateralism . 88 . 92 1.05 Militarism . 88 . 85 1.03 Internationalism . 89 . 93 1.05 ISAF . 91 . 93 1.02 
As in Chapter 6, a model was estimated separately within the high and low policy- 
specific knowledge groups. More specifically, two models were estimated in which 
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all paths were constrained to be equal, thus assuming that the two groups would not 
differ in parameter estimates or model fit. The models were initially constrained to 
be equal since Hurwitz and Peffley argued that individuals, independent of their 
extent of knowledge, use the hierarchical structure to generate their foreign policy 
attitudes. 
To recap from Chapter 6, if both informed and uninformed respondents rely on core 
values and postures to form their attitudes towards the ISAF, then the coefficients 
should be statistically significant in both groups, and the difference in magnitudes 
between the two groups should be statistically insignificant. However, if the use of 
core values and postures is moderated by political knowledge, then the coefficients 
should be significantly larger in the high knowledge group. Statistically significant 
differences between the two groups were determined using modification indices (see 
Chapter 6)7'4. 
Table 7.6 provides the structural coefficients and model-fit statistics. It shows that 
model fit was acceptable in both groups. The table also indicates that the coefficients 
were significant in both groups, indicating that both groups relied on these constructs 
to shape their attitudes towards the ISAF. None of the chi-square differences for the 
three postures and five core values were statistically significant? 5. 
Both the coefficients of the Afghan government and Afghan populace were 
significantly associated with attitudes towards the ISAF. However, the magnitude of 
both these coefficients was higher in the high specific knowledge group than in the 
low specific knowledge group; differences that were just statistically insignificant 
using the Bonferroni correction (E 2=6.02, df = 1, p= . 015 and Ox2 = 5.13, df = 1, p 
= . 021, respectively). 
7.4 Differences are statistically significant at p<0.005 using the Bonferroni method. 7.3 Internationalism: 0x2 = 0.51, df = 1, p= . 38; Militarism: 0x2 = 1.28., df = 1, p= . 069; Multi- lateralism: Af = 0.83, df = 1, p= . 25; Social trust: Axe = 0.80, df = 1, p= . 26; Political trust: Axe = 0.97, df = 1, p =. 30; Humanitarianism: Ax = 1.33, df = 1, p =. 078; Nationalism: Axe = 0.95, df = 1, p 
= . 38; and Patriotism: 
Eff = 0.73, df = 1, p =. 30. 
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Table 7.6. Structural equation model for attitudes towards the ISAF by level of 
policy-specific knowledge 
Attitudes towards the ISAF 
Low High 
Coefficients 
Internationalism . 488** . 547** Militarism . 254** . 402** Multi-lateralism . 309** . 481** Social trust . 216* . 388** Political trust . 211* . 364** Humanitarianism . 338** . 394** Nationalism . 286** . 191* Patriotism . 233** . 325** 
Afghan government -. 174* -. 363** 
Afghan populace . 192* . 377** 
Model Fit: 
x2 82.18* 85.73* 
Df 58 58 
GFI . 88 . 86 AGFI . 87 . 86 RMSEA . 057 . 062 N 117 208 
Note: *=p<0.05; ** =p<0.01 
DISCUSSION 
As predicted, humanitarianism emerged as a powerful predictor of attitudes towards 
the ISAF. It showed significant positive paths to internationalism and multi- 
lateralism, but had no significant path to militarism. In terms of its total effects, 
humanitarianism had a stronger effect on attitudes towards the ISAF than any of the 
other core values. Thus, not only is humanitarianism a powerful predictor of social 
welfare policies, but results also suggested that it may be a powerful influence on 
foreign policy attitudes. 
An unexpected finding was the positive relationship between militarism and attitudes 
towards the ISAF. This could be due to several factors. The operation followed 
closely behind punitive military action, and this may have made it hard for 
individuals to distinguish between the different operations. Alternatively, September 
11`x' may have had a significant impact on the effect of militarism on public attitudes. 
Furthermore, the public may have perceived the humanitarian mission as just a small 
184 
Chapter 7 Political knowledge revisited 
part of a larger more belligerent operation, the so called "War on Terror". 
Retrospectively, it is hard to make strong assertions about this issue, but a detailed 
study of media representations of Britain's involvement within Afghanistan at this 
time period may help to clarify the role of militarism on public opinion (see Myers, 
Klak & Koehl, 1996 for an analysis of how the news coverage of Rwanda and 
Bosnia affected attitudes towards these missions). 
Images and foreign policy attitudes 
Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) proposed that specific foreign policy preferences reflect 
an integration of national images and dispositional factors. In particular, they argued 
that core values influence national images, which, in turn, influence foreign policy 
postures and through them specific attitudes. However, the results of the structural 
equation analyses suggested that the effects of national images on support for the 
ISAF did not strictly follow the structure postulated by Hurwitz and Peffley. Indeed, 
the conceptual model based on Hurwitz and Peffley showed a poor fit to the data. 
Although images were influenced by core values, images did not influence postures 
in a significant way. Based on modification indices, a model was estimated in which 
core values influenced both images and postures, and in which both postures and 
images affected attitudes towards the ISAF. 
Although contrary to findings by Hurwitz and Peffley (1992) and others (e. g. Murray 
& Cowden, 1999; Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002), the findings in this study are 
similar to those of Herrmann and Keller (2001) who reported that perceptions of 
different countries were not significantly related to value dispositions, such as 
political ideology, internationalism or militarism. 
What could explain this discrepancy between the results in this study and previous 
research? Existing research of images within the hierarchical model has 
predominantly relied on enemy images of the Soviet Union. It could be argued that 
these images were longstanding and ingrained in the American psyche. According to 
Kegley and Wittkopf (1987), the Soviet Union had spearheaded the communist 
challenge and American foreign policy had to be dedicated to the containment of 
Soviet expansionism and influence. Furthermore, according to Hurwitz and Peffley 
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(1990, p. 7), "perceptions of Soviet threat may be quite global and visceral, resting on 
general assessments that the Soviet Union ... poses a danger to the security and well- 
being of the United States". It can hardly be claimed that similar "visceral" 
perceptions underlay either images of the Afghan government or the Afghan 
populace. Indeed, Afghanistan quite possible did not figure greatly in the British 
psyche until after the September 11th attacks. The placement of post-Cold War 
images may need to be re-conceptualised within the hierarchical model, an issue that 
is revisited in the next chapter. 
Although images did not affect postures, they did significantly influence attitudes 
towards the ISAF. Images of the Afghan government had a significant negative 
effect on attitudes towards the ISAF, whilst images of the Afghan population had 
significant positive effects on ISAF attitudes. Thus, respondents who held images of 
the government as untrustworthy, aggressive and uncooperative, and images of the 
populace as trustworthy, peaceful, co-operative and friendly held more positive 
attitudes towards a peace operation in that country. These results, therefore, suggest 
that beliefs about the trustworthiness of a foreign nation have remained a key factor 
in organising attitudes in the post-Cold War era (Chanley, 1999). These findings also 
suggest that it may be productive to study images of both sides in a modern conflict. 
As well as being positively related to social trust, political trust and humanitarianism, 
images of Afghanistan were to some degree also affected by specific political 
knowledge. The results indicated that respondents with high specific knowledge of 
the ISAF appeared to rely more on images of the Afghan government and populace 
in shaping their attitudes towards the ISAF than did respondents with no such 
specific knowledge. However, the differences between the groups were insignificant. 
Nevertheless, this suggests that people may have based their judgement about the 
trustworthiness of the Afghan government or population not only on a country- 
specific evaluation, but also that these perceptions arose from a general proclivity to 
trust or mistrust others or to be concerned about others in need (e. g. Bartels, 1994; 
Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). Similarly, both images were significantly related to 
political trust. Politically trusting respondents were more likely to have negative 
perceptions of the Afghan government and more positive images of the Afghan 
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population than did politically cynical respondents. These results suggest a potential 
interplay between situational information and general predispositions. Such an 
interaction has been suggested by Herrman and colleagues (1999; see also Jenkins- 
Smith et al., 2004 and Herrmann & Keller, 2004), who have argued that mass 
decisions can be explained in terms of a quasi-rational integration of value 
disposition and strategic situational assessments. Future research on differing geo- 
political contexts may highlight the significance of situational variables in structuring 
public opinion. 
These results also affirm that images or stereotypes of other people and nations are 
important to the understanding of international attitudes (e. g. Hewstone, 1986). 
According to Tajfel (1981, p. 148) "the essential cognitive function of stereotyping is 
thus to systemise and simplify information from the social environment in order to 
make sense of the world that would otherwise by too complex and chaotic for 
effective action. " Stereotypes also fulfil social functions; "first, their role in 
contributing to the creation and maintenance of group `ideologies', explaining or 
justifying a variety of social actions; and second, their role in helping to preserve or 
create positively valued differentiations between one's own and other social groups" 
(Tajfel, 1981, p. 148). 
General versus policy-specific political knowledge 
According to Johns (2002), studies exploring the impact of knowledge require a 
detailed measure of knowledge that is specific to the independent variable under 
investigation. The simple correlations indicated that attitudes towards the ISAF were 
significantly related to both general political knowledge and policy-specific 
knowledge. As shown by the results in the previous chapter with regards to general 
political knowledge, the current results indicated that respondents with high policy- 
specific knowledge did not rely on core values and postures to constrain their 
attitudes towards the ISAF anymore than did respondents with low policy-specific 
knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results presented here showed that policy-specific political knowledge had no 
influence over the degree to which individuals used core values and postures to shape 
their attitudes. Contrary to expectations, findings from the present study also showed 
that images directly influenced attitudes and should be placed at the same level as 
postures within the hierarchical model. 
Additionally, and concurring with the results of other studies (e. g. Page & Shapiro, 
1992; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990), egalitarianism and moral traditionalism did not play 
a significant role in structuring foreign policy attitudes in the present study. Chapter 
3 discussed how social and political attitudes can be structured along two 
dimensions, a dimension of authoritarianism, and a dimension of egalitarianism. 
Following the reasoning of Duckitt (2001), egalitarianism would be subsumed within 
one dimension, whilst moral traditionalism would be contained within the other. The 
most powerful predictive measures of these dimensions are RWA and SDO (e. g. 
Altemeyer, 1998), and the next chapter investigates the effects of RWA and SDO 
upon the hierarchical model and attitudes towards peace operations. 
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WAR AND PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN 
As discussed in Chapter 3, of the many individual difference measures used to 
predict the rejection of out-groups and prejudice, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) 
and social dominance orientation (SDO) are widely held to be the most important by 
contemporary researchers (e. g. Altemeyer, 1998; Doty, Winter, Peterson & 
Kemmelmeier, 1997; Duckitt, 2001). Both RWA and SDO have also been shown to 
predict powerfully a wide range of political attitudes (e. g. Pratto et al., 1994). 
Another belief that might be an important construct to consider in international 
attitudes is a belief in a just world (BJW). Although existing evidence for this 
suggestion is scant, research indicates that BJW predicted attitudes towards the 
Kosovo War and the War in Afghanistan. The impact of BJW alongside SDO and 
RWA was therefore also assessed in this study. 
The relationship between images and attitudes towards peace operations had been 
explored in the previous chapter. It was shown that the model proposed by Hurwitz 
and Peffley (1990) did not provide a good fit to the data, and a re-conceptualisation 
was proposed. The present study tested this revised model. 
The impact of these and the variables assessed in previous chapters were investigated 
with respect to both a peace operation and a combat mission. This was made possible 
by the unique political situation in Afghanistan in April 2002, when British troops 
were involved simultaneously in a peace operation in Kabul (ISAF) and a combat 
mission in other areas of Afghanistan. 
Chapter 8 War and peace in Afghanistan 
RNA and SDO 
As outlined in Chapter 3, SDO refers to the extent to which "one desires that one's 
ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups" (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). Recent 
research has shown that people high in SDO are more likely to support military 
programmes in general (e. g. Cohrs, Moschner, Kielmann & Mass, 2002) as well as to 
support specific military operations in the Gulf War (Pratto, Stallworth & Conway- 
Lanz, 1998; see also Sidanius & Liu, 1992) and Afghanistan (Henry, Sidanius, 
Levin, Pratto, & Nammour, 2002). 
However, SDO does not unconditionally predict support for war. Pratto and 
colleagues (1994) investigated the effect of SDO on two types of war - Wars of 
Dominance (e. g. to protect economic interests, to have influence in that country) and 
Wars for Humanitarian Reasons (e. g. to ensure human rights, to protect civilians). 
They found that SDO was positively related to Wars of Dominance and negatively 
associated with Humanitarian Wars. Pratto and colleagues (1994, p. 758) therefore 
concluded that rather than predisposing individuals to support war unconditionally, 
"SDO predisposes people to endorse group dominance ideologies, thus facilitating 
support for wars of dominance. " 
RWA is seen as comprising tendencies to authoritarian submission, authoritarian 
aggression and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1998). Authoritarianism has also been 
repeatedly linked to support for military interventions. For example, authoritarianism 
has been linked to support for wars in general (e. g. Cohrs et al., 2002) as well as the 
Vietnam War (e. g. Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Izzett, 1971), the Gulf War 
1990/1991 (Doty, Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Stephan, Berger, 
Schmidt & Herrmann, 1995) and the Kosovo War (Bartholomes, Gericke, 
Hartenstein et al., 1999, Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). A strong correlation between 
authoritarianism and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights has also 
been reported by Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) and Cohrs and colleagues 
(2002). Furthermore, investigating American responses to the attacks of September 
1 Vh, Henderson-King and colleagues (2004) found that RWA was a significant 
predictor of the use of military force, increased surveillance and detention, attacking 
terrorists and sending aid to Afghanistan. 
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However, empirical research has predominantly explored the relationship between 
SDO, RIVA and military interventions. Thus, the effects of these two variables on 
attitudes towards peace operations needed to be validated. 
Belief in a just world 
Previous chapters have highlighted the importance of social trust in shaping attitudes 
towards peace operations. According to Janoff-Bulman (1992), not only are beliefs 
about people an important facet of an individual's fundamental assumptions, but 
beliefs about the world also play a significant role. 
The Belief in a Just World (BJW) postulates that, "individuals have a need to believe 
that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve" (Lerner & 
Miller, 1978, p. 1030). This hypothesis was originally formulated by Lerner (1965) 
to help explain why individuals might blame victims of misfortune for their own fate. 
Stated simply, BJW thus refers to the belief that good things happen to good people 
and bad things happen to bad people. According to Lerner and Miller (1978, p. 
1030), 
The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront his 
physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly. 
Without such a belief it would be difjlcult for the individual to commit 
himself to the pursuit of long range goals or even to the socially regulated 
behavior of day to day life. 
This hypothesis was subsequently developed to conceptualise BJW as an inter- 
individually varying disposition (Rubin & Peplau, 1975). According to this 
conceptualisation, the more individuals believe in a just world, the more they will 
rationalise inequalities, the less sympathetically they will react towards injustice, and 
the more they will derogate victims of social injustice. 
Indeed, research has highlighted the strong correlations between BJW and negative 
attitudes towards disadvantaged targets, such as individuals from economically 
deprived backgrounds (e. g. Furnham & Gunter, 1984) or poor countries (e. g. Harper 
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& Manasse, 1992), the unemployed (e. g. Montada & Mohiyeddini, 1998), the elderly 
(e. g. Begue & Bastounis, 2003) or immigrants and foreign workers (e. g. Dalbert & 
Yamauchi, 1994). Applebaum (2002) also reported that students with a weak BJW 
judged potential recipients of aid as more deserving than did students with a strong 
BJW. 
A great number of studies have explored the link between attitudes towards third 
world poverty and BJW. A common finding from these studies is that individuals 
with high BJW are more likely to attribute poverty to the victim's dispositional 
factors (e. g. Cambell, Carr & MacLachlan, 2001). In contrast, individuals with a 
weaker BJW are more likely to agree that poverty in the developing world is the 
result of situational factors, such as war, corruption or exploitation (e. g. Harper & 
Manasse, 1992). 
Although the concept of justice-injustice should be particularly relevant to the study 
of the use of force and international conflict, this link has rarely been assessed 
directly. Indirect evidence comes from a study by Maes (1998), who found that 
individuals who believed that the world is just were more likely to trust the 
government, which supported the Kosovo War, than were individuals who held 
contrary beliefs. Similarly, Cohrs and colleagues (2002) reasoned that the concept of 
justice should be particularly relevant in the domain of militaristic attitudes since 
many military interventions are framed in terms of establishing justice. They found 
that perceived justice was negatively related with attitudes towards military 
interventions in general, and military interventions against terrorism and the 
enforcement of human rights in particular. The authors suggested that this 
relationship was mediated by political trust, which they had not assessed. However, 
in another study the belief in just world did not directly influence attitudes towards 
the Kosovo War, but showed indirect influences through militarism and trust in 
government (Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). 
Two recent studies have also reported a link between BJW and a desire for revenge 
after the September 11ý' attacks. Kaiser, Vick and Major (2004) found that the more 
individuals endorsed beliefs in a just world before the September 11`h attacks, the 
more they felt distressed and threatened by the attacks, and the more they desired 
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retaliatory political actions. Similarly, Henderson-King and colleagues (2004) 
reported that BJW was significantly related to using military force and attacking 
terrorists after the attacks of September 11`h. 
Thus, there are theoretical and empirical grounds for investigating the importance of 
BJW in shaping attitudes towards peace operations, which were explored with 
respect to a humanitarian intervention and a combat mission in Afghanistan. 
BJW, R`VA and SDO - Relationship with core values 
Several studies have also shown that SDO, RWA and BJW conceptually precede 
core values (e. g. Duckitt et al., 2002). For example, using path analysis, Pratto and 
colleagues (1998; see also Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) showed that a model in which 
SDO indirectly affected attitudes towards military programmes through nationalism 
and conservatism provided a better fit than did an alternative model in which SDO 
directly influenced military attitudes. 
Indeed, social-psychological research points to a complex relationship between SDO, 
RWA, BJW and the other constructs relevant to this study. For example, given that 
has been linked to derogatory social attitudes, it is perhaps paradoxical that BJW has 
been related to social trust. According to Lerner (1980), however, the more 
individuals believe in a just world, the more positive their perception of others in 
general should be. Indeed, Begue (2002) reported that a just world belief was the 
most important predictor of interpersonal trust. Begue (2002, p. 377) reasoned that 
this is because "someone whose world is perceived as just must be just himself, and 
hence must be trustworthy. " Similarly, Dalbert, Lipkus, Sallay & Goch (2001) 
argued that individuals with a high BJW are more likely to believe that others will 
treat him or her fairly than are individuals with a low BJW. 
A similar positive relationship has also been reported between BJW and political 
trust. Peplau and Tyler (1975), for example, found that people who believed the 
world was just were less cynical about politics and politicians than were people who 
believed the world was unjust. Zuckermann & Gerbasi (1977) also showed that 
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respondents who scored high on BJW were more trusting in the government's 
position on various public issues than respondents who scored low on BJW. 
There is also evidence that SDO is related to some of the core values that have been 
assessed in previous chapters. Several studies have linked SDO with nationalism and 
patriotism (e. g. Duckitt et al., 2002; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz & Federico, 1998; 
Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto et al., 1998). Similarly, SDO has been found to be 
negatively related to empathy and altruism (Pratto et al., 1994). 
Strong relationships between RWA and nationalism have also been reported (e. g. 
Altermeyer & Kamenshikov, 1991; Duckitt et al., 2002; Oesterreich, 1998). Studies 
have also shown that authoritarianism is strongly related to trust in government (e. g. 
Altemeyer, 1998). Thus, one would expect authoritarianism to be more strongly 
related to support for an international intervention if the government is trusted than if 
it is not. 
Existing work in the foreign policy area has not made a structural distinction between 
SDO, RWA, BJW and core values, that is, it has assessed these constructs on the 
same level of abstraction as social trust or nationalism (e. g. Cohrs & Moschner, 
2002). Therefore, the position and effects of SDO, RWA and BJW within the 
hierarchical model were also investigated. 
Attitudes towards war and humanitarian interventions 
The issues mentioned above were explored with respect to a unique political 
situation in Afghanistan in April 2002, when British troops were concurrently 
involved in a peace operation in Kabul (ISAF) and a combat mission in other areas of 
Afghanistan. This allowed attitudes towards peace operations and combat missions to 
be assessed simultaneously within the same population. 
Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) proposed that the determinants of attitudes 
towards humanitarian interventions are different from those for conventional 
warfare. It was hoped that the political situation at the time of the study would 
illuminate how these two sets of attitudes might differ. 
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Political context 
In addition to spearheading the ISAF in Kabul, British troops were also deployed to 
Afghanistan to continue the military fight against Al Qaida. In March 2002,1,700 
Royal Marines were deployed to Afghanistan as Task Force JACANA to play their 
part, alongside other coalition forces, in the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure 
in eastern Afghanistan. This task force was the largest offensive ground operation 
involving UK forces since the Gulf conflict 1990/91. The Task Force withdrew from 
Afghanistan in July 2002. 
Study aims and hypotheses 
In addition to the predictions made in previous chapters, the literature reviewed 
above leads to the following hypotheses: 
"Effects of SDO, RWA and BJW within the hierarchical model " 
Based on previous research (e. g. Pratto et al., 1994) that SDO, nationalism and 
patriotism reflect an attitudinal bias to favour the national in-group, a positive 
relationship was expected between SDO, nationalism and patriotism. Furthermore, 
because the concern for others mitigates the desire to dominate other groups (e. g. 
Pratto et al., 1994), it was predicted that SDO was negatively related to 
humanitarianism. 
According to Pratto and colleagues (1998), individuals high in SDO are more likely 
to support military intervention than those low in SDO because such interventions re- 
assert a country's dominant position with respect to other countries. It was therefore 
predicted that SDO would positively correlate with militarism and attitudes towards 
the combat mission. Based on Pratto and colleagues (1994), SDO should be 
negatively associated with attitudes towards the ISAF. 
The impact of SDO on internationalism and multi-lateralism has not previously been 
tested, and predictions were therefore made tentatively. Several studies have shown 
that SDO was negatively related to choosing co-operative strategies (e. g. Schafer, 
1997a), and as multi-lateralism represents joint-action and co-operation between 
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countries and organisations, it could be argued that SDO should have a negative 
relationship with multi-lateralism. 
Similarly, internationalism refers to the extent to which an individual believes that it 
is in their nation's interest to get involved in international affairs. Internationalism 
could also be related to increased tolerance for other national or ethnic groups. 
Consequently, it could be argued that individuals who endorse internationalism are 
less likely to endorse hierarchical or prejudicial attitudes towards other ethnic or 
national groups, suggesting that SDO should be negatively related to 
internationalism. 
Since individuals high in RWA tend to be submissive to the views of important 
others, such as the government (e. g. Oesterreicher, 1998), it was hypothesised that 
RWA would be positively related to political trust. Based on findings by Altemeyer 
(1996) and Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) that individuals high in RWA support 
inter-group aggression, it was also expected that RWA was positively associated 
with militarism and attitudes towards the combat mission. 
Since RWA is also associated with an ethnocentric view of the world (e. g. 
Altemeyer, 1996), individuals high in RWA should not be interested in the situation 
in other countries, and therefore RWA should be negatively related to 
internationalism. Overall, it was expected that RWA would be positively related to 
attitudes towards the combat mission and the ISAF, largely as a function of its 
association with political trust. 
BJW refers to the belief that people get what they deserve. Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that such beliefs should be negatively related to attitudes towards peace 
operations in that respondents who believe in a just world should be more likely to 
believe that Afghanistan had created its own problems. Conversely, it could be 
argued that BJW should be positively related to attitudes towards the combat mission 
and the humanitarian mission since respondents high in BJW could view the combat 
mission as a punitive measure, as part of the "War on Terror", in which Afghanistan 
got what it deserved. 
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In a similar vein, BJW should be negatively associated with humanitarianism. It 
could be argued that since people high in BJW typically blame victims of misfortune 
for their fate, respondents high in BJW should be less likely to show concern for the 
well-being of others than participants low in BJW. Based on previous research 
(Begue, 2002), it was also argued that BJW would be positively related to social trust 
and political trust. 
Based on results from the previous chapter, it was expected that images are situated 
at the same level of abstraction as postures, thereby influencing attitudes towards the 
ISAF and the combat mission and being influenced by core values. No hypotheses 
were made about the relationships between SDO, RWA, BJW and images. 
METHOD 
Sample composition 
304 respondents participated in this postal survey, which was carried out in 
Guildford at the end of April 2002. Of the 600 questionnaires that had been 
distributed, 309 were returned, of which five had to be discarded because of 
incomplete information. Overall, the return rate for this survey was 51%. The 
questionnaire took about 30 minutes to complete. 
Compared to Census data (see Appendix H for details), the sample over-represented 
male respondents, those aged 30-44 and 45-59, those having A-levels and O-levels, 
and those in working in professional (Class 2), personal service (Level 6) and 
elementary occupations (Level 9), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and 
over, those with a degree and with no qualifications, and those in managerial (Class 
1), administrative (Class 4) and skilled trade occupations (Class 5). 
The sample was weighted on these characteristics to address these biases and to 
achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All the analyses in 
this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted. 
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Measures 
In addition to the measures outlined in the previous chapter, this study also assessed 
the following variables (see Appendix I for details of the items used in this survey): 
"Attitudes towards the combat mission" 
Attitudes towards the combat mission in Afghanistan were assessed by four items 
(five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree). These items 
included: "I approve of British troops participating in military strikes against the 
Taliban and A1'Qaida", "I approve of the way Tony Blair is handling the British 
response to the terrorist attacks on 1P' September", "I oppose British troops being 
involved in military action in Afghanistan (reversed scoring)" and "I approve of 
British troops participating in military air strikes to restore world peace". These four 
items were combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating higher agreement 
with the combat mission. 
"Social dominance orientation" 
Attitudes towards inter-group relations and support for hierarchy-enhancing myths 
were assessed with a 14-item SDO measure (Pratto et at., 1994; seven-point Likert 
scale: 1= Very negative to 7= Very positive). Items in this measure included: "It is 
important that we treat other countries as equal (reverse scoring)", "This country 
would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are", and "Some 
people are just more worthy that others". The 14 items were combined into a scale. 
Previous studies indicated good internal consistency and validity (see Pratto & 
Sidanius, 1999). Higher scores on this scale indicate a greater belief in inequality 
amongst social groups. 
"R WA" 
A 24-item RWA scale was used to measure authoritarian submission, authoritarian 
aggression and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981; seven-point Likert scale: 1= 
Disagree strongly to 7= Agree strongly). Items included: "Our customs and national 
heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to 
show greater respect for them", "Youngster should be taught to refuse to fight in a 
war unless they themselves agree the war is just and necessary (reversed scoring)", 
Chapter 8 War and peace in Afghanistan 
and "It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election campaign, but 
once a man becomes the leader of our country we owe him our greatest support and 
loyalty. " These items were combined into a scale, with higher scores reflecting 
greater endorsement of RWA. 
"Just world belief' 
Belief in a just world was measured with an instrument developed by Lipkus, Dalbert 
and Siegler (1996), following criticism of the internal validity of the scale proposed 
by Rubin and Peplau (1973,1975; see Furnham & Procter, 1989, Furnham, 2001). 
This measure asks participants to express their agreement or disagreement with eight 
statements that assess beliefs about justice (five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly 
disagree" to 5= Strongly agree). Items included: "I feel the world treats people 
fairly", "By and large, people get what they deserve" and "I feel that when people 
meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves". The eight items were 
combined into a scale, with greater scores on this scale indicating a greater belief in a 
just world for others. 
The descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations amongst all the 
constructs in this study are provided in Table 8.1. 
Analyses 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on a covariance matrix was used to estimate 
the models in this study, which incorporated the reliabilities of the respective scales 
to reduce the number of parameters to a reasonable level (e. g. Schumaker & Lomax, 
1996). To adjust for measurement error, the paths from latent variables to their 
indicators were set to one, whilst the error variances for each scale were set to the 
product of the scale's variance multiplied by one minus the scale's reliability (see 
Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). 
28 missing values were identified during data screening, which were imputed from 
the mean following the guidelines of du Toit and du Toit (2001; see also Jöreskorg, 
2001). Using PRELIS 2.5, the univariate and multivariate distributional properties of 
the data were then assessed, which indicated that the distribution was multivariate 
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normal with a univariate skewness ranging from -1.728 to 2.024, and a kurtosis 
ranging from -1.903 to 2.3508.1. Multivariate kurtosis (Mardia's statistic) was also 
assessed, which equalled 1.511, which also indicated that the assumption of 
multivariate normality was tenable. 
RESULTS 
General descriptive analyses 
Consistent with findings from the previous chapter, almost six out of ten respondents 
(59%) agreed with British troops being used as part of the ISAF to being peace to 
Afghanistan. Similarly, six out of ten respondents (61%) agreed with British troops 
being used as part of the ISAF to restore world peace, with 62% also agreeing with 
British troops being used as part of the ISAF to restore human rights in Afghanistan. 
Over six out of ten respondents (67%) also approved of British troops participating in 
military strikes against the Taliban and Al'Qaida. A similar percentage of 
respondents (66%) also agreed with British troops participating in military strikes in 
Afghanistan to restore world peace, whilst 35% were opposed to British troops being 
involved in military action in Afghanistan. 
Table 8.1 provides the correlations between the measures used in this study and 
shows that attitudes towards the ISAF and the combat mission were significantly 
related to most variables under investigation. Attitudes towards the ISAF and the 
combat mission were moderately correlated (r = . 49), indicating that respondents 
who agreed with British participation in the humanitarian intervention also agreed 
with British involvement in military action in Afghanistan. Both attitudes were 
significantly related to internationalism, multi-lateralism and militarism. Militarism 
was related to attitudes towards the combat mission as well as attitudes towards the 
ISAF. 
8.1 Kline (1998) recommenced absolute value cut-offs of 3.0 for skewness and 8.0 for kurtosis. Whilst 
there is no standard cut-off for multivariate normality, Kline suggests that multivariate normality can 
be assumed if this value is less than 3. 
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As predicted, RWA was positively correlated with both attitudes towards the ISAF 
and the combat mission. As predicted, SDO was positively related to attitudes 
towards the combat mission. Contrary to predictions, however, SDO was also 
positively correlated with attitudes towards the ISAF. Finally, contrary to 
predictions, BJW were positively correlated with both attitudes towards the ISAF 
and the combat mission. 
The following sections will explore the relationships amongst these constructs and 
their effect on the missions in Afghanistan in more detail using structural equation 
modelling. 
SDO, RWA, BJW and attitudes towards the ISAF and the concurrent combat 
mission 
The ISAF 
It was argued that SDO, RWA and BJW should conceptually precede other core 
values, such as political trust and nationalism. A hierarchical model (ModelISAFI) was 
therefore estimated in which these "worldviews" were placed at a higher level of 
abstraction than core values (see Figure 8.1). In addition, attitudes towards the ISAF 
affected the five contextual variables in this model. This model fit the data well (x2 = 
89.03, df = 83, p= . 039, GFI = . 902, AGFI = . 902, RMSEA = . 
062, ECVI = . 08). 
Overall, this model explained 47 percent of the total variance in attitudes towards the 
ISAF. 
Figure 8.1 shows that RWA and BJW had significant positive paths to political trust, 
whilst BJW also showed a significant positive path to social trust. By contrast, SDO 
and RWA had significant negative paths to social trust. SDO and RWA, but not 
BJW, had significant positive paths to nationalism and patriotism. Finally, SDO and 
RWA had significant negative paths to humanitarianism, whilst BJW showed a 
positive path to humanitarianism. 
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Political trust, social trust, patriotism and humanitarianism had significant positive 
effects on internationalism, whilst nationalism had a significant negative path to 
internationalism. Political trust, humanitarianism and nationalism also had significant 
positive effects on militarism, whilst social trust a significant negative effect. 
Political trust, social trust, patriotism and humanitarianism all had significant 
positive paths to multi-lateralism. Overall, political trust and humanitarianism were 
the strongest predictors (in terms of total effects) of attitudes towards the ISAF in 
Afghanistan (see Table 8.2). 
In turn, internationalism, militarism and multi-lateralism had significant positive 
effects on attitudes towards the ISAF. Attitudes towards the ISAF showed significant 
positive paths to outcome perceptions, perceived responsibility and perceived respect 
and significant negative paths to perceived risk and monetary considerations 8.2. 
To assess whether SDO, RWA and BJW also influenced the three postures and 
attitudes towards the ISAF directly, a model (ModellsAF2) was re-estimated with 
these paths included. This model also fit the data well (x2 = 86.88, df = 71, p= . 031, 
GFI =. 905, AGFI =. 905, RMSEA =. 059). However, this model did not fit the data 
significantly better than ModellsAFi (0x2 = 2.15, df = 12, p= . 32), and the strictly 
hierarchical ModellsAFi shown in Figure 8.1 was retained. 
Finally, to explore whether SDO, RWA and BJW could be placed at the same level 
of abstraction as the other core values, an alternative model (ModellsAF3) was 
estimated in which these three constructs were situated alongside other core values 
(%2 = 139.88, df = 92, p =. 010, GFI =. 758, AGFI =. 759, RMSEA =. 094, ECVI = 
. 16). This Modelj$AF3 
did not fit the data better than did ModelisAFi (ECVI = . 07 
versus ECVI = . 16), and ModelISAFI shown 
in Figure 8.1 was retained. 
The influence of SDO, RWA and BJW on attitudes towards the ISAF was therefore 
best conceptualised as indirect through core values and postures. 
8.2 An alternative model (Model, SAFIA) in which the five policy-specific variables influenced attitudes 
towards the ISAF was also estimated. This model did not fit the data well (x2 = 115.03, df = 95, p= 
. 012, GFI =. 774, 
AGFI =. 774, RMSEA =. 12, ECVI =. 17). This alternative model (ModelISAFIA) did 
not fit better than did ModelIsAFI (ECVI =. 17 versus ECVI =. 08) and ModellsAFI was retained. 
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The combat mission 
When the hierarchical model (ModelcoMB1) was estimated for attitudes towards the 
combat mission in Afghanistan (x2 = 86.12, df = 83, p= . 047, GFI = . 914, 
AGFI = 
. 914, RMSEA = . 048, 
ECVI = . 07; see Figure 8.2), a similar picture to that of 
attitudes towards the ISAF emerged. As predicted, militarism was positively 
associated with attitudes towards the combat mission. Indeed, militarism was a 
stronger predictor of combat attitudes than internationalism or multi-lateralism8.3. 
As in the previous section, two alternative models were estimated that explored 
whether SDO, RWA and BJW shaped attitudes towards the combat mission directly 
(ModelcoMB2: x2 = 79.09, df = 71, p= . 042, GFI = . 921, AGFI = . 
921, RMSEA = 
. 043, ECVI = . 07), and whether these three constructs should 
be placed at the same 
level of abstraction as core values (ModelcoMB3: x2 = 135.34, df = 96, p= . 017, GFI 
= . 767, AGFI = . 766, RMSEA = . 
092, ECVI = . 15). Neither model provided a 
better 
fit to the data than did ModelcoMBi (ModelcoMßt - ModelcoMB2 =i2=7.03, df = 12, 
p= . 15; ModelcoMBi - ModelcoMB3 = 
ECVI = . 07 vs. ECVI = . 15, respectively), and 
ModelcoMBi was therefore retained. 
The effect of images on attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan 
To explore the effect of images within the hierarchical model, a model (ModelISAF») 
based on findings from the previous chapter was estimated in which images were 
situated at the same level of abstraction as postures. Images were therefore shaped by 
core values and influenced attitudes towards the ISAF independently of postures. 
According to this model, political trust and social trust showed negative paths to 
images of the Afghan government. In turn, images of the Afghan government had a 
negative path to attitudes towards the ISAF. Political trust, social trust and 
humanitarianism showed positive paths to images of the Afghan population, which in 
turn had a positive path to attitudes towards the ISAF (see Figure 8.3). The model fit 
8.3 To investigate whether the five contextual factors influenced attitudes towards the combat mission 
an alternative model (ModelcoMain) was also estimated. This model did not fit the data well (x2 = 
111.25, df = 95, p= . 019, GFI = . 779, AGFI = . 779, RMSEA = . 13, ECVI = . 18). This Alternative Model (ModelcoMßin) did not fit better than did ModelcoMBI (ECVI = . 18 versus ECVI = . 07) and ModelcoMBI was retained. 
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the data well (x2 = 101.23, df = 90, p= . 048, GFI = . 938, AGFI = . 938, RMSEA = 
. 047, ECVI =. 06). 
To test whether a model following Hurwitz and Peffley's (1990) conceptualisation 
provided a better fit to the data, a model (ModelISAFI2) was estimated in which images 
were situated between core values and postures. This model did not fit the data very 
well (x2 = 148.51, df = 116, p= . 014, GFI = . 788, AGFI = . 781, RMSEA = . 085, 
ECVI = . 15), and fit the data 
less well than did the previous model (Model! sAFII; 
ECVI = . 15 versus ECVI = . 
06). The model (ModelISAFu) shown in Figure 8.3 was 
retained (see Table 8.3 for the total effects within this model). 
Finally, a model was estimated in which SDO, RWA and BJW directly affected the 
two images. In this model only SDO showed a significant negative path to images of 
the Afghan population, whereas BJW showed a positive path to images of the 
Afghan population. RWA did not significantly affect either image nor did BJW and 
SDO show significant paths to images of the Afghan government. The fit of the 
model was acceptable (x2 = 100.00, df = 84, p= . 041, GFI = . 940, AGFI = . 939, 
RMSEA = . 044, ECVI = . 
06). However, this model (ModeIIsAF13) did not fit the data 
significantly better than did the original model (ModelisAFlt; 0x2 = 1.23, df = 6, p= 
. 52), and the more parsimonious model (ModellsAF») in Figure 8.3 was retained. 
To investigate whether a similar relationship existed between images and attitudes 
towards the combat mission in Afghanistan, a model (ModelcoMB>>) was tested that 
was identical to the structure retained above. The model fit the data well (x2 = 99.14, 
df = 90, p =. 037, GFI =. 912, AGFI = . 912, RMSEA =. 049, ECVI =. 06). 
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DISCUSSION 
This study investigated the different attitudinal bases of attitudes towards war and 
attitudes towards a humanitarian operation. With the exception of militarism being a 
stronger predictor of attitudes towards the combat mission than the ISAF, attitudes 
towards the two interventions were otherwise very similar. Indeed, attitudes towards 
the combat mission and attitudes towards the ISAF were moderately correlated (r = 
. 49). Both attitudes were positively related to 
internationalism and multi-lateralism. 
In terms of total effects, both attitudes were most positively influenced by political 
trust and humanitarianism, followed by patriotism and social trust. Finally, both 
attitudes were also positively related to SDO, RWA and BJW (in terms of total 
effects). 
This finding is contrary to Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001), who have argued that a 
distinction needs to be made between attitudes towards conventional war issues and 
attitudes towards humanitarian interventions. Indeed, Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff 
(2001) proposed that attitudes towards humanitarian interventions are a novel 
attitude dimension and should therefore show a different relationship with 
psychological predictors than attitudes towards a conventional war. 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, it may be harder to distinguish 
between contemporary peace operations and conventional combat missions in terms 
of the use of force and rules of engagement (e. g. Langholtz, 1998). This distinction 
may become even more blurred when humanitarian arguments are used in support of 
both peace operations and combat missions. Indeed, contrary to predictions, 
humanitarianism was positively related to militarism in both SEM models of 
attitudes towards the ISAF and attitudes towards the combat mission. In terms of 
total effects, humanitarianism was also the strongest predictor of attitudes towards 
both types of intervention, followed by political trust. An analysis of the media 
representations of the war in Afghanistan and Britain's involvement in the ISAF may 
shed some light on this issue (see Myers, Klak & Koehl, 1996). 
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SDO, RWA and BJW and attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan 
Although SDO and RWA did not directly affect attitudes towards the ISAF or the 
combat mission in the model, an examination of the total effects indicated that both 
SDO and RWA were related to mission attitudes. Contrary to predictions, SDO was 
positively related (in terms of total effects) to both attitudes towards the ISAF and 
attitudes towards the combat mission. 
This finding is contrary to that of Pratto et al. (1994), who showed that SDO was 
positively related to attitudes towards war and negatively related to attitudes towards 
humanitarian action. However, as discussed above, this may indicate that the ISAF 
was not perceived solely as a humanitarian mission but as part of a larger anti- 
terrorist action or as the enforcement of basic human rights. Two studies (Cohrs et 
al., 2002; Henry et al, 2002) have found positive relationships between SDO and 
RWA with both the fight against terrorism and the military enforcement of human 
rights. Indeed, the enforcement of human rights was a major component of the ISAF 
mission. 
As hypothesised, RWA was positively related to both mission attitudes (in terms of 
its total effects). Previous research has investigated this link only with respect to 
military combat missions, both hypothetical and real. This study adds to these 
findings by showing that RWA was also related to humanitarian missions. Consistent 
with previous research (e. g. Altermeyer, 1996), this relationship was mediated by 
political trust, indicating that authoritarianism was characterised by obedience to 
authority. 
Since BJW refers to a belief that people get what they deserve, it was predicted that 
BJW should be negatively related to the ISAF and the combat mission. However, 
contrary to predictions BJW was positively associated with both mission attitudes (in 
terms of total effects). There is some indication in the literature that rather than being 
associated with victim derogation, BJW can be associated with pro-social behaviour. 
For example, Bierhoff, Klein and Kramp (1991) found that individuals with high 
BJW perceived greater social responsibility and empathy to give first aid to a victim 
after an accident than did individuals with low BJW. Similarly, Furnham (1995) 
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reported a positive relationship between BJW and donating money to medical 
charities abroad. According to Bierhoff et al. (1991), high BJW can lead to prosocial 
behaviour when victims are perceived as innocent and not responsible for their lot. 
Indeed, the concept of deservingness is an integral aspect of BJW (see Lerner, 1980), 
and respondents who are high in BJW could have been more likely to support the 
interventions in Afghanistan because they perceived a divide between the oppressive 
Taliban regime and the suffering population. This suggestion is borne out by the 
finding that BJW was positively related to images of the Afghan population but was 
not related to images of the Afghan government, indicating that respondents high in 
BJW were more likely to perceive the Afghan population in positive terms of 
friendship, trust and peace. Respondents in this study could therefore have perceived 
the Afghan population as deserving international help through both humanitarian and 
military interventions, which punish the guilty and reward the deserving. 
BJW, RWA, SDO and core values 
Another more general aim of this study was to investigate the effects of SDO, RWA 
and BJW within the hierarchical model. Based on existing research (e. g. Pratto et al., 
1994; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), it was argued that these constructs should 
conceptually precede core values in the model. Indeed, comparisons of different 
models indicated that this provided the best fit to the data. 
According to SEM models, the relationship between BJW and attitudes towards the 
two interventions in Afghanistan was mediated by social trust, political trust and 
humanitarianism. Respondents who believed in a just world were significantly more 
likely to trust the government and generalised others; findings that replicate those of 
Begue (2002). In addition, respondents who believed the world was just were also 
significantly more likely to be concerned about the welfare of others. In turn, both 
types of trust were significantly related to attitudes towards the combat mission as 
well as the ISAF. Panel data or experimental manipulation could investigate this 
relationship in more detail. 
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In line with previous studies (e. g. Pratto et al., 1994), SDO showed direct positive 
effects on nationalism and patriotism, indicating that individuals who were high in 
SDO held more nationalistic beliefs and were more patriotic than individuals low in 
SDO. SDO was also negatively related to humanitarianism, and social trust. The 
former finding builds on results by Pratto et al. (1994) that SDO was negatively 
related to altruism and empathy; the two constructs assumed to underlie 
humanitarianism (e. g. Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002). Trust in others and a concern 
for the welfare of others therefore mitigated the desire to dominate other groups. 
RWA showed significant positive effects on political trust, nationalism and 
patriotism, which are consistent with previous research (Altemeyer, 1996). 
Respondents scoring high on RWA were more politically trusting, held more 
nationalistic beliefs, and were more patriotic than those scoring low on RWA 
(Oesterreich, 1998). In line with predictions, it was negatively associated with social 
trust and humanitarianism. 
Images and attitudes towards interventions in Afghanistan 
Present results also confirmed findings from the previous study that images shape 
attitudes towards peace operations in a different way than proposed by Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1990). Rather than being situated at a level of abstraction between core 
values and postures, images may be more accurately placed at the same level of 
abstraction as postures. Images are therefore influenced by core values and, in turn, 
influence specific attitudes towards peace operations (see Figure 8.5 for a re- 
conceptualisation of Hurwitz and Peffley's model). 
Images of the Afghan government had negative paths to both attitudes towards the 
ISAF and the combat mission, whereas images of the Afghan population had positive 
paths to these attitudes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, respondents who perceived the 
Afghan government to be untrustworthy, aggressive, threatening and authoritarian, 
and the Afghan population to be trustworthy, peaceful and good, agreed more with 
Britain's involvement in both the combat mission and the peace operation. 
215 
Chapter 8 War and peace in Afghanistan 
Figure 8.5. A revised version of Hurwitz and Peffley's (1990) model of the 
hierarchical model including images 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that SDO, RWA and BJW affect core values within the 
hierarchical model, which are more generic constraints than core values. The next 
chapter assesses the influence of more general descriptors of attitudes, namely 
Schwartz's value types, on attitudes towards peace operations. More specifically, it 
explores the relative importance of ten universal values as predictors of attitudes 
towards two humanitarian interventions. 
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BASIC HUMAN VALUES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
PEACE OPERATIONS 
TWO SCENARIOS 
Two studies are reported in this chapter that explore the role of basic human values 
in shaping attitudes towards peace operations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the term 
"value" has been defined in inconsistent ways not only by social scientist but also by 
political scientists (for an overview of the different uses of the term see Rohan, 
2000). In keeping with political research, "core values" in this thesis have referred to 
an individual's overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about 
government, citizenship and society (e. g. McCann, 1997) or the "personal statements 
regarding the individual's priorities and concerns" (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 
pp. 1105-1106). These core values are epitomised in individuals' beliefs about 
government, nations, human nature, moral traditions, and equality in society amongst 
others. 
Values in social psychology have a different connotation. Values are typically 
conceptualised as important life goals or standards that serve as guiding principles in 
life (e. g. Rokeach, 1973). The definition of "values" also frequently implies a 
structure or organisational system. For example, Hofstede (2001), Rokeach (1973) 
and Schwartz (1992) maintain that individuals have a value system that contains a 
finite number of universally important value types, with individuals differing in the 
importance or priority they attach to each of these value types. 
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Rokeach (1973) suggested that values occupy a central position in cognitive 
networks of attitudes and beliefs. If value priorities are "a type of personality 
disposition" (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994, p. 178), basic human value systems should 
cause people to view the world in a particular way. More specifically, "all attitudinal 
and behavioural decisions ultimately should be traceable to personal value priorities" 
(Rohan, 2000, p. 270). 
Rohan (2000) proposed a model in which attitudinal or behavioural decisions are 
linked to basic human values (or what he terms personal value systems) through a 
causal chain of intermediate variables. In its simplest form (see Figure 9.1), the 
model proposes that basic human values are causally antecedent to worldviews, 
which refer to individual's conscious beliefs about the world that are a function of 
their value priorities, such as RWA, SDO and nationalism. In turn, these worldviews 
influence specific attitudes and behaviours 9.1. 
Figure 9.1. Relations among basic human values, worldviews, and attitudinal 
and behavioural decisions -A simplified model adapted from Rohan (2000) 
Basic human values 
)-----+( 
Worldview 
}-----ºý Attitudinal 
behavioural decision 
According to Rohan's model, the core values studied in previous chapters and extant 
research should be intrinsically related to basic human values. Indeed, some research 
is accumulating that shows that core values and postures, such as political trust, 
militarism or nationalism, are underpinned by such basic human values (e. g. Devos, 
Spini & Schwartz, 2002; Wolfradt & Dalbert, 2003). However, such values have so 
9" It should be noted that the influences in Rohan's original model are bi-directional. According to 
Rohan (2000), changes in worldviews will be mirrored by changes to the underlying value priorities. 
This reasoning incorporates Rokeach's (1973, p. 21) argument, "a major advantage gained in thinking 
about a person as a system of values ... is that it becomes possible to conceive of 
his undergoing 
change as a result of changes in social conditions. " Similarly, Ronan included a bi-directional path 
from attitudinal or behavioural decision to worldviews to allow for the possibility that worldviews 
may change in response to a behaviour that is performed frequently. Present data did not allow for 
such bi-directional effects to be tested, and future research using large-scale longitudinal data is 
needed to address the causality within this model. 
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far not been studied with respect to the Hurwitz and Peffley's hierarchical model of 
foreign policy attitudes. 
The main aim of this study was to identify the relative importance of specific basic 
human value types as predictors of attitudes towards humanitarian operations. A 
second aim was to examine the extent to which core values and postures were related 
to, and influenced by, basic human values. These investigations were theoretically 
guided by Schwartz's theory of basic human values. 
The theory of basic human values 
Schwartz (1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987,1990) defined values as enduring beliefs 
pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct that transcend specific 
situations and guide choices of actions9'2. Furthermore, Schwartz and his colleagues 
have suggested that it is possible to order values by importance to form a hierarchy 
of value priorities. 
Schwartz (1992) derived a typology of values based on the assumption that values 
refer to a finite number of motivational concerns that originate from the requirement 
to cope with reality. More specifically, value types are assumed to represent, to 
different degrees, three universal requirements of human existence to which all 
individuals and societies must be responsive: (1) to satisfy biological needs, (2) to 
achieve co-ordinated social interaction, and (3) to meet social and institutional 
demands for group survival and welfare (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 
1990). Through socialisation, individuals learn to think of their motivational 
concerns as conscious values, to use terms to communicate these values, and to 
ascribe different degrees of importance to them. 
9.2 Evidence suggests that the stability of values can be affected by "significant events", such as the 
September 11` attacks. For example, Olivas-Lujan, Harzig & McCoy (2004) reported an 
amplification of cosmopolitan and power values in American students following the attacks. 
Interestingly, the authors also collected data from a small sample of UK students, but failed to find a 
similar impact on cultural values in this sample. Future research is needed to explore the possible 
impact of such significant events on value priorities using a greater range of values in a diverse 
populations. 
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According to Schwartz (1992), values also fall along two dimensions that function as 
motivations. The first dimension contrasts values that orient towards the pursuit of 
self-interest (self-enhancement) with values that tend towards a concern for the 
welfare of others (self-transcendence). Values on the second dimension reflect the 
extent to which individuals are motivated to preserve the status quo (conservation) or 
the degree to which individuals are motivated to challenge themselves both for 
intellectual and emotional realisation (openness to change). 
Schwartz's model postulates that 56 values can be categorised into ten value types, 
which, in turn, are arrayed along these two value dimensions (see Figure 9.2 for a 
schematic representation of these value relations). The ten value types and their 
meanings are as follows: 
(1) Self-direction: "independent thought and action-choosing, creating and 
exploring" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 5) 
(2) Stimulation: "excitement, novelty, and challenge in life" (p. 8) 
(3) Hedonism: "pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself' (p. 8) 
(4) Achievement: "personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards" (p. 8) 
(5) Power: "attainment of social status and prestige, and control or 
dominance over people and resources" (p. 9) 
(6) Security: "safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and 
of self' (p. 9) 
(7) Conformity: "restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to 
upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms" (p. 9) 
(8) Tradition: "respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
that one's culture or religion impose on the individual" (p. 10) 
(9) Benevolence: "preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people 
with whom one is in frequent personal contact" (p. 11); and 
(10) Universalism: "understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of all people and for nature" (p. 12). 
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Following Schwartz and Bilsky (1987,1990), this model also postulates that 
different value types serve individual or collective interests. Five value types are 
thought to serve mainly individual interests (power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation and self-direction) and are opposed to three value types that serve 
primarily collective interests (benevolence, tradition and conformity). Both types of 
values are postulated to form adjacent regions. Two value types serve both types of 
interests (universalism and security), which are located on the boundaries between 
these regions (see Figure 9.2). 
Figure 9.2. Schwartz's (1992) revised theoretical model of relations among 
motivational types of values, higher order value types, and bipolar value 
dimensions 
Self-transcendence ý" 
UNIVERSALISM BENEVOLENCE 
Collective 
interests 
SELF- 
DIRECTION TRADITION 
CONFORMITY 
iw 
STIMULATION 
// SECURITY 
HEDONISM / 
// ACHIEVEMENT POWER 
Individual Self-enhancement interests 
The structural relationship between the different value types can also be framed with 
reference to the two motivational value dimensions (see Figure 9.2. ). Conformity, 
tradition and security are value types compatible with the underlying motivation of 
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conservation, which stress order and resistance to change. Underlying self-direction 
and stimulation is an intrinsic motivation for mastery and openness to change, and 
these value types lie in direct opposition to conformity, tradition and security. 
Underlying power, achievement and hedonism is the motivation of self. 
enhancement, which results in an emphasis on the "attainment or preservation of a 
dominant position within the more general social system" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 9). 
Finally, benevolence and universalism are both motivated by a concern for others 
and the transcendence of selfish interests, which are in direct opposition to values 
such as power, achievement and hedonism. 
Figure 9.2 indicates the conflicts and compatibilities that may occur between 
different value types. According to Schwartz (1992), the combined pursuit of certain 
value types may give rise to psychological and / or social conflict. Such conflict may 
arise with the following three value type combinations (shown at opposite ends to 
each other in the figure): 
"(1) self-direction and stimulation versus conformity, tradition, and 
security - emphasising own independent thought and action and favoring 
change conflict with submissive self-restriction, preservation of 
traditional practices, and protection of stability; (2) universalism and 
benevolence versus achievement and power - acceptance of others as 
equals and concern for their welfare interferes with the pursuit of one's 
own relative success and dominance over others; (3) hedonism versus 
conformity and tradition - indulgence of one's own desires contradicts 
restraint of one's own impulses and acceptance of externally imposed 
limits" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 15). 
By contrast, value types that are adjacent to each other in the figure are postulated to 
be compatible. Combinations of the value types lead to the following nine emphases, 
which have been validated by cross-cultural research (see Schwartz, 1992, p. 42): (1) 
enhancing the welfare of others and transcending selfish interests (combining 
universalism and benevolence); (2) showing self-restraint and submission (uniting 
tradition and conformity); (3) protecting order and harmony in relations with others 
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(combining conformity and security); (4) controlling uncertainty (uniting security 
and power); (5) desiring social superiority and esteem (combining power and 
achievement); (6) egoistic self-indulgence (uniting achievement and hedonism); (7) 
desiring pleasant arousal (combining hedonism and stimulation); (8) showing 
motivation for mastery and novelty (uniting stimulation and self-direction); and (9) 
relying on one's own judgement and being comfortable with diversity (combining 
self-direction and universalism). Of interest is that cross-cultural research did not 
show evidence for a tenth combination, namely uniting benevolence and tradition. 
Schwartz also hypothesised that associations between the 10 value types and other 
variables should decrease monotonically as one moves around the circular structure 
of value types in both directions from the value that correlates most highly with the 
variable in question. According to Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002, p. 483, see also 
Schwartz, 1996), 
instead of testing a large set of predictions for the potential associations 
between a variable and each value, the theory allows us to derive one 
integrated hypothesis specking the general pattern of associations 
between the external variable and the value priorities. 
Basic human values and attitudes towards foreign policy issues and militarism 
The majority of research that has investigated the value structure of political attitudes 
using Schwartz's value system has focused on voting behaviour (e. g. Schwartz, 
1996) or the underlying dimensions of political ideology (e. g. Barnea & Schwartz, 
1998)9'3. However, a few studies have also attempted to explain international 
attitudes in terms of Schwartz's value types. 
Mayton, Diessner and Granby (1996; see also Granby, Mayton & Diessner, 1993) 
found that individuals who preferred non-violent strategies in conflict resolution 
9.3 For studies that have explored the link between political attitudes and values using a value structure 
other than Schwartz's, see, for example, Billig & Cochrane (1979), Braithwaite (1997); Rokeach 
(1973). 
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placed greater importance than did individuals who preferred violent strategies on 
universalism and benevolence; value types that are associated with the preservation 
and protection of the general welfare of all people and nature. Non-militaristic 
individuals were also more likely to endorse conformity and self-direction; value 
types that are associated with harmony in relations and personal freedom. 
By contrast, Mayton, Peters and Owens (1999) reported that militaristic attitudes 
most strongly correlated with values related to power, security, hedonism, 
achievement and conformity, a finding that was replicated by the same authors in 
2000. Another study also found that scores on an acceptance of war scale were 
positively related to power and valuing absolute rules, whilst being negatively related 
to valuing taking care of others and inclusiveness (Johnson, Handler & Criss, 1993). 
Individuals who preferred militaristic solutions were more likely to endorse values of 
power, achievement and hedonism; value types that place greater emphasis on goals 
related to social status, prestige, personal success and personal gratification. In 
addition, these individuals also placed higher priorities on security values, which are 
associated with safety and stability of society. 
The finding that militaristic attitudes were positively related to self-enhancement 
values (e. g. power) and conservation values (e. g. conformity), as well as other 
variables, such as RWA and SDO, was also obtained in studies that examined the 
determinants of attitudes towards specifics wars, such as the Gulf War (e. g. Doty, 
Winter, Peterson & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Pratto et a1., 1994) and the Kosovo War 
(e. g. Begue & Apostolidis, 2000). Nelson and Milburn (1999, p. 161) thus concluded 
that militaristic attitudes are "nested within a value system and worldview that gives 
high priority to the achievement and maintenance of power, authority, and 
superiority for one's self and one's identity groups". 
However, both Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001), and Cohrs and his colleagues 
(2002) have recently suggested that a distinction needs to be made between attitudes 
towards conventional war issues and attitudes towards humanitarian interventions. 
For example, Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff (2001) have argued that attitudes towards 
humanitarian interventions' are a novel attitude dimension that is only weakly 
anchored in a pre-existing political value system. They also propose that such 
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attitudes should show a different relationship with human values than conventional 
war attitudes. 
Yet, the empirical evidence that attitudes towards humanitarian interventions are 
associated with different value and psychological correlates than conventional war 
attitudes is tentative. For example, Cohrs and colleagues (2002) found, that 
generalised militaristic attitudes, attitudes towards military force against terrorism 
and attitudes towards military enforcement of human rights were most strongly 
positively correlated with security values, followed by power values, whilst being 
most strongly negatively related to universalistic values. Therefore, the association 
between basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations merited further 
investigation. 
Value types, worldviews and core values 
A number of recent studies have also explored the link between basic human values, 
worldviews and core values. Perhaps the most `extensive' research has been 
conducted with regards to the worldviews of RWA and SDO, and studies have 
shown that these were differentially related to value types. 
For example, Rohan and Zanna (1996) investigated the link between RWA and 
Schwartz's value types. They reported that individuals who held authoritarian beliefs 
were significantly more likely than their non-authoritarian counterparts to place 
importance on conformity, tradition, security and power, and to place less 
importance on self-direction, stimulation and universalism. Similar findings were 
also made by McFarland and Adelson (1996), who reported significant relationships 
between authoritarianism and tradition (r = . 41), conformity (r = . 30) and security 
(r 
= . 26). 
By contrast, SDO was not significantly related to these three values but was instead 
significantly associated with power (r = . 37) and universalism (r = -. 29; McFarland 
& 
Adelson, 1996). Duriez and van Hiel (2002) extended these findings by showing that 
SDO, but not RWA, was significantly positively related to power, achievement and 
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hedonism, and negatively associated with universalism and benevolence. Similar 
findings were also made by van Hiel and Mervielde (2002). 
Some studies have also shown a close relationship between BJW and value types. 
Reviewing this research, Furnham and Proctor (1989) found that BJW was positively 
related to conservative social attitudes, conformity to social rules and deference to 
authority. Building on this work, Wolfradt and Dalbert (2003) explored the value 
basis of BJW with a limited set of Schwartz' s values and reported that BJW was 
positively related to conformity and security, and negatively correlated with self- 
direction. 
It has been argued that institutions such as the government help maintain and 
transmit human values (e. g. Rokeach, 1979). However, only one study to date has 
explored the value basis of political trust. Devos, Spini and Schwartz (2002) found 
that trust in institutions was most positively correlated with tradition, security and 
conformity, and most negatively associated with self-direction and universalism. 
They thus concluded that individuals who sought security and conformity were more 
likely to seek attachment to collectives, whilst individuals who relied on their 
individuality and their own judgment were more sceptical about institutions. 
Although Feather (1994) investigated the link between national identification and the 
endorsement of particular values and found it to be most correlated with hedonism 
and security, no study to date has investigated the value bases of nationalism or 
patriotism. According to Wrightsman (1991), individuals with a greater focus on 
social value dimensions (e. g. broad-mindedness) believe that humans are essentially 
good (see also de St. Aubin, 1996). However, no extant work has investigated the 
link between social trust, humanitarianism and Schwartz's value types. Therefore, 
the value bases of these variables were explored in the current studies. 
Study aims and hypotheses 
The main aim of this chapter was to clarify the role of basic human values in 
predicting attitudes towards peace operations. A second aim was to explore the 
relationship between value types, core values and postures. Finally, the extent to 
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which value types mediated the relationship between core values, postures and 
attitudes towards peace operations was also investigated. Two studies were carried 
out that addressed these issues in two different scenarios: a hypothetical observer 
mission in the Middle East, and post-conflict humanitarian interventions in Iraq. 
Based on the theory discussed previously, specifically Schwartz's value system, the 
following predictions were made (see Table 9.1 for a summary of these predictions): 
"Values types and attitudes towards peace operations" 
Two opposing hypotheses about the relationship between value types and attitudes 
towards peace operations can be made. Idealistically speaking, humanitarian 
interventions, such as observer missions, should be concerned with the welfare of 
other people living in foreign countries, i. e. with a world at peace. Attitudes towards 
such operations should therefore be most positively correlated with universalism, and 
become increasingly more negative as one moves around the value circle in both 
directions to achievement and power. 
Realistically speaking, humanitarian operations entail bringing stability to a country 
in conflict and re-establishing harmony in relations. Consequently, it was predicted 
that attitudes towards humanitarian intervention would be most positively correlated 
with security, becoming increasingly less so with other values round the circle in 
both directions to stimulation and self-direction. 
"Relationship between value types, worldviews and core values" 
Based on Devos and colleagues (2002), who found that individuals who seek 
conformity and security were more likely to be politically trusting, it was 
hypothesised that security and self-direction should be most strongly related to 
political trust. More specifically, political trust should correlate most positively with 
security, and increasingly less positively with other values going round the value 
circle in both directions to self-direction values. 
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The link between social trust and value types has not yet been assessed empirically. 
Because social trust stems from the interactions one has with other people, which 
gets generalised to distant others, it was predicted that social trust should correlate 
most positively with benevolence, and become increasingly more negative with other 
values going round the value circle in both directions to achievement and hedonism 
values. 
Similarly, the link between humanitarianism has not been assessed empirically. Since 
humanitarianism refers to the concern for the well-being of others, it was 
hypothesised that it should be most positively associated with universalism, and 
become increasingly negatively associated with other values in both directions of the 
value circle to achievement and power values. 
Nationalism has been defined as an attachment to the nation grounded in the 
perception of national superiority. Consequently, nationalism should be most 
positively correlated with power, and increasingly less so with adjacent values until it 
is most negatively associated with universalism and self-direction 
According to Feather (1994), individuals who identified with their country were most 
likely to endorse values such as security and hedonism. However, patriotism is a 
positive feeling towards the in-group, and it was hypothesised that it should be most 
positively correlated with benevolence, becoming increasingly negative with other 
values in both direction to achievement and hedonism. 
Social conservatism and valuing tradition is at the heart of RWA, and in line with 
other research (e. g. Rohan & Zanna, 1996), RWA should be correlated most 
positively with tradition, and become increasingly more negative with adjacent 
values until becoming most negatively related to hedonism and stimulation. 
SDO refers to the extent to which one desires one's in-group to dominate others 
(Pratto et al., 1994). Consequently, and in line with Altemeyer (1998), it was 
predicted that SDO was most positively correlated with power, becoming 
increasingly more negative around the value circle to self-direction and universalism. 
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Finally, only some of Schwartz's value types have been examined in existing 
research on BJW. However, previous work using other value systems has indicated 
that BJW correlated most highly with conformity to social rules (e. g. Furnham & 
Proctor, 1989). Consequently, it was predicted that BJW was most highly related to 
conformity, becoming increasingly negative around the value circle to hedonism and 
stimulation. 
"Value types and postures" 
No research to date has examined the underlying value types of internationalism. 
Since internationalism is the belief that Britain should be actively involved in foreign 
affairs, and therefore deals with the transcendence of selfish interest, it was 
hypothesised that it should be most positively related to universalism, and become 
increasingly more negative around the value circle to achievement. However, the 
argument could also be made that international involvement is motivated by control 
or dominance over people and resources. Thus, the reverse could also be predicted: 
internationalism would be most positively related to power and increasingly less so 
as one moves around the value circle until becoming most negatively related to 
universalism and self-direction. 
As indicated by previous research (e. g. Cohrs et al., 2002), militarism should be 
correlated most positively with power, becoming increasingly more negative as one 
moves around the value circle to self-direction and universalism. 
Finally, no existing research has linked multi-lateralism to value types. Research on 
social dilemmas indicates that the priority described to universalism distinguishes 
individuals who co-operated in such dilemmas from those who defected (e. g. 
Gärling, 1999). Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) found that interpersonal co-operation 
most strongly correlated with benevolence and power values, which suggests that 
similar value priorities may underlie international co-operation. Two differing 
hypotheses can be made about the value basis of multi-lateralism. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that since multi-lateralism involves co-operation with others, it 
should be most positively related to values that transcend personal interest, i. e. 
universalism and benevolence, and be most negatively associated with power and 
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achievement values. On the other hand, since multi-lateralism may indicate 
conforming to international norms and harmony in relations, it could be argued that it 
would be most strongly associated with security and conformity values, and become 
increasingly less so to stimulation and self-direction. 
"Mediating effects of value types" 
Finally, it has been argued that all attitudinal decisions are traceable to personal 
value priorities (Rohan, 2000). At the most extreme end, this view suggests that if 
one wanted to examine the impact of core values or postures (i. e. the social and 
political beliefs individual hold) on policy preferences, it should be sufficient to 
focus on basic human value types. The question of whether or not worldviews, core 
values and postures, apart from basic human values, separately contributed to an 
explanation of attitudes towards peace operations was therefore also investigated. 
STUDY 1- A HYPTOHETICAL OBSERVER MISSION IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 
The political context -A hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East 
Conflict has been a constant part of life and politics in the Middle East since before 
the Second World War. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and its 
opposition by the Arab population of Palestine and neighbouring states, has led to 
multiple armed conflicts over the last 50 years and created frequent incidents of 
violence and tension. 
Despite many attempts to create a political solution to the problems of the Middle 
East, peace still seems to be a distant hope. It has been proposed that the presence of 
a neutral observer force stationed within Israel and Palestine could help to enforce 
agreements between both sides and bring peace to the region. Indonesia proposed 
such an observer force to the UN Security Council in March 2001, and four 
European governments - Britain, France, Germany and Italy - proposed such a force 
to the G8 summit in July 2001. On both occasions the idea was rejected by the UN 
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and the G8 summit. However, it is still a common and recurring part of proposed 
solutions to peace in the Middle East and the "Roadmap". 
METHOD 
Sample composition 
Data for this study were collected in a postal survey, which was carried out in 
Guildford between November 2002 and January 2003. A total of 600 questionnaires 
were sent out. 236 respondents returned a completed questionnaire; a response rate of 
41%. 
Compared to 2001 Census data for Guildford, the study sample over-represented 
male respondents, those aged 24-29, those with A-levels, and those in associate 
professional (Class 3), personal (Class 6) and sales occupations (Class 7), whilst it 
under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with no educational qualifications, 
and those who were in managerial (Class 1) and elementary professions (Class 9; see 
Appendix J for further details). 
To achieve a more accurate representation of the overall Guildford population the 
sample was weighted on these four demographic variables. All the analyses in this 
chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted. 
Measures 
As well as assessing the measures used in the previous chapters, this study also 
included the following variables (see Appendix K for details on the items used in this 
survey): 
"Attitudes towards an observer mission in the Middle East" 
Five items were used to assess attitudes towards an observer force in the Middle East 
(five-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree). The statements 
were introduced by the following: It has frequently been argued that a UN observer 
force would help establish and maintain peace between Israel and Palestine. We 
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would like to know your views about Britain's participation in such a mission in the 
Middle East by showing your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements. "A UN observer mission in Israel and Palestine would be a good solution 
to the political situation in the Middle East", "British troops should be sent to the 
Middle East as part of a UN observer mission after a peace settlement has been 
reached", "An observer mission in the Middle East would help Israel and the Arab 
nations settle their differences and live in peace", "In addition to participating in a 
UN observer mission, Britain should increase diplomatic efforts to broker a peace 
settlement", "British participation in a UN observer mission in the Middle East 
would help make the world a safer place" and "British troops should be sent to the 
Middle East as part of a UN observer mission before a peace settlement has been 
reached". Principal component analysis indicated one factor. The items were 
combined into a scale, with higher scores indicating greater agreement with the 
observer mission. 
"Basic human values" 
Values were measured with the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992), which lists 
56 value items that are followed by a short definition in parentheses. Participants had 
to rate each value as a guiding principle in their own life on a 9-point scale from -1 
(opposed to my principles) to 0 (not important) to 7 (of extreme importance). 
According to Schwartz and Bardi (2001), the asymmetry of this scale reflects the 
discriminations individuals naturally make when thinking about value importance. 
Before rating each of the value items, participants were asked to read the whole list 
and to choose the values most and least important for them. This procedure anchors 
the ratings and prevents a shifting of criteria as participants go through the value 
survey (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). 
Information on the descriptive statistics, reliabilities and inter-correlations amongst 
all the constructs in this study, not including basic human values, is provided in 
Table 9.2 of the Results section. The reliabilities of the basic human values and their 
relationships with the variables assessed in this study are presented separately in the 
Results section. 
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Analyses 
Unlike the previous chapters, which have reported structural equation modelling, 
Pearson correlations were used to investigate the relationship between attitudes 
towards the hypothetical observer missions and their determinants. Hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted to examine the relative contribution of basic 
human values in the prediction of attitudes towards the observer mission. These 
analyses were chosen because the increased number of constructs assessed in this 
study and the lower sample size prevented the application of structural equation 
modelling. However, the correlational method of analyses in this chapter reflected 
the predominant approach to the study of values in the literature (see IIardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Mayton et al., 1999). 
Four groups of variables were entered by blocks into the regression equation. Basic 
human values were entered first, followed by worldviews (BJW, RWA and SDO) as 
the second block. Core values (e. g., social trust and humanitarianism) were entered 
as the third block, and finally postures were entered as the last block. The aim of this 
procedure was to evaluate whether worldviews, core values and postures had any 
incremental validity over and above that of basic human values. 
The order in which predictors are entered in a regression equation can make a 
difference with respect to how much variance they account for. In line with the 
argument outlined previously, the interest here was whether the determinants of the 
hierarchical model could add significantly to the prediction of specific attitudes 
towards a hypothetical observer mission over and above basic human values. The 
order in which blocks were entered therefore followed the order of levels within the 
hierarchical model - from the most abstract to the more specific. 
RESULTS 
Attitudes towards an observer mission in the Middle East 
Over half of the respondents (56%) agreed that a UN observer mission in Israel and 
Palestine would be a good solution to the political situation in the Middle East. Over 
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six out of ten respondents (62%) also believed that British troops should be sent to 
the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission after a peace settlement had been 
reached, with (63%) also agreeing that an observer mission in the Middle East would 
help Israel and the Arab nations settle their differences and live in peace. 62 percent 
also agreed that British participation in a UN observer mission in the Middle East 
would help make the world a safer place, whilst 59% also believed that in addition to 
participating in an observer force, Britain should increase diplomatic efforts to 
broker a peace settlement. In contrast, only 45 percent of respondents agreed that 
British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission 
before a peace settlement has been reached. 
Table 9.2 shows the correlations between the measures in this study, excluding basic 
human values that were analysed separately below. Attitudes towards a hypothetical 
observer mission in the Middle East were positively related to internationalism, 
militarism and multi-lateralism. Of the core values, humanitarianism and social trust 
were most strongly related to attitudes to the observer mission, followed by political 
trust and patriotism. BJW was also positively correlated with attitudes to the observer 
mission, as were RWA and SDO. The following sections explore the relationships 
amongst basic human values, the study variables and attitudes towards the observer 
mission. 
Schwartz's Value Survey 
Following Schwartz (1992), respondents were dropped before the analyses if they 
used response option 7 (of supreme importance) more than 21 times, or used any 
other response more than 35 times, as those respondents are assumed to have failed 
to make an effort to differentiate amongst their values. Respondents who answered 
fewer than 41 values were also excluded from the analyses. On the bases of these 
ranges, five respondents had to be dropped, leaving a total sample size of 231. 
The 56 values assessed in the present study were classified into 10 value types 
following the results of data analyses reported by Schwartz (1992), which used 
smallest space analysis (Guttman, 1968) applied to ratings obtained for these values 
from samples in 20 different countries. The value types in their order around the 
235 
Chapter 9 Basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations 
aý 
"O 
b 
... 
... 
wi 
I 
.a 
0 
CO 
cl 
H 
4+ 
ca 
w 
o 
I.. 
- 
b 
-U 
Cm 
tý 'O 
v ewe 
-U b 
4m 
. C% AU 
Ný 
ýO 
C 
ýw 
H 
H 
HW 
00 PNOM ýF 00 Qs et ~ 00 to el 'IT ti N ti et N 
ý. i $ 
rl 
~ 
oooNNen er 
ONN W)tn 
O nOVItýOý"r. 
+M'ýf NO ~ 00 
1NW, 
mal; 
iM.. 
Oh 0r1 V1 e 
-e en el "I el 
'- MONK 00 
000 0 
00 n Cl In r- N -+ OO Oý N V1 - V1 OOelei en It N... -. gyp. -irr NID 
MO 
-TONgr00t-41N00Mv 
1-kr) 
M 
NtIV-4 V-4 'T 
V tqN1 en CD "o v 1NIfiNf VN100 
MO 
V1 %0in IRt00ýOhN0 N 00 Ittt- 
OOON 14tnOýin Ch t- 00 V1MOP 
00 N? 11? NN V1 en e? e? NN . -ý IN Ni 00 
IIiiI' MÖ 
M ON I) POkA00rren NO. ten en OýON 102 
1-1 N -00 NIt'1 OI C N0% en N'l 0ONNO -N 
At 
Oý. -ýN Vý N -1 41 -1 V100 4l i"iiiMÖ 
NMNO 000N. OC1, co 0""r000'e? MN 00. ". 
V 
O; ýOkn V; 'Rel ..: el te el'TNNNN -N lnO Q. 
. 
-0 
14 
0 0- "a CO - O S: 
i:, En P. a. ºr. p. N6Ö "o OA 
-4riri'i t. iýN000\. ý-". -ýC7arwth CA ý 
236 
Chapter 9 Basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations 
Table 9.3. Schwartz Value Survey - Value types 
Value type Values a 
Universalism Broadminded, wisdom, a world of 
beauty, equality, unity with nature, a 
world at peace, social justice, protecting the environment . 74 
Benevolence Honest, loyal, helpful, forgiving, responsible . 80 
Tradition Respect 
for tradition, humble, accepting my position in life, devout, 
. 68 moderate 
Conformity Self-discipline, obedient, politeness, honouring of parents and elders . 75 
Security Family security, national security, reciprocation of 
favours, social order, 
, 80 clean 
Power Social power, wealth, authority, preserving public image . 75 
Achievement Successful, ambitious, capable, influential . 68 
Hedonism Pleasure, enjoying life . 66 
Stimulation A varied life, daring, an exciting life . 69 
Self-direction Creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing one's own goals . 68 
Note: The names of the value types are those assigned by Schwartz (1992) 
circle, the specific values comprising each value type, and their internal reliabilities 
(Cronbach's alpha) in this study are shown in Table 9.3. Although these reliabilities 
were low, they were within the range of variation commonly observed for these 
indices (see Schwartz, 1992). 
The total score for each subject for each value type was obtained by averaging the 
subject's mean score across the values making up each value type. Indices of the four 
higher-order value types were obtained by averaging all the values that constitute the 
higher order type (see Table 9.4). Following Schwartz' (1992) recommendations for 
standardising importance ratings of value types to control for scale use differences 
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across individuals, each individual's mean importance rating for the 56 core values 
was used as a covariate in the following analyses. 
Table 9.4. Schwartz Value Survey - Value dimensions 
Value dimension Values a 
Equality, inner harmony, freedom, self-respect, creativity, a 
Self-transcendence / world at peace, unity with nature, wisdom, ,a world of . 79 openness to change beauty, social justice, independent, broadminded, protecting 
the environment, choosing own goals, curious 
A spiritual life, meaning in life, politeness, respect for 
Self-transcendence / tradition, mature 
love, self-discipline, detachment, true 
conservation 
friendship, moderate, loyal, humble, honouring parents and . 75 
elders, accepting my portion in life, honest, obedient, helpful, 
devout, responsible, forgiving 
Self-enhancement / Social power, sense of 
belonging, social order, wealth, 
conservation reciprocation of 
favours, family security, social recognition, . 73 
authority, healthy, preserving my public image, clean 
Self-enhancement / openness Pleasure, an exciting life, a varied life, ambitious, daring, 
. 71 to change influential, capable, intelligent, enjoying life, successful 
Relationship between value types and attitudes towards a hypothetical observer 
mission in the Middle East 
The correlations between value types and attitudes towards a hypothetical observer 
mission in the Middle East are shown in Figure 9.3. The figure shows that 
correlations for security, conformity and power were the most positive, whilst those 
for self-direction and stimulation were the most negative. 
Thus, individuals motivated by conservation of order (security), harmony in relations 
(conformity) and controlling relationships and resources (power) held more positive 
attitudes towards the observer mission in the Middle East than individuals who were 
motivated by mastery (self-direction) or openness to change (stimulation). 
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The Spearman rank correlation between the predicted and observed order of 
correlations was significant (rs = . 79, p<0.01, one-tailed; for a similar procedure see 
Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), thus providing additional support for the overall 
model relating attitudes towards this observer mission to the priority given to all the 
values types. 
Figure 9.3. Correlations of values priorities with attitudes towards a 
hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East 
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Value types 
To explore this finding further, the sample was split at the median on the two most 
relevant and conflicting value types - self-direction and security. Attitudes towards 
an observer mission in the Middle East were then compared for four sub-samples 
formed by a2 (self-direction: high / low) X2 (security: high / low) cross- 
classification. A two-way analysis of variance showed significant main effects for 
self-direction and security (F (1,229) = 36.09 and 26.18, respectively, p< . 01), 
but 
no significant interaction. 
Table 9.5 shows the means for the four sub-samples. The table indicates that 
individuals with different attitudes differed in the extent to which they regarded self- 
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direction and security as important. Individuals who attributed high importance to 
security and low importance to self-direction showed substantially more positive 
attitudes to this observer mission than did those who attributed high importance to 
self-direction and low importance to security. The other two sub-samples, in which 
individuals were likely to experience value conflict, showed neutral attitudes towards 
a hypothetical observer mission in the Middle East. 
Table 9.5. Mean attitudes towards a hypothetical observer mission in the 
Middle East as a function of the importance of security and self-direction values 
Security 
Low High 
Low 3.15 (N = 54) 4.11 (N=76) 
Self-direction 
High 2.27 (N=59) 3.08 (N-42) 
Values, worldviews and core values 
Another purpose of this study was to assess the relationship between value types, 
worldviews, core values and postures. Table 9.6 provides the correlations between 
the 10 value types, worldviews and core values assessed in this study. 
Contrary to predictions, political trust was most positively correlated with 
conformity, followed by security and tradition, and most negatively associated with 
self-direction and stimulation. Individuals who valued conservation of order and 
harmony in social relations were thus more politically trusting than individuals who 
valued relying on one's own judgement. 
Social trust was most positively associated with benevolence and universalism, and 
most negatively related to power and achievement. Respondents who valued 
transcendence of self-interests and tolerance of others, as well as openness to change, 
were more socially trusting than respondents who valued social superiority. 
Humanitarianism was most positively correlated with universalism, benevolence and 
self-direction, and most negatively related to power, security and achievement. 
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Individuals who prioritised comfort with the diversity of existence and concern for 
the welfare of others were more humanitarian than individuals who valued social 
superiority and social esteem. 
Nationalism correlated most positively with security, conformity and tradition, and 
related most negatively to self-direction. Respondents who were motivated by 
preservation of traditional practices and protection of stability, and who were 
motivated by self-esteem, were more nationalistic than respondents who prioritised 
personal freedom. 
Patriotism was most positively related to benevolence and universalism, and most 
negatively related to achievement and power. Individuals who valued the welfare of 
close and distant others were more patriotic than individuals who prioritised values 
stressing pursuit of one's own success and dominance over others. 
RWA correlated most positively with tradition and conformity, and related most 
negatively to hedonism and stimulation. Respondents who were motivated by 
conservation of order were more authoritarian than individuals who prioritised values 
relating to pleasure and gratification for oneself. 
SDO was most positively associated with power and achievement, and most 
negatively related to universalism and benevolence. Individuals who valued social 
superiority and personal esteem scored higher on SDO than respondents who valued 
the transcendence of self-interests and the welfare of close and distant others. 
Finally, BJW correlated most positively with conformity and security, values that 
stress conservation of order and harmony in social relations, and correlated most 
negatively with universalism and self-direction, values that emphasise reliance on 
one's own judgement and comfort with diversity 
Values and postures 
Table 9.7 shows that internationalism was most positively correlated with security, 
conformity and tradition, and most negatively associated with stimulation and self- 
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direction and hedonism. As predicted, individuals who prioritised conservation of 
order and harmony in social relations were more likely to believe that Britain should 
be internationally involved than individuals who prioritised motivation for mastery 
and openness to change. 
As hypothesised, militarism correlated most positively with power, security and 
conformity, and most negatively with universalism and self-direction. Individuals 
who were motivated by controlling uncertainty by controlling relationships and 
resources, and who were motivated by esteem, were more likely to believe in the use 
of force as a foreign policy means than individuals who were motivated by comfort 
with the diversity of existence and self-reliance. 
Finally, multi-lateralism was positively correlated with security and conformity and 
negatively associated with hedonism and achievement. Respondents who valued 
conservation of order and harmony in relations were more likely to believe in Britain 
being involved multi-laterally in foreign affairs than individuals who prioritised 
values dealing with self-centredness. 
Attitudes towards the observer mission - Hierarchical regression analyses 
The previous correlational analyses have shown that worldviews, postures and core 
values were significantly related to value priorities. These results posed the question 
as to how well these variables predicted attitudes towards the observer mission in the 
Middle East, controlling for the effects of value types. 
A hierarchical regression analyses was conducted to address this question. The ten 
basic human values were entered at the first step. The constructs BJW, RWA and 
SDO were entered at the second step. Core values were then entered at the third step, 
followed by the three postures at the fourth step. 
Table 9.8 shows how well attitudes towards the observer mission were predicted by 
the ten value types. This set of predictors accounted for a significant amount of total 
variance in attitudes towards the observer mission (Adj. RZ = . 24, F(10,220) = 8.13, 
p= . 008). 
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The second step assessed how well the three worldview constructs predicted attitudes 
towards the observer mission over and above the ten value types. Table 9.8 shows 
that BJW, RWA and SDO accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in 
attitudes towards this mission after controlling for basic human values (R2change _ . 06, 
Fchange(13,217) = 3.11, p =. 047). 
The five core values were entered at the next step, and Table 9.8 indicates that these 
five core values accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in attitudes 
towards this mission after controlling for the effects of value types and the three 
worldview constructs (R2change = . 11, Fchange(l 8,207) = 6.02, p= . 033). 
Finally, the fourth step explored how well the three postures predicted attitudes 
towards the observer mission after all the other variables were controlled for. Table 
9.7 shows that the three postures accounted for a significant proportion of the 
variance in attitudes towards this mission after controlling for the effects of core 
values and value types (R2cnege _ . 08, Fchange (21,204) = 4.17, p= . 029). 
The strongest predictors of attitudes towards this hypothetical mission were security 
and conformity values, followed by power values. Security, conformity and power 
values remained significant predictors after the constructs of BJW, RWA and SDO 
had been added to the equation (R2chage = 6%). Of the three added constructs, BJW 
had the greatest effect on attitudes towards the observer mission, indicating that 
individuals who believed that the world is just held more positive attitudes towards 
this mission than respondents with lower BJW. 
The change in R2 of 11% indicates that core values were additional influences in 
shaping attitudes towards the Middle East. However, security and conformity values 
remained significant predictors even when core values were added to the equation. 
Individuals who trusted the government, who were humanitarians, who were 
patriotic, and socially trusting held more positive attitudes towards this mission that 
their counterparts. 
Finally, the R2 change of 8% also indicates that postures were additional predictors 
shaping attitudes towards the observer mission. Individuals who believed that Britain 
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should be internationally involved, should use forceful foreign policy means and 
should act multi-laterally held more positive attitudes towards a hypothetical 
observer mission in the Middle East. 
STUDY 2- HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN IRAQ 
The previous section investigated the relevance of basic human values to attitudes 
towards peace operations with regard to a hypothetical scenario. The research 
reported in this section explores the predictions made earlier with respect to a `real' 
peace operation in Iraq. 
The political context - Persian Gulf War 2003 
After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the UN imposed strict resolutions designed to 
remove the threat Saddam Hussein's regime posed to neighbouring countries and the 
international community at large. In November 2002, the UN declared that it would 
no longer tolerate Iraq's non-cooperation with international law. UN Security 
Council Resolution 1441 was approved to provide Iraq with a final opportunity to 
comply with UN disarmament obligations. Despite international diplomatic efforts, 
and without the approval of the Security Council, coalition forces that included UK 
troops commenced military operations in March 2003. Overall, the UK contributed 
46,000 military personnel (Operation Telic) to a total of 467,000 U. S. -led coalition 
forces (Ministry of Defence, 2003). The major phase of combat operations was 
declared over by President Bush on I" May 2003. 
Since the end of the combat operations, UK forces in Southern Iraq have been 
involved in stabilisation and reconstruction processes as outlined in the UK's "Vision 
for Iraq and the Iraqi people", which had been launched in March 2003. This 
document outlined the future of Iraq that British forces would contribute to build, 
and included a vision of Iraq as stable, law-abiding, co-operative with the internal 
community, and meeting its international obligations as well as providing a 
representative government for its people. 
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In line with this vision, UK forces have begun to establish a safe and secure 
environment for the Iraqi people and to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the 
Iraqi people are met. Since the end of the war in Iraq on 1st May 2003, a total of 689'4 
British military personnel have died (compared to 1059 US military personnel; Iraq 
Coalition, 2004) and 2200 UK troops have been wounded whilst serving in Iraq (The 
Scotsman, April 2004). 
Although the British public was generally opposed to Britain's involvement in 
military activities in Iraq (Worldviews, 2002), it was strongly in favour of 
humanitarian interventions after the war. Eurobarometer data (2003) indicated that 
87 percent of British respondents were in favour of the enforcement of British 
humanitarian aid towards Iraq, compared to 12 percent who were against such aid. 
Similarly, 57 percent of respondents also favoured British troops being sent to Iraq to 
maintain peace, with 40 percent being against the use of British forces as 
peacekeepers. 
METHOD 
Sample composition 
209 British respondents from the general public participated in this postal survey, 
which was carried out in Guildford at the end of June 2003. Of the 600 
questionnaires that had been distributed, 215 were returned, of which six had to be 
discarded because of incomplete information. Overall, the return rate for this survey 
was 35 percent 
Comparison with 2001 Census data (see Appendix L for details) showed that the 
study sample over-represented male respondents, those aged 45-59, those with A- 
levels and O-levels, and those in professional (Class 2) and sales occupations (Class 
7), whilst it under-represented those aged 60 and over, those with no educational 
qualifications, and those in managerial (Class 1) and administrative occupations 
(Class 4). 
9.4 This figure was correct at the time of writing (September 2004). See http: //icasualties. org/oif for 
statistics on the coalition forces that are updated daily. 
247 
Chapter 9 Basic human values and attitudes towards peace operations 
The sample was weighted on these demographic characteristics to address these 
biases and to achieve a more accurate representation of the overall population. All 
the analyses in this chapter were conducted after the sample had been weighted. 
Measures 
In addition to the measures assessed in the previous studies, the following variable 
was also included in this study (see Appendix M for details of the items used in this 
survey): 
"Support for humanitarian actions in Iraq " 
Support for the humanitarian mission in Iraq was assessed by five items (five-point 
Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 5= Strongly agree). Now that military action in 
Iraq has officially ended, the Government believes that British forces should 
contribute to making Iraq a peaceful and democratic country. How do feel about 
British troops being involved in such post-conflict missions in Iraq? Items included: 
"I approve of British troops being used to bring peace to Iraq", "British troops will 
help make Iraq a more democratic country", "British troops in Iraq will help restore 
the human rights of Iraqi citizens", "British troops should not be involved in 
humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN or NATO", and "British 
involvement in humanitarian operations in Iraq will make the world a safer place". 
Principal component analysis indicated one factor, and the items were combined into 
a composite variable, with higher scores indicating greater agreement with British 
involvement in humanitarian operations in Iraq. 
The descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlations amongst the constructs in 
Study 2, not including basic human values, are provided in Table 9.9 of the Results 
section. The reliabilities of basic human values and their relationships with the 
variables assessed in this study are presented separately. 
Analyses 
As for the previous study, the analyses in this chapter were restricted to correlations 
and hierarchical regression. Again, this was due to the increased number of 
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constructs assessed in this study and a low sample size, which precluded the use of 
structural equation modelling. 
RESULTS 
Attitudes towards humanitarian actions in Iraq 
Half of the respondents in this sample (51%) agreed that British participation in 
humanitarian operations in Iraq will make the world a safer place, whilst a similar 
percentage (52%) agreed that British troops will bring democracy to post-conflict 
Iraq. Half of the respondents (52%) also approved of British troops being used to 
bring peace to Iraq, and 54% approved the restoration of human rights. However, 
more than six out of ten respondents (63%) agreed that British troops should not be 
involved in humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN or NATO. 
Table 9.9 presents the correlations between the measures in this study. This table 
does not include the relationships between basic human values and other study 
variables, which were analysed separately. Attitudes towards humanitarian 
interventions in Iraq were positively related to militarism, internationalism, multi- 
lateralism and humanitarianism. Attitudes towards Iraq were also positively 
correlated with political and social trust. BJW was positively related to attitudes 
towards Iraq, as were RWA and SDO. Following the format of Study 1, the 
following sections explore the relationships amongst basic human values, the study 
variables and attitudes towards humanitarian interventions in Iraq. 
Schwartz's Value Survey 
As reported for the previous study, respondents were dropped before the analyses if 
they used response option 7 (of supreme importance) more than 21 times, or used 
any other response more than 35 times, as those respondents are assumed to have 
failed to make an effort to differentiate amongst their values. Respondents who 
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answered fewer than 41 values were also excluded from the analyses. On the bases of 
these ranges, seven respondents had to be dropped, leaving a total sample size of 
202. 
The 56 values assessed in the present study were classified into 10 value types 
following the results of data analyses reported by Schwartz (1992). The reliabilities 
in this study were as follows: universalism: a= . 77; benevolence: a= . 81; tradition: 
a= . 66; conformity: a= . 79; security: a= . 79; power: a= . 73; achievement: a= 71; 
hedonism: a= . 69; stimulation: a= . 71; and self-direction: a= . 69. The reliabilities 
for the four value dimensions, which are obtained by averaging all the values that 
constitute the higher order type (see Table 9.2 for details), were: self- 
transcendence/openness to change: a= . 81; self-transcendence/conservation: a= . 78; 
self-enhancement/conservation: a= . 72; and self-enhancement/openness to change: a 
= . 74. These reliabilities were similar to those found in the previous study, and were 
within the bound of variation commonly observed (see Schwartz, 1992). 
The mean rating that each subject gave to the values in the value survey were 
statistically controlled in the following analyses. Schwartz (1992) recommended this 
procedure because some of the predictions obtained from values can be attributed to 
response tendencies. 
Relationship between value types and attitudes towards British humanitarian 
operations in Iraq 
The correlations between value types and attitudes towards humanitarian operations 
in Iraq are shown in Figure 9.4, which indicates that such attitudes were most 
strongly positively correlated with security, conformity and power values and most 
negatively related with self-direction and stimulation values. As in the previous 
study, individuals motivated by conservation of order (security), harmony in 
relations (conformity) and controlling relationships and resources (power) held more 
positive attitudes towards the humanitarian interventions in Iraq than individuals who 
were motivated by mastery and openness to change. 
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Figure 9.4. Correlations of value priorities with attitudes towards humanitarian 
operations in Iraq 
0.8 
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0.4- 
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Value types 
Support for the overall model relating attitudes towards Iraq with value priorities was 
given by a Spearman rank correlation between the predicted and observed order of 
correlations, which was highly significant (r5 = . 78, p<0.05, one-tailed; 
for a similar 
procedure see Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). 
Following the procedure outlined in the previous study, the sample was first split at 
the median on the two most relevant and conflicting value types - self-direction and 
security. Attitudes towards Iraq were then compared for the four sub-samples formed 
by a2 (self-direction: high / low) X2 (security: high / low) cross-classification. A 
two-way analysis of variance showed significant main effects for self-direction and 
security (F (1,200) = 34.24 and 28.67, respectively, p< . 01), but no significant 
interaction (see Table 9.10 for the means of the four sub-samples). 
Similar to the results reported in the previous section, individuals who attributed high 
importance to security and low importance to self-direction showed substantially 
more positive attitudes to this peace operation than did those who attributed high 
importance to self-direction and low importance to security. 
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Table 9.10. Mean attitudes towards humanitarian operations in Iraq as a 
function of the importance of security and self-direction values 
Security 
Low High 
Low 3.03 (N = 50) 4.07 (N=69) 
Self-direction 
High 2.21 (N=51) 2.83 (N=32) 
Values, worldviews, core values and postures 
Worldviews and core values showed a similar pattern of association with value 
priorities as previously reported in Study 1 (see Table 9.11). The relationships 
between values and postures in this research (see Table 9.12) were also similar to 
those reported in the previous study, with one exception. Whereas multi-lateralism 
was positively related to universalism and benevolence in the previous study, no such 
association was found in the present research. However, multi-lateralism was most 
strongly related to security, conformity, achievement and hedonism in both studies. 
Attitudes towards Iraq - Hierarchical regression analyses 
Using the same procedure as outlined in the previous study, a hierarchical regression 
was conducted to investigate whether the findings from the hypothetical scenario 
regarding the impact of basic human values on constructs in the hierarchical model 
could be replicated in a study on attitudes towards a "real" humanitarian mission. 
Table 9.13 shows that the ten value types accounted for a significant amount of total 
variance in attitudes towards Iraq (Adj. RZ = . 20, F (10,191) = 18.26, p= . 009). 
The three constructs of BJW, RWA and SDO were entered at the second step of this 
regression, which explained a (just) significant proportion of the variance in attitudes 
towards Iraq after controlling for the effects of value types (R2change = . 05, Fchange(13, 
188)=3.11, p=. 048). 
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Core values were included in the equation at the next step, entered at the next step of 
the equation, which accounted for a significant amount of total variance in attitudes 
towards Iraq after controlling for the effects of basic human values, BJW, RWA and 
SDO (R2change = . 13, Fchange(18,183) = 12.46, p= . 016). 
The three postures were entered at the final stage. These explained a significant 
amount of variance in attitudes towards Iraq once the effects of the other variables 
were controlled for (R2change = . 09, Fchange(21,180) = 8.92, p= . 023). Contrary to 
previous findings, power values, as well as security and conformity values, remained 
significant predictors even when core values and postures were added to the 
equation. 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of these two studies was to investigate the effects of basic human 
values on attitudes towards peace operations. In line with other research that has 
examined the effect of values on political attitudes (e. g.; Cohrs et al, 2002; 
Kristiansen & Matheson, 1990; Mayton et al., 1999), individuals' attitudes towards 
peace operations, both hypothetical and real, were a function of their value priorities. 
Values and attitudes towards peace operations 
Two predictions were made about the relationship between values and attitudes 
towards peace operations. On the one hand, it was argued that such attitudes could be 
most strongly related to universalism as peace operations are frequently framed in 
humanitarian terms. On the other hand, it was also argued that they could be most 
strongly associated with security as peace operations bring stability and harmony to a 
country in conflict. Findings from the two studies show that attitudes towards the 
Middle East and Iraq were associated more significantly with values stressing 
security, conformity and power than they were associated with universalism. Thus, 
as respondents assigned more importance to the conservation of order and harmony 
in relations their attitudes towards the Middle East and Iraq became more favourable. 
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The importance of security, conformity and power values in shaping attitudes 
towards these two operations is also similar to findings made by Cohrs and 
colleagues (2002) and Fetchenhauer & Bierhoff (2001) about the value basis of 
humanitarian military interventions, such as the use of force to enforce human rights 
and in the fight against terrorism. 
However, it is unclear from the present research whether this pattern of value 
association would characterise attitudes towards peace operations that do not have 
such a strong military association. With respect to attitudes towards Iraq at least, it is 
possible that respondents did not make a clear-cut distinction between Britain's 
involvement in combat action and post-conflict humanitarian operations. This 
possibility is borne out by the finding that attitudes towards Iraq were more strongly 
correlated with militarism than internationalism or multi-lateralism. Thus, future 
research should investigate the value basis of attitudes towards peace operations in 
less ambiguous situations. 
Values, core values and postures 
Another aim of the two studies reported in this chapter was to assess the relationship 
between value types, worldviews, core values and postures. The majority of 
relationships were in the predicted direction in both studies (see Table 9.14 for 
details of the observed relationships). In line with previous research (Devos et al., 
2002), individuals who rated conservation of order and harmony in social relations 
(conformity, tradition and security) as important were more politically trusting than 
respondents who rated pleasure for oneself and one's own judgement (self-direction 
and hedonism) as important. In contrast, respondents who prioritised values of 
tolerance of others and transcendence of self-interest (benevolence and universalism) 
were more socially trusting than respondents who rated social superiority (power) as 
important. Thus, the present investigation showed that political trust and social trust 
were differentially related to value types, providing further evidence for their 
distinctiveness (e. g. Uslaner, 2002). 
A similar differential relation to value types was also found for nationalism and 
patriotism, indicating that these are distinct constructs. Whilst nationalism was most 
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strongly motivated by overcoming the threat of uncertainty by controlling 
relationships and resources (security, power and achievement), patriotism was most 
highly related to a concern about the welfare of close and distant others (benevolence 
and universalism). 
As predicted, RWA, but not SDO was positively associated with conservation of 
order (tradition and conformity), whilst SDO, but not RWA, was related to social 
superiority and esteem (power and achievement). These findings are similar to those 
made by McFarland (1999), and Duriez and van Hiel (2002). Overall, these findings 
are supportive of Lippa and Arad's (1999) claim that RWA is related to the 
preservation of in-group norms and tradition, whilst SDO is associated with 
superiority and power. Considering that the upholding of tradition and conformity to 
social norms are a defining feature of RWA, it is perhaps unsurprising that it was 
most significantly related to tradition and conformity values. Similarly, the finding 
that SDO, which is grounded in feelings of superiority over other social groups, was 
most strongly related to power and achievement values is to be expected. 
Unlike previous studies, the present research also investigated the value bases of the 
three postures. Results from both studies indicated that both internationalism and 
multi-lateralism were associated with similar value types. Both postures were most 
strongly associated with security and conformity, indicating that individuals who 
believed in Britain's international involvement and multi-lateral ventures were 
motivated by conserving order and harmonising relations. Militarism, by contrast, 
was foremost associated with power, followed by security, suggesting that 
individuals who believed in the use of force in international relations were motivated 
by overcoming the threat of uncertainties by controlling relationships and resources. 
The effect of values within the hierarchical model 
Finally, although value types were significantly related to core values and postures, 
the hierarchical regression analyses in both studies indicated that the components of 
the hierarchical model contributed to the prediction of attitudes towards the Middle 
East and Iraq, after controlling for the effects of value types. 
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However, security and conformity, and power in the case of Iraq, remained 
significant predictors even when core values and postures had been added to the 
equation. This finding indicates that basic human values had an effect on attitudes 
towards peace operations over and above the effects of the constructs assessed in the 
present research. 
It is unclear from present research whether this finding is due to the fact that 
pertinent core values and postures were missing from the model that tapped into 
these security and conformity values, or whether basic human values are associated 
with attitudes towards peace operations in a more direct way. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the contribution of the present study lay in the demonstration that 
attitudes towards peace operations were related not only to basic human values, but 
also to a complex interplay of these values with worldviews, core values and 
postures. This study has not only replicated previous findings on the underlying 
values of core values, but has also filled some empirical gaps concerning the value 
basis of social trust, humanitarianism, and multi-lateralism. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of the present research was to investigate the determinants of attitudes 
towards peace operations. Attitudes towards peace operations were explored with 
reference to a hierarchical model of foreign policy opinions. This model was 
extensively tested among the general population, and revisions and extensions were 
proposed. This chapter revisits the theoretical limitations and empirical shortcomings 
of the hierarchical model, and discusses how findings from the present research have 
informed these concerns. By doing so, theoretical and practical implications are 
outlined and some future directions are proposed. Firstly, this chapter outlines the 
degree of support for peace operations evidenced in the present research programme, 
followed by a brief discussion of some methodological issues that may limit the 
generalisation of the current research findings. 
Support for peace operations 
This thesis began with the question of how supportive the British public is of 
Britain's involvement in peace operations or humanitarian interventions. Findings 
from this research programme showed that respondents were generally supportive of 
British participation in such operations. 
55% approved of British troops being used to bring peace to Sierra Leone (Chapter 4 
and 5). Support for British troops in Sierra Leone increased to 59% when British 
soldiers had been taken hostage, and declined to 55% when a British soldier was 
killed in Sierra Leone (Chapter 5). Similar levels of support were also found for 
attitudes towards the ERRF (Chapter 6). Almost six out of ten respondents (58%) 
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agreed that the decision to join the European Rapid Reaction Forces was a good one, 
with a similar percentage (57%) also agreeing that British troops are used to bring 
peace to Europe. 
A majority of respondents (61%) agreed with British troops being used to keep the 
peace in Afghanistan (Chapter 7). Six out of ten respondents (63%) also agreed with 
British troops being used in Afghanistan to bring peace to the world and to restore 
human rights (62%). 66% agreed with British involvement in military strikes against 
the Taliban and Al'Qaida (Chapter 8). A majority also supported a possible 
international observer force in the Middle East (Chapter 9), with 62% believing that 
British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission. 
However, support for the humanitarian mission in Iraq was relatively low. 51 percent 
agreed that British participation in humanitarian operations in Iraq will make the 
world a safer place, whilst a similar percentage (52%) agreed that British troops will 
bring democracy to post-conflict Iraq. 63 percent agreed that British troops should 
not be involved in humanitarian action in Iraq without the consent of the UN or 
NATO. 
The present studies also found that the typical British supporter of peace operations 
not only believes that Britain should be involved internationally, but also that this 
involvement should be multi-lateral in nature and be conducted without the use of 
force before September 11,2001 and with the use of force after September 11,2001. 
Furthermore, the typical British supporter is socially and politically trusting, 
humanistic, slightly patriotic, but not nationalistic. The typical supporter also values 
conservation of order and harmony in relations. 
A note on the general limitations of this research 
Before discussing the major findings of this research programme and their 
implications, it is germane to mention some of the methodological issues that may 
limit the generalisation of the results discussed below. 
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The investigations in this thesis were survey based. Due to a restricted number of 
respondents that could reasonably be questioned in these surveys, the populations in 
this thesis are not comparable to those traditionally studied within this research area 
using large-scale opinion polls. Despite this reservation, however, this approach 
allowed for relationships to be explored that are neglected in other research. 
Surveys also carry with them inherent methodological problems. For example, 
individuals who respond to postal surveys are often different in their political outlook 
from those who do not respond. They tend to be better educated, to have higher 
incomes, and to be more interested in the topics dealt with in the questionnaire 
(Dillman, 1978 cited in Erikson & Tedin, 2001). 
Research has also explored the effect of question wording on survey responses, 
which has shown that subtle variations in the presentation of survey questions can 
affect the way in which individuals respond to the items (Haddock, 2003; for details 
on response effects in surveys see Tourangeau, Rips & Rasiniski, 2000). The 
importance of response effects on attitudes towards peace operations could be 
explored in an experimental study in which respondents are given questionnaires 
about peace operations that differed in the rating scales used as well as the order of 
the items. Future studies may also include measures within the survey questionnaire 
that assess self-presentation (e. g. Berinsky, 2004). 
The hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes - Some critical reflections 
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argued that Converse and others erred in their 
conclusions about the volatility of public opinion by focusing on a narrow definition 
of constraint. Rather, they proposed that a hierarchical structure of attitudes allows 
politically uninformed as well as informed individuals to express a foreign policy 
position. According to this model, individuals "cope with an extraordinarily 
confusing world (with limited resources to pay information costs) by structuring 
views about specific foreign policies according to their more general and abstract 
beliefs" (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, p. 114). 
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Although this model was developed in 1987, several theoretical limitations and 
empirical shortcomings were identified that still had to be tested. These concerns are 
revisited below with respect to what the present research programme has revealed 
about each. The theoretical implications of the findings as well as research 
limitations and future research directions are outlined where appropriate. 
The hierarchical structure 
Present research results supported the assumptions of the hierarchical model of 
foreign policy attitudes that specific political attitudes are shaped by more general 
predispositions. This finding is consistent with other applications of this model to 
foreign policy concerns (Bartels, 1994; Jenkins-Smith et at., 2004; Juhasz, 2001). 
However, the present research programme has added to previous studies by 
systematically comparing the hierarchical model to alternative conceptions. 
Structural equation modelling indicated that the hierarchical model provided a better 
fit than models in which no distinction was made between postures and core values, 
or in which core values were allowed to influence attitudes towards specific policies 
directly. Based on suggestions by Rathbun (2003), a model was also tested in which 
militarism and multi-lateralism were dependent on beliefs about internationalism. 
However, this model did not provide an adequate framework for describing attitudes 
towards peace operations. 
The hierarchical model also postulates that the direction of effects is from more 
abstract principles to specific opinions rather than vice versa. According to Peffley 
and Hurwitz (1993, p. 66), top-down rather than bottom-up linkages are "the norm 
for international belief systems, given the great complexity of the domain and the 
sheer volume of international information". Findings from Chapter 5 supported this 
conclusion. However, a larger, longitudinal data set than was used in the present 
study is needed to corroborate these findings. 
The results also demonstrate that the hierarchical structure of foreign policy beliefs 
proposed to explain political attitudes in the US is equally relevant to public beliefs 
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in Britain. This result is consistent with recent research (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004) 
that has shown that British and American beliefs did not differ significantly in the 
structural relationships amongst those beliefs. However, Jenkins-Smith's study only 
investigated the impact of political ideology and internationalism on attitudes 
towards nuclear security issues. Further comparative studies are therefore needed to 
investigate whether the range of core values and postures assessed in the present 
research are equally important to shaping foreign policy attitudes in other countries. 
Although the models tested and cross-validated in the empirical studies provided a 
good fit to the data, these results do not indicate that the model has been proven 
(Kline, 1998). In particular, the variables included in the models could have been 
influenced by unmeasured factors. However, the present studies have attempted to 
provide a parsimonious integration of variables that was theory-guided, and which 
had been identified by previous research as particularly salient in attitudes towards 
foreign policy issues. 
Only one policy domain and one particular issue were investigated in this research 
programme, which may limit the ability to extend the conclusions to models of 
attitude constraint in other domains. It is possible that the complexity of international 
politics renders this domain particularly favourable to hierarchical models of 
constraint (see Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993). According to Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 
p. 1113), attitudes towards military issues may be more highly constrained than other 
foreign policy issues because "the public is thinking more seriously about issues like 
military involvement and defense spending, these issues are more likely to be linked 
to general postures. " However, there is ample evidence that hierarchical models are a 
useful framework for examining attitudes not only in the foreign policy domain (e. g. 
Brewer et al., 2004), but also with respect to other issue domains, such as donations 
to charities (Cheung & Chan, 2000), gay rights (Brewer, 2003) and environmental 
concern (e. g. Weible, Sabatier & Lubell, 2004). 
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Effect of knowledge 
As discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7, the possible effect of knowledge on 
individuals' reasoning about foreign policy issues is a topic of intense debate. The 
present research showed that neither general nor policy-specific political knowledge 
had any significant effect on attitudes towards peace operations. Indeed, both 
informed and uninformed respondents appeared to rely on core values and postures 
to shape their attitudes towards such operations. This strongly supported Hurwitz and 
Peffley (1987; see also Feldman, 1988), who assumed that political knowledge does 
not affect the use of core principles, and opposed those which proposed that political 
expertise facilitates attitude formation (e. g. Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Zaller, 1992). 
Sniderman, Tetlock and Brady (1986, p. 79) asked, "How is it possible for ordinary 
citizens to put together a consistent outlook on politics, given that they know so little 
about it? " This research answers this question by showing that although individuals 
may not be very knowledgeable about foreign policy matters, their international 
attitudes are structured by more general orientations. 
The implications of this finding are greater than just confirming propositions made 
by Hurwitz and Peffley. Popkin (1991, p. 218) argued that the use of general 
principles in lieu of factual knowledge is "an inescapable fact of life, and will occur 
no matter how educated we are, how much information we have and how much 
thinking we do. " Indeed, Popkin believed that political campaigns should be 
refrained to accommodate citizen's limited information. However, Delli Carpini and 
Keeter (1996) claimed that a lack of basic political knowledge is a hindrance to the 
democratic process, and suggested several reforms to counter this deficiency, such as 
better education and greater availability of elite debates. 
The measures employed in the present studies were limited, covering only a small 
area of political participation. In this study general political knowledge was assessed 
by questions taken from the British Election Studies. It has been suggested that these 
questions are biased to facts about constitutional rules and partisan policy positions, 
and therefore ignore important aspects of political knowledge, such as the ability to 
pursue public goals, to hold government to account or to interpret information and 
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engage in political argument or decision-making (e. g. Frazer & Macdonald, 2003). 
Johns (2002) identified three measures of political knowledge that have been used in 
British studies, which are based on different conceptualisations and 
operationalisations of the term "political knowledge". Further studies on the effect of 
political knowledge on political attitudes should explore a greater range of such 
forms of political knowledge. 
It should also be noted that the present findings were limited by their focus on a 
single issue at a single point in time. Following Goren (2001b, p. 21), "more research 
across issue space and over time is needed before robust generalisations can be made 
about the impact cognitive ability has on the relationship between core principles and 
issue attitudes. " 
Postures and core values 
Postures 
Internationalism and multi-lateralism were consistently positively related to attitudes 
towards peace operations. With the exception of attitudes towards humanitarian 
interventions in Iraq (Chapter 9) and the combat mission in Afghanistan (Chapter 8), 
internationalism was a consistently better predictor of attitudes towards peace 
operations than were either multi-lateralism or militarism. The importance of 
internationalism in shaping international attitudes in the present research is consistent 
with findings reported in previous studies (e. g. Holsti, 1996; Ziegler, 1987). 
According to Herrmann and Keller (2004, p. 563), this construct's "explanatory 
power is greatest for questions of engagement in far-flung places for reasons not 
related to traditional security interests". Although it could be argued that having 
British troops deployed in foreign countries represents instances of British interests 
being at stake, the importance of internationalism in shaping opinions on a spectrum 
of issues ranging from no obvious interests to vital interests needs to be explored 
further. 
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Multi-lateralism was consistently positively related to attitudes towards peace 
operations, indicating that the more individuals believed in international co-operation 
the more positive their attitudes towards such missions. This result is in line with 
previous studies that have highlighted the importance of multi-lateralism in 
determining European attitudes towards foreign deployments (e. g. Holsti, 1996; 
Juhasz, 2001). 
Militarism was positively associated with peace operations in four out of seven 
studies (Chapters 7 to 9). This finding is in line with Kushner (2004), who reported 
that although "militant internationalism" is associated with support for military 
action, it does not preclude support for humanitarian aid, foreign aid or peacekeeping 
missions. 
It should also be pointed out that these four studies were conducted after the 
September 11`h attacks. These attacks may have increased the public's perception of 
threat from large-scale terrorist attacks, leading them to endorse more belligerent 
foreign policy attitudes. Indirect evidence for this possibility comes from a study by 
Gordon and Arian (2001), who found that feelings of threat were significantly related 
to foreign policy choices. More specifically, the more threatened individuals felt, the 
more their policy choices tended to maintain or intensify a conflict. There is some 
indication that a short-lived amplification of militaristic beliefs occurred after 
September 11`h. For example, Jenkins-Smith and Herron (2003) reported that 
although belief in military force surged immediately after the September 11`h attacks, 
public views returned to pre- 9/11 levels within a few months. Future British 
research utilising longitudinal studies that cover the period before and after 
September 11th could address this issue. 
Additionally, the foreign policy landscape may be more confusing after the 
September 11`h attacks. The "War on Terror" has already led to two concurrent 
military and humanitarian missions in the same territory (i. e. Afghanistan and Iraq), 
which may appear to be part of the same political endeavour. An analysis of how 
these two pairs of concurrent missions were represented in the media may reveal how 
they were perceived by the public. 
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Core values 
A substantial focus of the present research was on one particular component within 
the hierarchical model - core values. Chapter 2 indicated that the analysis of core 
values in the hierarchical model had thus far been limited to a few variables, such as 
morality of warfare, moral traditionalism and political ideology. Indeed, Peffley and 
Hurwitz (1993) argued that researchers need to update their research agenda to 
discover abstract orientations that play a role in structuring foreign policy attitudes. 
Chapter 3 presented several constructs that were deemed to be relevant to a 
discussion of attitudes towards peace operations. 
Political ideology 
In contrast to previous studies (e. g. Jenkins-Smith et al., 2004), research reported in 
this thesis found no significant influence of political ideology on attitudes towards 
peace operations. Political ideology also had no significant effect on the three 
postures. A possible reason for the discrepancy in these findings is that the majority 
of previous studies have used political ideology as the sole core value under 
investigation (also see Bartels, 1994; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). 
There is some empirical evidence that the distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy core principles may be blurring, at least at the elite level. For example, 
Herrmann and Keller (2001) have argued that the differences between domestic and 
foreign policy issues may diminish as a result of increasing globalisation, leading 
elites to depend on political ideology when making decisions about both policy 
domains. Future research should explore the possibility of such "trans-domain" core 
values. 
Nationalism and patriotism 
Chapter 3 indicated that nationalism and/or patriotism were important predictors of 
foreign policy attitudes in a number of studies. However, it was also shown that 
previous studies disagreed on the direction of this relationship. Throughout this 
thesis, nationalism was negatively related to internationalism and positively 
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associated with militarism, which is consistent with findings by Hurwitz and Peffley 
(1987,1990). 
In contrast, patriotism was positively related to internationalism and multi-lateralism. 
With the exception of two studies (Chapters 4 and 5), patriotism was not 
significantly related to militarism. Overall, patriotism showed a positive and 
significant total effect on specific attitudes towards peace operations in all studies. It 
was also a stronger predictor of specific policy attitudes (in terms of its total effects) 
than was nationalism, a finding that replicates that of Conover and Feldman (1987). 
These results are consistent with Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) that patriotism is 
strongly related to peace-loving attitudes and internationally-oriented opinions, but 
are opposed to the findings of Bartels (1994) and Mueller-Peters (1998). This could 
be due to the fact Kosterman and Feshbach's measures of patriotism and nationalism 
were used throughout this thesis, and/or that the opposing studies used a single item 
to assess these constructs as opposed to the multi-item measures used in the present 
research. 
These findings also show that positive attachment to one's country per se, in the 
form of patriotism, does not preclude support for Britain's involvement in 
international affairs. This corroborates recent re-conceptualisations of inward and 
outward forms of national attachment. Inward national attachment is characterised by 
a protective interest in the maintenance of a unique national identity, whereas 
outward national attachment is concerned with the role of the national group in the 
international arena (Davis, 1999; Nigbur & Cinnirella, unpublished). 
Social and political trust 
The impact of political and social trust on public opinion has only recently become a 
research focus. In line with previous studies that have argued that individuals use 
these two forms of trust as a heuristic in forming political attitudes across a range of 
topics (e. g. Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002; Hetherington & Globetti, 2002), present 
findings also indicate that both political and social trust have important 
consequences. Overall, social trust was more strongly related to co-operative 
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attitudes (i. e. internationalism), whilst political trust was more concerned with 
government interventions (i. e. militarism and multi-lateralism). 
Unlike previous studies, these findings have also assessed the relationship between 
multi-lateralism and social trust, and have shown that individuals who are socially 
trusting are more likely to believe that Britain needs to co-operate with other 
countries to bring about change in the world than less trusting respondents. 
Additionally, this research has extended previous findings by exploring the effect of 
knowledge on the relationship between social trust and foreign policy attitudes. 
Contrary to Brewer and Steenbergen (2002), who suggested that the effect of social 
trust on foreign policy opinions depends on the information individuals have, the 
present results showed that there were no systematic differences in the way with 
which uninformed and informed respondents relied on social trust to structure their 
attitudes. 
In contrast to social trust, the effect of political trust on foreign policy attitudes has 
been explored less frequently in previous studies. Contrary to Popkin and Dimock 
(2002), who argued that political trust should be positively related to both 
internationalism and militarism, findings from Chapter 6 indicated that political trust 
was positively associated with internationalism and negatively related to militarism. 
Respondents who were political trusting were more likely to believe that Britain 
should be involved internationally using non-military measures than less politically 
trusting participants. 
However, structural equation modelling showed that militarism was positively 
associated with political trust in subsequent studies (Chapters 7 to 9). According to 
Hetherington and Globetti (2002), political trust is a standing decision for supporting 
or rejecting government activity. This argument may presuppose that individuals 
know where the government stands on certain political issues. However, as in the 
case of social trust, present findings also showed that the effect of political trust was 
not moderated by political knowledge. Instead, these findings may be due to the way 
with which Britain's involvement in Afghanistan was represented in the media at that 
time. Since this study did not investigate media representations, a further study that 
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explored media frames and political discourse would be necessary to clarify this 
relationship. 
In addition to previous studies, this research programme also assessed the link 
between multi-lateralism and political trust. Studies showed that respondents who 
trusted the government were more likely to believe that Britain should work closely 
with other countries to bring about change than did less trusting participants. 
Therefore, social and political trust significantly shaped individuals' beliefs in 
international co-operation and political interventions in the international arena. 
Through them, political and social trust also significantly constrained specific 
attitudes towards foreign policy concerns. Given the centrality of these two 
constructs in shaping foreign policy attitudes, it is particularly important for policy- 
makers to understand the role of these types of trust in maintaining support for 
foreign policy actions. 
Humanitarianism 
Humanitarianism had not received a lot of empirical attention in studies on foreign 
policy attitudes. It was argued in Chapter 7 that there are several reasons why 
humanitarianism may be pertinent to research on peace operations. If 
humanitarianism entails a general concern for the well-being of others and a 
willingness to help others, then foreign policy interventions designed to improve the 
well-being of others should evoke compassion. 
Indeed, present results showed that this construct was a significant predictor of 
postures and attitudes towards peace operations. In studies in which humanitarianism 
was assessed (Chapters 7 to 9), humanitarianism was one of the most potent 
predictors (in terms of its total effects) of support of peace operations. It was also one 
of the strongest predictors of internationalism and multi-lateralism. Therefore, a 
general compassion for the situation of other people translated into the belief that 
Britain should be involved in solving international problems with the co-operation of 
other countries or institutions. 
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Further research needs to determine whether the significant impact of 
humanitarianism is restricted to issues with an explicit humanitarian dimension, such 
as foreign aid or support for human rights. A future study may also want to explore 
the role of empathy in mediating or moderating the role of humanitarianism on 
policy issues (cf. Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001). 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Belief in a Just 
World 
Findings from the present research indicated that SDO, RWA and BJW were 
positively associated (in terms of total effects) with attitudes towards the ISAF, the 
Middle East and Iraq. SDO, RWA and BJW were also positively related to attitudes 
towards the combat mission in Afghanistan, which is consistent with previous 
research (e. g. Pratto et al., 1994; Cohrs et al., 2002). 
The finding that attitudes towards peace operations were positively associated with 
SDO contradicts earlier finding by Pratto and colleagues (1994). Pratto et al. (1994) 
investigated the relationship between SDO, war and humanitarian intervention, and 
showed that individuals high in SDO held positive attitudes towards war, whilst SDO 
was negatively related to attitudes towards humanitarian action. 
It could be that the interventions in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iraq were not 
perceived purely in humanitarian terms, but as part of the fight against terrorism. 
Some studies (e. g. Cohrs et al., 2002; Henry et al., 2002) indicated that the fight 
against terrorism as well as the military enforcement of human rights were positively 
associated with SDO and RWA. Indeed, the military enforcement of human rights 
was an important part of the mission in both Afghanistan and Iraq, which may 
account for the positive correlation with the three constructs. Hence, a variety of 
missions need to be explored in future studies to disentangle these findings further. 
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Core values versus basic human values 
The aim of the final empirical chapter was to explore the role of basic human values 
in the explanation of foreign policy attitudes. The results from the two studies 
reported in that chapter showed that the hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes 
can be fruitfully extended by including basic human values at a higher level of 
abstraction than core values (see Figure 10.1). 
Figure 10.1. Revised hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes, 
incorporating basic human values 
Basic human values 
)º Core values 
}--ºý Postures Specific foreign policy 
attitudes 
Previous research had investigated the value correlates of attitudes towards war. The 
present two studies have extended these findings by examining the value basis of 
attitudes towards humanitarian interventions. It was found that attitudes towards 
peace operations in the Middle East and Iraq were most strongly correlated with 
security values, followed by conformity and power. The greater the importance 
assigned to conservation of order and harmony in relations, the greater the support 
for the mission in the Middle East and Iraq. 
Interestingly, this pattern of value association is the same as that found in studies of 
attitudes towards conventional war (e. g. Nelson & Milburn, 1999; Cohrs et al., 
2002). This is despite Fetchenhauer and Bierhoff s (2001) argument that attitudes 
towards humanitarian intervention should be differently related to human values than 
attitudes towards war. Future studies need to investigate whether these associations 
also hold with peace operations in other countries or whether they were specific to 
the two missions investigated here. 
The two studies also investigated whether or not core values separately contributed 
to individuals' attitudes towards peace operations when taking into account basic 
human values. Hierarchical regression analyses in both studies indicated that 
worldviews, core values and postures continued to contribute to an understanding of 
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attitudes towards peace operations even controlling for basic human values. 
Nevertheless, results also suggested that security and conformity values were 
significant predictors alongside worldviews, core values and postures. 
Braithwaite (1997) proposed that political values coalesce around two core 
dimensions referred to as security and harmony values, which are exemplified by 
values of national strength and order, and international harmony and equality, 
respectively. Only one value bears evidence to the value balance model advanced by 
Braithwaite in the present research - namely security. Instead, the fact that core 
values and postures were associated with a more or less unique value pattern also 
indicates a more complex picture. 
Future studies should continue the exploration of basic human values within the 
hierarchical model of foreign policy attitudes. Such research will indicate whether 
security values are central to all foreign policy beliefs or whether they are of 
particular importance only with respect to military/defence issues. 
Contextual effects and images 
Several studies have shown that public support for an international intervention is 
dependent on a variety of contextual effects, such as the perceived effectiveness of a 
mission (e. g, Burk, 1999; Kull & Ramsay, 2001). However, structural equation 
modelling showed that such contextual effects were better conceptualised as 
consequences of mission support in all but two studies. Respondents who supported 
the missions were more likely to view the mission as successful, to believe that 
participation has increased respect for Britain throughout the world, and to believe 
that Britain had a moral obligation to get involved. Conversely, they were less likely 
to perceive a risk of casualties and to think that such missions were a waste of 
money. 
However, in line with a developing body of research that examined the effect of 
policy-specific information on beliefs (e. g. Herrmann et al., 1999, Herrmann & 
Keller, 2004), the present research has shown that images can supplement the 
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standard focus on general principles in the search for the underlying structure of 
foreign policy beliefs. 
Hurwitz and Peffley initially conceptualised images as a "standing decision" about 
specific countries that are super-ordinate to postures, but constrained by core values 
(see Figure 10.2). 
Findings from the present research programme (Chapters 7 and 8) indicated that the 
placement of images within the hierarchical model may need to be revised. Structural 
equation modelling indicated that although images influenced specific attitudes 
towards peace operations, they were not significantly related to any of the three 
postures (see also Herrmann & Keller, 2001). 
Figure 10.2. Original hierarchical model including images 
Core values 
}--ý Images } --ý Postures 
) Specific policy 
attitudes 
However, images of Afghanistan were significantly affected by core values, such as 
social and political trust. Images were also affected by political knowledge (although 
this relationship was just insignificant). Overall, these findings suggested that 
present-day images of particular countries may be better conceptualised as 
"situational" factors that are located at the same level of abstraction as postures (see 
Figure 10.3). 
Further research is needed to determine whether this re-conceptualisation better 
captures the effects of images within the hierarchical model than the original 
formulation. Such research will also need to investigate the sources of images more 
carefully, i. e. the degree to which images are shaped by core values and the extent to 
which they are related to political knowledge and/or media representations. 
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Figure 10.3. Revised hierarchical model including images (not including basic 
human values) 
In the light of recent research (e. g. Boettcher, 2004; Herrmann & Keller, 2004), 
future studies could also explore a greater range of image components. In a series of 
experimental studies using undergraduate students, Boettcher (2004) explored the 
role of location, ethnicity/race/religion, type of humanitarian crisis (repressive 
regime, ethnic conflict, civil war), casualty ratio and probability of success. 
Boettcher (2004) found no clear patterns of the impact of type of humanitarian crisis 
on support for a humanitarian intervention. However, he found that location of the 
intervention and race/ethnicity/religion of the populace mattered in that US support 
was highest for humanitarian intervention in Eastern Europe and lowest for African 
countries. These findings require replication in a British sample. 
A theoretical caveat 
According to Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson (1993, p. 247), "hierarchical models, in 
which general, abstract idea elements - postures and core values - structure more 
specific policy beliefs, have undermined the view that foreign policy beliefs in the 
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United States lacked structure". As outlined above, a consistent finding in this thesis 
has been that individuals engage in theory-driven processing when forming opinions 
about peace operations. 
It has been argued that such heuristics can distort individuals' judgements, that is 
individuals who rely on core values and postures may have opinions that they would 
not hold if given more information (e. g. Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000). However, the 
present research programme showed that political knowledge had little or no effect 
on attitudes towards peace operations and did not moderate the relationships within 
the hierarchical structure. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and others (e. g. Luskin, 2002) also noted that 
heuristics may lead to incorrect or sub-optimal opinions or judgements. However, the 
question arises whether modern foreign policy is that simple that the concepts of 
optimality or correctness can readily be applied? 
Practical implications of the research 
The study of public opinion establishes guidelines within which policymakers are 
able to consider policy options (e. g. Sobel, 2001). According to Holsti (1996, p. 33), 
the most important reason for interest in public opinion on foreign 
affairs arises from the assumption that in some ways and at least some of 
the time public attitudes have an impact, for better or for worse, on the 
conduct of the nation's external policy. 
Whilst the present research programme has not addressed the impact of public 
opinion on foreign policy decision-making, several empirical studies (Bardes & 
Oldendick, 1990; Everts, 2001) indicate that there is a general tendency in Western 
democracies for policy makers to be responsive to strongly expressed opinions about 
specific policy issues. 
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A minimum level of public support is needed to justify military interventions, such 
as peace operations. According to Boettcher (2004, p. 333), "when public support for 
humanitarian intervention wanes or when the public begins openly to question the 
operation ... democratic governments will find it difficult to continue humanitarian 
activities. " The war in Vietnam is a case in point in which public outcry contributed 
to the abandonment of policies that permitted the sacrifice of American soldiers. 
Public opinion may also be crucial to the government when it is conducting reviews 
of its foreign and defence policies. The importance assigned to peace operations in 
new policies will not only depend on the international environment, but will also be 
influenced by domestic opinions (Martin & Fortmann, 1995). 
As well as influencing governmental decisions, declining public support can also 
affect the performance of soldiers on peace operations. Studies of soldiers have 
repeatedly shown that public opinion at home has an effect on how soldiers 
themselves view such missions. For example, Halverson and Bliese (1996) found 
that soldiers' personal support for the mission was directly related to the perceived 
public support at home. Similarly, Kornhuber (1994, cited in Britt, 1998) found that 
German peacekeepers experienced stress as a result of the ambivalent feelings 
German society had for such operations. 
Overall, findings from this study suggest ways in which policy makers can frame 
peace operations to generate or sustain public support for such missions. Specifically, 
a British government intending to establish and maintain a peace operation would do 
well to appeal to core values, such as social trust and humanitarianism, as well as to 
beliefs favouring international involvement and co-operation. 
Future research 
In line with the majority of other political research, the empirical studies reported in 
this thesis have made the assumption that attitudes towards peace operations are uni- 
dimensional and bi-polar, i. e. positive, negative or neutral. However, a growing 
literature indicates that individuals' opinions do not always readily fall into a 
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positive-negative distinction, but are often simultaneously positive and negative (e. g. 
Alvarez & Brehm, 1995; Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 2000; 
Lavine, 2001; Nelson & Milburn, 1999; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). In other words, 
individuals frequently "tend to have roughly as many ideas on one side of the issues 
as on the other" (Sniderman & Saris, 2000, p. 5). When these evaluations of an 
attitude object are in conflict, the individual is said to be ambivalent (e. g. Alvarez & 
Brehm, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; Feldman & Zaller, 1992). 
Haenze (2001) found that attitudes towards the NATO intervention in Kosovo were 
marked by a conflict between two principal values: feelings of responsibility for the 
victims of civil war and ethnic cleansing, and reluctance to destroy lives or injure 
civilians. Haenze furthermore reported that such attitudinal ambivalence impacted on 
willingness to protest against military intervention by signing a petition. Cohrs and 
colleagues (2002) also reported higher attitudinal ambivalence towards the 
humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan and Kosovo as a result of universalism 
and justice centrality (i. e. attitudes towards justice/injustice). The role of attitudinal 
ambivalence and attitudes towards peace operations therefore needs to be explored in 
greater detail in future studies. 
Future research may also need to address the role of emotions as influencing foreign 
policy choices within the hierarchical model or foreign policy attitudes in general. 
Although research has investigated the role of emotions indirectly, such as the 
emotional response to political issues (e. g. Conover & Feldman, 1984), 
comparatively little research has explored how emotions, such as fear or hatred, 
influence foreign policy preferences. Proposing a framework for studying the effects 
of emotion on foreign policy behaviour, Geva & Skorick (2003) found that negative 
emotions were indeed a powerful determinant of conflictual foreign policy attitudes. 
One aspect of emotion most pertinent to present-day foreign policy issues may be 
anxiety, which promotes immediate learning whilst undermining what has already 
been learned (Marcus, 2002). Investigating the link between fear of war and the 
underlying value priorities, Boehnke and Schwartz (1997) postulated that value 
priorities influence the appraisal of threat of war. They found that the perceived 
threat of war was greater amongst individuals who attributed greater importance to 
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values expressing concern for others - universalism and benevolence, and to values 
pertaining to the preservation of social order - security and conformity. Different 
objects of worry have also been found to be differentially related to political 
behaviour. For example, Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and Devereux (1988) reported that 
worries about external events but not worries about personal problems were 
positively related to political activism and liberalism. 
A related aspect of foreign policy that warrants further investigation concerns 
perceptions of threat (e. g. Abolfathi, 1980). There is some indication that perceptions 
of national threat, if not personal threat, have figured in the British psyche since the 
September 11th attacks and Britain's involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq (e. g. 
MORI, March 2003). For example, a Eurobarometer survey (October 2003) indicated 
that the perceived threat of terrorism was higher in Britain than in any other 
European country. There is also a growing body of evidence that the September 11`h 
attacks had an impact on political and social attitudes (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos & 
Provost, 2002). Kushner (2004) is currently exploring perceptions of threat in 
shaping people's worldviews and specific policy preferences. A similar study could 
also explore the effect of threat on the hierarchical model in a British population or in 
European comparative research. 
Future studies should also explore the role of the mass media in greater detail. Most 
foreign policy events do not affect the individual directly. Rather, international 
events are always mediated by the mass media (Isernia et al., 2002). Although media 
use was investigated at the most basic level (i. e. the newspaper most frequently 
read), other media such as television or the internet were not explored in any of the 
present studies. Yet, these two media are clearly important vehicles of information. 
When asked where they would normally hear about, or go to find out about, defence 
issues, 79% stated that they would use television, 63% newspapers and 18% the 
internet (MORI, June 2003). An experimental study could explore the effect the 
media has on different levels within the hierarchical model. Such as study could also 
explore the impact of "soft" (human-interest themes) and "hard" (knowledgeable 
information sources) media on foreign policy opinions and general predispositions 
(cf. Baum, 2004). 
281 
Chapter 10 Discussion and Conclusion 
Although the present research has shown that political knowledge had no significant 
impact on the use of general principles, it has been argued that the role of political 
knowledge in shaping the impact of a general predisposition on opinions about a 
specific political issue depends on whether the media/public debate offers one 
undisputed interpretation or competing interpretations of the principle (e. g. Brewer, 
2003). More specifically, if the implication of a value is undisputed in a specific 
policy context, then individuals who endorse this principle should hold one policy 
attitude, whereas individuals who reject that value should hold the competing 
opinion (e. g. Kinder & Sanders, 1996). In such cases, the impact of the value on 
specific attitudes should be greater among knowledgeable individuals than among 
the less knowledgeable ones. By contrast, political knowledge should not have an 
impact in cases where the media/public debates stress competing interpretations of a 
value (Brewer, 2003). An experimental design could be used to explore this issue and 
to disentangle the differential effects of competing interpretations on theory-driven 
reasoning. 
Finally, the investigation into attitudes towards peace operations and their 
determinants has so far been limited to a society that has been the provider of 
peacekeeping troops. However, what is still needed is an assessment of such attitudes 
in a population that has been at the receiving end of Britain's foreign policy. 
Concluding remark 
The present research programme explored the complexity with which individuals 
organise their political worlds, which is more diverse than implied by the traditional 
approaches to political attitudes. According to Paris (2000, p. 27), studies of peace 
operations have neglected "building bridges between the study of peace operations 
and larger theoretical debates. " By advancing our understanding of support for peace 
operations, the present research took a small step in addressing this shortcoming. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW MATERIALS FOR CHAPTERS 4 AND 5 
(SIERRA LEONE) 
Cards were used for participants to indicate their answers: 
1= Strongly Disagree 
2= Disagree 
3= Neither agree nor disagree 
4= Agree 
5= Strongly Agree 
and 
1= Very Likely 
2= Likely 
3= Neither likely nor unlikely 
4= Unlikely 
5= Very unlikely 
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In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that 
attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our 
understanding of how people like you think about these things. 
Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: (Please 
mark one box for each) 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I am proud to be British ................................................. 
Q QQQ Q 
Being British is an important part of my identity ................ 
QQQQQ 
I would rather be a citizen of Britain than any other 
country in the world .................................................... 
El QQQQ 
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, 
the better off they are .................................................. 
QQQQQ 
In a sense I am emotionally attached to Britain and 
emotionally affected by its actions ................................. 
El 11 El 0 El 
Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: (Please 
mark one box for each) 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
International cooperation should be encouraged to solve 
common problems, such as world hunger or world peace ... 
QQQQ Q 
Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate 
on taking care of problems at home ................................ 
QQQQQ 
In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough ......................................................... 
QQQQQ 
The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with 
other nations .............................................................. 
QQQQQ 
To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work 
together with other nations or international organisations 
such as the UN or NATO ............................................. 
QQQQQ 
Britain's power in the world is diminished by working 
together with other nations or international organisations ... 
QQQQQ 
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Many of the tasks undertaken by the British Armed Forces fall under the term peace 
support or peace operation. The British Army is deployed in over 80 countries around the 
world, with military personnel currently contributing to a UN operation in Sierra Leone. 
Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following to statements 
Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: (Please 
mark one box for each) 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The decision to participate in the UN mission in 
Sierra Leone was a good one ........................................ 
El 0000 
I approve of British troops being used to bring peace 
to Sierra Leone ........................................................... 
ED QQQQ 
British troops in Sierra Leone have succeeded in 
implementing the peace agreement ................................ 
El El 0 El El 
Very Neither Likely Very 
Unlikely Unlikely nor Unlikely Likely Likely 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be injured? .... 
11 El 0 El Q 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be killed? ...... 
El 0 0 Q El 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken 
hostage? ................................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Personal information 
Are you male F1 or female J? 
How old are you 
Please select the highest level of education you have achieved: 
Degree, including PhD .................................................. 
A-level or equivalent .................................................... 
El 
O-level/GCSE ............................................................. 
E1 
Other .................................................................... 
No qualifications .......................................................... 
r7 
Please indicate your occupation: 
Do you have children? Yes M No El 
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Not at all 
interested 
How interested are you in current affairs? ......................... 
0 
Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read: 
The Daily Telegraph ..................................................... 
Q 
The Guardian .............................................................. 
Q 
The Independent .......................................................... 
Q 
The Times .................................................................. 
Q 
The Financial Times ..................................................... 
Q 
The Daily Mail ............................................................ 
EJ 
The Sun ..................................................................... 
Q 
The Daily Express ........................................................ 
Q 
Other .................................................................... 
Q 
Neither uninterested 
nor interested 
QQQ 
Very 
interested 
Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes [I No 
El 
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? Yes [I No 
0 
Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes [] No 0 
If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote? 
Labour ..................................................................... 
Q 
Liberal ..................................................................... 
Q 
Conservative ............................................................... 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Very 
liberal 
How liberal or conservative would you rate your position on 
foreign policy issues? .................................................. 
F1 
Neither liberal 
nor conservative 
QQ 
Very 
conservative 
QQ 
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APPENDIX B 
Demographic Composition of Unweighted Panel Sample - 
Sierra Leone 
The table presents the demographic characteristics of the final 80 respondents in the 
sample, when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Census data for Guildford 
for comparison. The difference between the sample and the Census data for each 
sub-section is provided in the column to the right. 
Demographic composition of unweighted panel sample (N = 80*3) 
Study sample 
2001 Census Difference 
(N = 80) 
data for Sample/Census 
Guildford 
Gender Male 53.2% 49.0% 4.20% 
Female 46.8% 51.0% 4.20% 
Age 18-24 12.0% 11.65% 0.35% 
25-29 14.2% 13.34% 0.86% 
30-44 35.9% 33.64% 2.26% 
45-59 28.1% 22.23% 5.87% 
60 - over 9.8% 19.14% 9.34% 
Education Degree 30.9% 30.57% 0.33% 
A-level 14.5% 11.50% 3.00% 
O-level 34.5% 33.66% 0.84% 
Other 9.8% 5.96% 3.84% 
No qual. 10.3% 18.30% 8.00% 
Occupation 1 14.9% 19.28% 4.38% 
2 17.9% 16.40% 1.50% 
3 17.2% 17.00% 0.20% 
4 12.8% 13.42% 0.62% 
5 8.3% 9.24% 0.94% 
6 7.4% 5.49% 1.91% 
7 8.0% 6.80% 1.20% 
8 3.2% 3.89% 0.69% 
9 10.3% 8.48% 1.82% 
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APPENDIX C 
The effects of attitudes towards European integration and 
attitudes towards the armed forces on attitudes towards the 
ERRF -Additional analyses 
The Eurobarometer provided one important qualification to this finding. At the EU 
level attitudes towards the ERRF were positively related to attitudes towards the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and European Integration. Thus, 
respondents who endorsed a common defence policy were more likely to believe that 
the ERRF was a good initiative than respondents who were against it (82% versus 
49%; Manigart, 2001a). A similar pattern of responses was also found regarding 
attitudes towards being a member of the European Union: respondents who believed 
that being a member of the EU was good for their country were more likely to 
endorse the ERRF than those who believed the contrary (83% versus 53%). Could 
these associations explain Britain's attitudes towards the implementation of the 
ERRF? 
Although no country-specific data are available on these relationships, data indicate 
that 51% of British respondents supported a common defence policy, which was 
considerably lower than the EU average of 73% support. When asked about the level 
of decision-making regarding defence issues, only 22% of British respondents 
believed that decisions should be made at EU-level (compared to the European 
average of 43%), whilst 23% believed that decisions about military interventions 
should be taken by all the member countries of the EU (versus 37% Europe-wide; 
Manigart, 2001a). A similar picture emerged with regards to foreign policy. 
Compared to the European average of 65%, only 31% of British respondents 
believed that the member states of the EU should have one common foreign policy 
(Eurobarometer 54.1,2001). 
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Attitudes towards the ERRF were therefore directly related to more general attitudes 
towards European Integration. To investigate this link further, attitudes towards 
European Integration were also assessed in this study. 
Attitudes towards the Armed Forces 
Attitudes towards the ERRF may thus be shaped by more general attitudes towards 
European Integration. It is, however, possible that attitudes towards the ERRF are 
also shaped by another related construct, namely attitudes towards the British Armed 
Forces. It has been argued that the majority of present-day military missions, that is 
peace operations, have created a military that is more like Janowitz' (1960) 
`constabulary force': committed to using the minimum of force or violence and 
seeking international relations rather than victory (Isernia, 2001). Furthermore, an 
increasing emphasis on a humanitarian role of the Armed Forces has led to a change 
in the perception of the forces alongside a change in perceptions of the use of force 
in the international arena in many countries, such as Italy (Isernia, 2001) and France 
(La Balme, 2001). 
Little is known about the British public's view on the role of the Armed Forces in 
today's political climate. Opinion poll data indicate that British respondents have 
incorporated the newer roles of keeping the peace into their perceptions of the Armed 
Forces. In a 2000 European survey on this subject, almost all British respondents 
(96%) believed that the British Armed Forces' role should be national defence, 
whilst 93 percent believed that the British Armed Forces should be preparing to fight 
wars (Manigart, personal communication, November 4,2002). However, eight out of 
ten respondents (82%) also agreed that keeping or re-establishing peace in the world 
is one of the army's role, whilst 81 percent agreed that the British Armed Forces 
should help other countries in case of disaster (Manigart, personal communication, 
November 4,2002). 
It could therefore be argued that individuals who have embraced the more modern 
roles of the Armed Forces may be more likely to hold positive attitudes towards the 
ERRF than individuals who have retained the traditional roles of the British military. 
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To explore this possibility, perceptions of the role of the Armed Forces were also 
assessed in this study. 
Additional constructs 
According to the Eurobarometer studies, attitudes towards the ERRF across Europe 
were influenced by attitudes towards Europe in general, and evaluations of EU 
competencies in particular. It was therefore expected that respondents who hold 
positive attitudes towards EU membership would be more likely to hold more 
positive attitudes towards the ERRF than those who hold negative attitudes towards 
Europe Integration. 
The sources and consequences of attitudes towards the Armed Forces on foreign 
policy attitudes have received little attention in the empirical literature. However, it 
was expected that individuals who have endorsed the modern roles of the Armed 
Forces should be more positive towards the ERRF than individuals who have not 
accepted these roles. 
It should be noted here that different placements of these constructs within the 
hierarchical model are theoretically possible. Firstly, attitudes towards Europe and 
the Armed Forces may be shaped by the three foreign policy postures, and may in 
turn directly influence attitudes towards the ERRF. For example, respondents who 
are willing to see Britain being internationally involved may hold more positive 
attitudes towards European integration and the British Armed Forces than 
respondents who believe that Britain should concentrate on problems at home. 
However, it is also possible that these two constructs shape foreign policy postures. 
For example, a positive attitude towards European Integration may lead to more 
willingness to become involved internationally. Similarly, endorsing peacekeeping 
roles of the Armed Forces may lead to greater willingness to become involved in 
international problems and to act multi-laterally. This issue will therefore also be 
addressed. 
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"Attitudes towards Europe" 
Perceptions of Europe were assessed by four items (5-point Lickert scale: 1= 
Strongly Disagree -5= Strongly Agree): "Tony Blair has said he would like to see 
Britain play a role `at the heart of Europe'. Do you agree or disagree with this 
view? ", "If there were a referendum today I would prefer Britain to get out of the 
European Community. ", "There should a single co-ordinated European foreign 
policy" and "Britain and other members of the EU should move towards closer 
political and economic integration". Factor analysis indicated only one component, 
which explained 49 percent of the variance. The items were combined into one scale, 
with higher scores indicating more positive attitudes towards European Integration. 
"Attitudes towards the British Armed Forces" 
Attitudes towards the British Armed Forces and their role in today's political climate 
was assessed by four items (5-point Likert scale: 1= Strongly Disagree -5= 
Strongly Agree): "The Armed Forces are important for Britain"; "The main job of 
British soldiers is to fight wars" (reversed scoring); "British soldiers should only 
defend Britain and its territories " (reversed scoring); "In today's world, 
peacekeeping and other non-combat activities should be central to the British 
military's functions". Factor analysis indicated only one component, which 
accounted for 43 percent of the total variance. The items were combined into a scale, 
with higher scores indicating a greater willingness to see British soldiers fulfilling 
non-traditional, peacekeeping roles. 
Assessing the effects of attitudes towards the Armed Forces and Europe in the 
hierarchical model 
The aim of this set of analyses was to assert the additional exploratory power of 
attitudes towards European Integration and the Armed Forces on support for the 
ERRF. The first model to be tested situated these additional variables between 
foreign policy postures and attitudes towards the ERRF. According to this model, 
attitudes towards the ERRF were significantly and positively influenced by Attitudes 
towards Europe and, to a lesser extent, Attitudes towards modern roles of the Armed 
Forces. Attitudes towards Europe, in turn, were positively affected by 
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Internationalism and Multi-lateralism, whilst Attitudes towards modern role of the 
Armed Forces were positively influenced by Internationalism and Multi-lateralism 
and negatively affected by Militarism. 
This model provided a good fit to the data, x2 = 44.23, df = 53, p= . 13, N= 322, GFI 
= . 989, AGFI = . 989, RMSEA = . 
036. To test whether an alternative model would 
provide a better fit to the data, the model was re-estimated with attitudes towards 
Europe and the Armed Forces being the determinants of foreign policy postures 
rather than their consequences. In this model, Attitudes towards Europe positively 
influenced Internationalism and Multi-lateralism, whereas Attitudes towards the 
modern roles of the Armed Forces only negatively affected Militarism. In turn, 
Attitudes towards Europe were positively influenced by political and social trust as 
well as patriotism and negatively affected by nationalism. Attitudes towards the 
modern roles of the Armed Forces were positively influenced only by political trust 
and patriotism and negatively shaped by nationalism. 
This alternative model only showed an acceptable fit to the data, x2 = 63.31, df = 62, 
p= . 06, N= 322, GFI = . 967, AGFI = . 964, RMSEA = . 058. However, this 
alternative model fit the data significantly worse than did the original one, Oý = 
19.08, df = 9, p= . 034, and the original model was therefore retained. 
The total effects showed that of all the constructs in this model, Internationalism had 
the strongest total effect on attitudes towards the ERRF (. 48), followed by attitudes 
towards Europe and social trust. Of the core values, social trust had a greater total 
effect on Attitudes towards Europe than did political trust, which had a marginally 
stronger total effect on Attitudes towards the Armed Forces than did social trust. 
Thus, more positive attitudes towards European Integration were associated with 
more positive attitudes towards the ERRF. To a lesser extent, more positive attitudes 
towards the peacekeeping role of the British Armed Forces were also related to more 
positive attitudes towards the ERRF. The analyses also indicate that attitudes towards 
European Integration were shaped by a general view of whether Britain should be 
involved internationally and by the view that Britain should collaborate with other 
nations to achieve foreign policy goals. Similarly, attitudes towards the Armed 
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Forces that incorporated a peacekeeping role were not only influenced by a 
cooperative foreign policy stance but also by how important multi-lateral ventures 
were believed to be. Moreover, attitudes towards the Armed Forces were also 
negatively shaped by Militarism, indicating that a more pacifist approach to foreign 
policy interventions was related to more positive attitudes about peacekeeping roles 
for British soldiers. 
Consistent with expectations, attitudes towards European Integration and attitudes 
towards the Armed Forces also affected support for the ERRF. Respondents who 
held more positive attitudes towards European Integration were more likely to also 
hold more positive attitudes towards the ERRF than participants who believed the 
contrary, which is supportive of the Eurobarometer finding. Similarly, respondents 
who endorsed modern, peacekeeping roles of the Armed Forces were also more 
supportive of the ERRF than were participants who believed more in the traditional 
military roles. 
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APPENDIX D 
Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data - 
Attitudes towards the ERRF 
The table presents the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, 
when the sample was not weighted, as well as 2001 Census data for Guildford for 
comparison. 
Demographic composition of unweighted sample data 
Guildford Guildford Difference 
ample Census data Sample/Census (N = 322) 
Gender Male 51.1% 49.0% 2.10% 
Female 48.9% 51.0% 2.10% 
Age 18-24 13.8% 11.65% 2.15% 
25-29 13.7% 13.34% 0.36% 
30-44 30.7% 33.64% 2.94% 
45-59 23.5% 22.23% 1.27% 
60- over 18.3% 19.14% 0.84% 
Education Degree 29.8% 30.57% 0.77% 
A-level 12.7% 11.50% 1.20% 
O-level 34.2% 33.66% 0.54% 
Other 7.3% 5.96% 1.34% 
No qual. 16.0% 18.3% 2.30% 
Social class 1 15.5% 19.28% 3.78% 
2 17.0% 16.40% 0.60% 
3 18.2% 17.00% 1.20% 
4 13.3% 13.42% 0.42% 
5 8.9% 9.24% 0.34% 
6 7.1% 5.49% 1.61% 
7 7.5% 6.80% 0.70% 
8 4.3% 3.89% 0.41% 
9 8.2% 8.48% 0.28% 
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Questionnaire Items for Chapter 6 -Attitudes towards the 
ERRF 
In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that 
attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our 
understanding of how people like you think about these things. 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I love my country ....................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
I am proud to be British .............................................. 
Q 1 Q Q U 
In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and 
emotionally affected by its actions ............................ 
Although at times I may not agree with the government, 
my commitment to Britain always remains strong....... 
I feel a great pride in Britain ....................................... 
El 
It is not that important for me to serve my country ....... 
M 
I feel good when I see the British flag flying ................ 
M 
The fact that I am British is an important part of 
my identity .............................................................. 
It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional 
attachment to ones country ....................................... 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
QQQQ 
In general, I have very little respect for the 
British people .......................................................... 
QQQQQ 
Britain is really just a big and powerful institution ....... 
QQQQQ 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British 
history and heritage .................................................. 
Q QQQ Q 
The important thing for the British foreign aid programme 
is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage ... 
QQQQQ 
Other countries should try to make their government 
as much like ours as possible .................................... 
QQQQQ 
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, 
the better off they are ............................................... 
QQQQQ 
Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes 
Britain to do things in a big way ................................ 
QQQQQ 
It is important that Britain win in international sporting 
competitions like the Olympics ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is really not important that Britain be number one in 
whatever it does ...................................................... 
El Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
Generally, most people can be trusted ......................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Most people can be counted on to do what 
they say they will do ................................................ 
Q Q Q Q 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until 
they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy Q Q Q Q Q 
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it ..... 
Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I trust the government to do what is right ............... ...... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The government is run for the benefit of all people ...... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
People in government waste a lot of money 
that we pay in taxes .................................................. 
El Q Q Q Q 
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The government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves ........................................ 
11 QQQQ 
None Very little Some Quite a lot A lot 
How much confidence do you have in your 
government? ............................................................ 
El QQQQ 
True False Don't know 
Britain's electoral system is based on proportional 
representation .......................................................... 
Q Q Q 
Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ........... 
El 0 Q 
British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen ............ 
0 Q Q 
The longest time allowed between general elections is 
four years ................................................................ 
QQQ 
No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay 
a deposit .................................................................. 
Q QQ 
The number of members of parliament is about 100 ..... 
Q QQ 
Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament 
and the British Parliament ........................................ 
11 QQ 
MPs from different parties are on parliamentary 
committees .............................................................. 
QQQ 
Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State 
in the government .................................................... 
QQQ 
No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two 
different places ........................................................ 
QQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems 
such as world hunger or world peace ......................... 
QQQQQ 
Britain should help improve the standard of living in less 
developed countries ................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Britain should put pressure on countries which 
systematically violate basic human rights .................. 
Q QQQQ 
337 
Appendix E 
Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate 
on taking care of problems at home ........................... 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough ...................................................... 
Q QQQ Q 
Britain should take all steps including the use of force to 
prevent aggression by an expansionist power ............. 
11 QQQQ 
The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with 
other nations ............................................................ 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations 
or international organisations such as the UN or NATO QQQQ 
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling 
international disputes ............................................... 
QQQQQ 
Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together 
with other nations or international organisations......... QQQQQ 
Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your 
assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each) 
Very Neither Likely Very 
Likely Likely nor Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be injured? .............................................................. 
El QQQ Q 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be killed? ................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken 
hostage? .................................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
ERRF troops will succeed in implementing a peace 
agreement in a country in conflict ............................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
ERRF troops will not succeed in establishing a lasting 
peace in a country in conflict .................................... 
QQQQQ 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in 
European conflicts ................................................... 
11 QQQ Q 
As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to 
intervene in countries that experience conflict ............ 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries 
would have been better spent at home ....................... 
Q QQQ Q 
British peace operations are a waste of money ............. 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the participation of British troops in the European 
Rapid Reaction force that will perform peacekeeping duties in 
European conflicts? .................................................. 
Q QQQ Q 
I approve of British troops being used as part of an ERRF to 
bring peace to Europe ............................................... 
QQQQQ 
Demographics 
Are you male 0 or female J? 
How old are you 
Please select the highest level of education you have achieved: 
Degree, including PhD ............................................ 
A-level or equivalent ............................................... 
O-level/GCSE ......................................................... 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
No qualifications ..................................................... 
Please indicate your occupation:, 
Do you have children? Yes Q No Q 
Not at all Neither uninterested Very 
interested nor interested interested 
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Are you interested in current affairs? ..................... 
Q 
Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read: 
The Daily Telegraph ............................................... 
Q 
The Guardian ........................................................... 
F7 
The Independent ...................................................... 
F-1 
The Times ............................................................... 
Q 
The Financial Times ................................................ 
F-1 
The Daily Mail ........................................................ 
F-1 
The Sun ................................................................... 
Q 
The Daily Express ................................................... 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Appendix E 
Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes E] No 
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? 
Yes Q No Q 
Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes Q No E] 
If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote? 
Labour ..................................................................... 
Q 
Liberal ..................................................................... 
Q 
Conservative ............................................................ 
Other .................................................................... 
Very Neither liberal 
liberal nor conservative 
How liberal or conservative would you rate your position on 
foreign policy issues? ............................................... 
QQQ 
Very Don' 
conservative Know 
QQ 
If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your 
name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which 
will be preserved at all times. 
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APPENDIX F 
Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data - 
Attitudes towards the ISAF 
The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, 
when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for 
comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation 
of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in 
the column on the right. 
Demographic composition of unweighted study sample 
Guildford 
Guildford Difference Study sample Sample/Census 
(N = 336) 
Census data 
Gender Male 53.3% 49.0% 4.30% 
Female 46.7% 51.0% 4.30% 
Age 18-24 11.6% 11.65% 0.05% 
25-29 12.8% 13.34% 0.54% 
30-44 34.6% 33.64% 0.96% 
45-59 25.5% 22.23% 3.27% 
60- over 15.5% 19.14% 3.64% 
Education Degree 30.0% 30.57% 0.57% 
A-level or equiv 14.3% 11.50% 2.80% 
O-level or equiv 34.6% 33.66% 0.94% 
Other 4.3% 5.96% 1.66% 
No qual. 16.8% 18.3% 1.5% 
Social class 1 14.9% 19.28% 4.38% 
2 17.2% 16.40% 0.80% 
3 17.7% 17.00% 0.70% 
4 12.3% 13.42% 1.12% 
5 8.5% 9.24% 0.74% 
6 7.2% 5.49% 1.71% 
7 8.5% 6.80% 1.70% 
8 3.0% 3.89% 0.89% 
9 10.7% 8.48% 2.22% 
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APPENDIX G 
Questionnaire Items for Chapter 7 -Attitudes towards the ISAF 
In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that 
attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our 
understanding of how people like you think about these things. 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I love my country ....................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
I am proud to be British .............................................. 
Q Q Q M [) 
In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and 
emotionally affected by its actions ............................ 
Although at times I may not agree with the government, 
my commitment to Britain always remains strong....... 0 
I feel a great pride in Britain ....................................... 
0 
It is not that important for me to serve my country ....... 
0 
I feel good when I see the British flag flying ................ 
0 
QQQQ 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
The fact that I am British is an important part of 
my identity .............................................................. 
QQQQQ 
It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional 
attachment to ones country ....................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
In general, I have very little respect for the 
British people .......................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Britain is really just a big and powerful institution ....... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British 
history and heritage .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The important thing for the British foreign aid programme 
is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage... Q Q Q Q 
Other countries should try to make their government 
as much like ours as possible .................................... 
11 Q Q Q Q 
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, 
the better off they are ............................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes 
Britain to do things in a big way ................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is important that Britain win in international sporting 
competitions like the Olympics ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is really not important that Britain be number one in 
whatever it does ...................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
Generally, most people can be trusted ......................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Most people can be counted on to do what 
they say they will do ................................................ 
EJ Q Q Q Q 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until 
they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy 0 Q Q Q Q 
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I trust the government to do what is right ..................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The government is run for the benefit of all people ...... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
People in government waste a lot of money 
that we pay in taxes .................................................. 
El Q Q Q Q 
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The government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves ........................................ 
11 QQ 
None Very little Some 
How much confidence do you have in your 
government? ............................................................ 
QQQ 
True False Don't know 
Britain's electoral system is based on proportional 
representation .......................................................... 
Q Q Q 
Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ........... 
0 E Q 
British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen ............ 
Q Q Q 
The longest time allowed between general elections is 
four years ................................................................ 
QQQ 
No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay 
a deposit ............................................................. ..... 
Q Q Q 
The number of members of parliament is about 100 ..... 
EJ Q Q 
Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament 
and the British Parliament ................................... ..... 
Q Q Q 
MPs from different parties are on parliamentary 
committees .............................................................. 
Q Q Q 
Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State 
in the government .................................................... 
QQQ 
No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two, 
different places ........................................................ 
QQQ 
QQ 
Quite a lot A lot 
QQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems 
such as world hunger or world peace ......................... 
QQQQQ 
Britain should help improve the standard of living in less 
developed countries ................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Britain should put pressure on countries which 
systematically violate basic human rights .................. 
Q QQQQ 
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Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate 
on taking care of problems at home ........................... 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough ...................................................... 
Q QQQ Q 
Britain should take all steps including the use of force to 
prevent aggression by an expansionist power ............. 
QQQQQ 
The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with 
other nations ............................................................ 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or 
international organisations such as the UN or NATO.. QQQQQ 
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling 
international disputes ............................................... 
QQQQQ 
Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together 
with other nations or international organisations......... QQQ 11 Q 
Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your 
assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each) 
Very Neither Likely Very 
Likely Likely nor Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be injured? .............................................................. 
El QQQ Q 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be killed? ................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken 
hostage? .................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree 
As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in 
European conflicts ................................................... 
ED Q Q Q 
As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to 
intervene in countries that experience conflict ............ 
Q Q Q Q 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
m 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries 
would have been better spent at home ....................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
British peace operations are a waste of money ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
One should always find ways to help others less fortunate 
than oneself ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The dignity and well-being of all should be the most 
important concerns in any society ............................. 
El Q Q Q Q 
One of the problems of todays society is that people are 
often not kind enough to others ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
All people who are unable to provide for their own should 
be helped by others .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
A person should always be concerned about the well-being 
of others .................................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness 
will only be abused .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of 
others than they should ............................................. 
El Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure 
that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed ...... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in 
this country ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
This country would be better off if we worried about how 
equal people are ....................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is not really that big a problem if some people have more 
of a chance in life than others .................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
If people were treated more equally in this country 
we would have fewer problems ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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One of the big problems in this country is that we don't 
give everyone an equal chance .................................. 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the 
breakdown of society ............................................... 
11 Q Q Q Q 
We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live 
according to their own moral standards even if they are 
very different from our own ...................................... 
EJ Q Q Q Q 
This country would have fewer problems if there were more 
emphasis on traditional family ties ............................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The world is changing and we should adjust our view 
of moral behaviour to those changes .......................... 
E] Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The expertise shown by British troops in Afghanistan has 
reinforced respect for Britain around the world .......... 
Q Q Q Q 
British troops in Afghanistan are respected by 
local people ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the population of 
Afghanistan? 
Trustworthy Q Q Q Q Q Not trustworthy 
Dishonest Q Q Q Q Q Honest 
Repressive Q Q Q Q Q Free 
Friend Q Q Q Q Q Enemy 
Responsible Q Q Q Q Q Irresponsible 
Aggressive Q Q Q Q Q Peaceful 
Good Q Q Q Q Q Bad 
Authoritarian Q Q Q Q Q Democratic 
Threatening Q Q Q Q Q Not threatening 
Cooperative Q Q Q Q Q Uncooperative 
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Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the government of 
Afghanistan? 
Trustworthy Q Q Q Q Q Not trustworthy 
Dishonest Q Q Q Q Q Honest 
Repressive Q Q Q Q Q Free 
Friend Q Q Q Q Q Enemy 
Responsible Q Q Q Q Q Irresponsible 
Aggressive Q 0 Q Q Q Peaceful 
Good Q Q Q Q Q Bad 
Authoritarian Q Q Q Q Q Democratic 
Threatening Q Q Q Q Q Not threatening 
Cooperative Q Q Q Q Q Uncooperative 
Some people know a lot about politics and foreign policy, others do not keep up with 
Britain's involvement in Afghanistan. Please answer the following questions. 
True False Don't know 
The US is part of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ..................................... 
11 Q U 
The ISAF is confined to Afghanistan's capital Kabul ... 
11 Q Q 
The ISAF is headed by British troops .......................... 
Q M Q 
The ISAF's role is to assist the Taliban in rebuilding the 
new Afghanistan ...................................................... 
Q Q Q 
The ISAF operates under the auspices of NATO .......... 
Q Q Q 
Demographics 
Are you male Q or female 0? 
How old are you 
Please select the highest level of education you have achieved: 
Degree, including PhD ............................................ 
A-level or equivalent ............................................... 
0-level/GCSE ......................................................... 
EI 
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Other .................................................................... 
Q 
No qualifications ..................................................... 
Q 
Please indicate your occupation: 
Do you have children? Yes Q No Q 
Not at all Neither uninterested Very 
interested nor interested interested 
Are you interested in current affairs? ........... .......... 
QQQQQ 
Please indicate the newspaper you most freq uently read: 
The Daily Telegraph ..................................... .......... 
Q 
The Guardian ................................................. .......... 
Q 
The Independent ...................................................... 
Q 
The Times ............................................................... 
Q 
The Financial Times ................................................ 
Q 
The Daily Mail ........................................................ 
Q 
The Sun ................................................................... 
Q 
The Daily Express ................................................... 
Q 
Other .................................................................... 
Q 
Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes Q No Q 
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? 
Yes E] No Q 
Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes E] No Q 
If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote? 
Labour ..................................................................... Q Liberal ..................................................................... 
Q 
Conservative ............................................................ 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Very Neither liberal Very Don'i 
liberal nor conservative conservative Know 
In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on 
political issues? ........................................................ 
QQQQQ 
If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your 
name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which 
will be preserved at all times. 
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APPENDIX H 
Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data - 
Chapter 8 
The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, 
when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for 
comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation 
of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in 
the column on the right. 
Demographic composition of unweighted sample and 2001 Guildford Census 
data for comparison (Chapter 8) 
Guildford 
Guildford 
Difference 
Study sample Census data 
Sample/Census 
(N=304) 
Gender Male 54.2% 49.0% 5.20% 
Female 45.8% 51.0% 5.20% 
Age 18-24 11.1% 11.65% 0.55 
25-29 12.3% 13.34% 1.04 
30-44 35.6% 33.64% 1.96 
45-59 25.9% 22.23% 3.67 
60- over 15.1% 19.14% 4.04 
Education Degree 28.8% 30.57% 1.77% 
A-level or equiv 14.7% 11.50% 3.20% 
O-level or equiv 36.2% 33.66% 2.54% 
Other 6.2% 5.96% 0.24% 
No qual. 14.1% 18.3% 4.2% 
Occupation 1 13.8% 19.28% 5.48% 
2 17.9% 16.40% 1.50% 
3 17.2% 17.00% 0.20% 
4 11.4% 13.42% 2.02% 
5 7.7% 9.24% 1.54% 
6 8.1% 5.49% 2.61% 
7 8.3% 6.80% 1.50% 
8 2.9% 3.89% 0.99% 
9 12.7% 8.48% 4.22% 
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APPENDIX I 
Questionnaire Items for Chapter 8- Attitudes towards the ISAF 
and the Combat Mission 
In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that 
attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our 
understanding of how people like you think about these things. 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I love my country ....................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
I am proud to be British .............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and 
emotionally affected by its actions ............................ 
El 
Although at times I may not agree with the government, 
my commitment to Britain always remains strong....... 0 
I feel a great pride in Britain ....................................... 
It is not that important forme to serve my country ....... 
0 
I feel good when I see the British flag flying ................ 
0 
The fact that I am British is an important part of 
my identity .............................................................. 
It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional 
attachment to ones country ....................................... 
0 
QQQQ 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
In general, I have very little respect for the 
British people .......................................................... 
QQQQQ 
Britain is really just a big and powerful institution ....... 
Q Q [] Q0 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British 
history and heritage .................................................. 
Q QQQ Q 
The important thing for the British foreign aid programme 
is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage ... 
Other countries should try to make their government 
as much like ours as possible .................................... 
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, 
the better off they are ............................................... 
Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes 
Britain to do things in a big way ................................ 
It is important that Britain win in international sporting 
competitions like the Olympics ................................. 
It is really not important that Britain be number one in 
whatever it does ...................................................... 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
QQ 
QQ 
QQ 
QQ 
Strongly Neither Agree 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree 
Generally, most people can be trusted ......................... 
0 0 E Q 
Most people would try to take advantage of you if ' 
they got the chance .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q 
Most people can be counted on to do what 
they say they will do ................................................ 
Q Q Q Q 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until 
they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy Q 0 0 0 
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it ..... 
Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree 
I trust the government to do what is right ..................... 
Q Q Q Q 
The government is run for the benefit of all people ...... 
Q Q Q Q 
People in government waste a lot of money 
that we pay in taxes .................................................. 
EJ Q Q Q 
Strongly 
Agree 
r-l 
m 
El 
m 
Strongly 
Agree 
11 
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The government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves ........................................ 
11 QQ 
None Very little Some 
How much confidence do you have in your 
government? ............................................................ 
Q QQ 
True False Don't know 
Britain's electoral system is based on proportional 
representation .......................................................... 
Q Q Q 
Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ........... 
Q Q Q 
British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen............ U 
U 
The longest time allowed between general elections is 
four years ................................................................ 
QQQ 
No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay 
a deposit .................................................................. 
QQQ 
The number of members of parliament is about 100 ..... 
QQQ 
Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament 
and the British Parliament ........................................ 
QQQ 
MPs from different parties are on parliamentary 
committees .............................................................. 
Q QQ 
Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State 
in the government .................................................... 
QQQ 
No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two 
different places ........................................................ 
QQQ 
QQ 
Quite a lot A lot 
QQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems 
such as world hunger or world peace ......................... 
Q QQQ Q 
Britain should help improve the standard of living in less 
developed countries ................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Britain should put pressure on countries which 
systematically violate basic human rights .................. 
QQQQQ 
353 
Appendix I 
Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate 
on taking care of problems at home ........................... 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough ...................................................... 
11 Q Q Q Q 
Britain should take all steps including the use of force to 
prevent aggression by an expansionist power ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with 
other nations ............................................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or 
international organisations such as the UN or NATO.. Q QQQ Q 
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling 
international disputes ............................................... 
QQ Q Q Q 
Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together 
with other nations or international organisations......... QQ Q Q 
Q 
Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your 
assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each) 
Very Neither Likely Very 
Likely Likely nor Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be injured? .............................................................. 
El Q Q Q Q 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be killed? ................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken 
hostage? .................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in 
European conflicts ................................................... 
11 QQQ Q 
As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to 
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intervene in countries that experience conflict ............ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries 
would have been better spent at home ....................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
British peace operations are a waste of money ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
One should always find ways to help others less fortunate 
than oneself ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The dignity and well-being of all should be the most 
important concerns in any society ............................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
One of the problems of todays society is that people are 
often not kind enough to others ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
All people who are unable to provide for their own should 
be helped by others .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
A person should always be concerned about the well-being 
of others .................................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness 
will only be abused .................................................. 
El Q Q Q Q 
People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of 
others than they should ............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The expertise shown by British troops in Afghanistan has 
reinforced respect for Britain around the world .......... 
El Q Q Q Q 
British troops in Afghanistan are respected by 
local people ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the population of 
Afghanistan? 
Trustworthy QQQQQ Not trustworthy 
Dishonest Q Q Q Q Q Honest 
Repressive Q Q Q Q Q Free 
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Friend Q Q Q Q Q 
Responsible Q Q Q Q Q 
Aggressive Q Q Q Q Q 
Good Q Q Q Q Q 
Authoritarian Q Q Q Q Q 
Threatening Q Q Q Q Q 
Cooperative Q Q Q Q Q 
Enemy 
Irresponsible 
Peaceful 
Bad 
Democratic 
Not threatening 
Uncooperative 
Please check one position for each item to indicate how you feel about the government of 
Afghanistan? 
Trustworthy Q Q Q Q Q Not trustworthy 
Dishonest Q Q Q Q Q Honest 
Repressive Q Q Q Q Q Free 
Friend Q Q Q Q Q Enemy 
Responsible Q Q Q Q Q Irresponsible 
Aggressive Q Q Q Q Q Peaceful 
Good Q Q Q Q Q Bad 
Authoritarian Q Q Q Q Q Democratic 
Threatening Q Q Q Q Q Not threatening 
Cooperative Q Q Q Q Q Uncooperative 
Some people know a lot about politics and foreign policy, others do not keep up with 
Britain's involvement in Afghanistan. Please answer the following questions. 
True False Don't know 
The US is part of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ..................................... 
Q Q D 
The ISAF is confined to Afghanistan's capital Kabul ... 
Q Q Q 
The ISAF is headed by British troops .......................... 
F-1 [] Q 
The ISAF's role is to assist the Taliban in rebuilding th e 
new Afghanistan ...................................................... 
Q Q Q 
The ISAF operates under the auspices of NATO .......... 
Q Q 0 
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Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one 
box for each, where 1= Very Negative, 2= Negative, 3= Slightly Negative, 
4= Neither Positive nor Negative, 5= Slightly Positive, 6= Positive, 7= Very Positive) 
1234567 
Some groups of people are simply not the 
equals of others .................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Some people are just more worthy than others ......... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
This country would be better off if we cared less abo ut 
how equal all people are ....................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Some people are just more deserving than others ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance 
in life than others ................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Some people are just inferior to others ..................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Increased economic equality ................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Increased social equality ........................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Equality ................................................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
If people were treated more equally we would have 
fewer problems in this country .............................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 0 
In an ideal world, all nations would be equal ........... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
We should try to treat one another as equals 
as much as possible .............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
It is important that we treat other countries as equals Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please 
mark one box for each, where 1= Disagree Strongly, 2 -Disagree somewhat, 3 
=Disagree slightly, 4= Neither agree nor disagree, S= Agree slightly, 6= Agree 
somewhat, 7= Agree strongly) 
1234367 
Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to 
preserve our way of life ........................................ 
QQQQQQQ 
People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other 
old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead 
develop their own personal standards of what is moral 
and immoral ........................................................ 
QQQQQQQ 
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Women should always remember the promise they make 
in their marriage ceremony to obey their husbands. Q QQQQQQ 
Our customs and national heritage are the things that have 
made us great, and certain people should be made to 
show greater respect for them ............................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
National anthems, flags, and glorification of one's 
country should all be de-emphasized to promote the 
brotherhood of all men ......................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
The facts on crime and sexual immorality, all show we 
have to crack down harder on deviant groups and 
troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards 
and preserve law and order ................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual 
behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any 
better or holier than those which other people follow[] QQQQQQ 
Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are 
unfortunate people who deserve much better care, 
instead of so much punishment ............................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn .................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
Organisations like the army and the priesthood have a pretty 
unhealthy effect upon men because they require strict 
obedience of commands from supervisors .............. 
Q QQQQQQ 
One good way to teach certain people right from wrong is 
to give them a good stiff punishment when 
they get out of line ............................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war 
unless they themselves agree the war 
is just and necessary ............................................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having 
a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a 
gentleman and, especially a lady ........................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without 
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mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and 
revolutionaries who are stinting things ................... 
QQ QQQQQ 
Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established 
religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those 
who attend church regularly .................................. 
QQ QQQQQ 
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they 
grow up they ought to get over them and settle downQ Q QQQQQ 
Rules about being "well mannered" and respectable are chains 
from the past that we should question very thoroughly 
before accepting ................................................... 
QQ QQQQQ 
The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment 
would not do any good in cases like these .............. 
[] Q QQQQQ 
If a child starts becoming a little too unconventional, his 
parents should see to it he returns to the normal ways 
expected by society .............................................. 
QQ QQQQQ 
Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them 
to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a 
firm, tough hand when dealing with them .............. 
QQ QQQQQ 
A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. 
The days when women are submissive to their husbands 
and social conventions belong strictly in the past ... 
QQ QQQQQ 
Homosexuals are just as good and virtuous as anybody else, 
and there is nothing wrong with being one ............. 
QQ QQQQQ 
It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election 
campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country 
we owe him our greatest support and loyalty .......... 
QQ QQQQQ 
Demographics 
Are you male Q or female Q? 
How old are you ? 
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Please select the highest level of education you have achieved: 
Degree, including PhD ............................................ 
Q 
A-level or equivalent ............................................... 
0-level/GCSE ......................................................... 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
No qualifications ..................................................... 
Q 
Please indicate your occupation: 
Do you have children? Yes Q No Q 
Not at all Neither uninterested Very 
interested nor interested interested 
Are you interested in current affairs? ..................... 
11 QQQQ 
Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read: 
The Daily Telegraph ............................................... 
Q 
The Guardian ........................................................... 
Q 
The Independent ...................................................... 
The Times ............................................................... 
Q 
The Financial Times ................................................ 
The Daily Mail ........................................................ 
Q 
The Sun ................................................................... 
Q 
The Daily Express ................................................... 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes Q No M 
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? 
Yes Q No Q 
Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes D No Q 
If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote? 
Labour ..................................................................... 
Q 
Liberal ..................................................................... 
Q 
Conservative ............................................................ 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Very Neither liberal Very Don'I 
liberal nor conservative conservative Know 
In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on 
political issues? ........................................................ 
11 QQQQ 
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If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your 
name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which 
will be preserved at all times 
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APPENDIX J 
Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data - 
Chapter 9- Study 1 
The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, 
when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for 
comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation 
of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in 
the column on the right. 
Demographic composition of unweighted sample and 2001 Guildford Census 
data for comparison 
Guildford Guildford Difference Study sample Census data Sample/Census (N - 304) 
Gender Male 52.3% 49.0% 3.30% 
Female 46.7% 51.0% 3.30% 
Age 18-24 12.6% 11.65% 0.95% 
25-29 15.7% 13.34% 2.36% 
30-44 35.2% 33.64% 1.56% 
45-59 23.9% 22.23% 1.67% 
60- over 12.6% 19.14% 6.54% 
Education Degree 31.1% 30.57% 0.53% 
A-level 14.5% 11.50% 3.00% 
O-level 35.2% 33.66% 1.54% 
Other 6.0% 5.96% 0.04% 
No qual. 13.2% 18.30% 5.10% 
Social class 1 15.1% 19.28% 4.18% 
2 18.0% 16.40% 1.60% 
3 18.9% 17.00% 1.90% 
4 14.5% 13.42% 1.08% 
5 9.5% 9.24% 0.26% 
6 8.4% 5.49% 2.91% 
7 8.8% 6.80% 2.00% 
8 2.7% 3.89% 1.19% 
9 4.1% 8.48% 4.38% 
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APPENDIX K 
Questionnaire Items for Chapter 9 Study 1- Attitudes towards 
Observer Mission 
In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that 
attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our 
understanding of how people like you think about these things. 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I love my country ....................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
I am proud to be British .............................................. 
11 Q Q Q Q 
In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and 
emotionally affected by its actions ............................ 
El 
Although at times I may not agree with the government, 
my commitment to Britain always remains strong....... 
I feel a great pride in Britain ....................................... 
It is not that important for me to serve my country ....... 
0 
I feel good when I see the British flag flying ................ 
0 
The fact that I am British is an important part of 
my identity .............................................................. 
It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional 
attachment to ones country ....................................... 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
QQQQ 
In general, I have very little respect for the 
British people .......................................................... 
El QQQQ 
Britain is really just a big and powerful institution ....... 
QQQQQ 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British 
history and heritage .................................................. 
11 QQQ Q 
The important thing for the British foreign aid programme 
is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage ... 
QQQQQ 
Other countries should try to make their government 
as much like ours as possible .................................... 
El 13 
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, 
the better off they are ............................................... 
11 QQQQ 
Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes 
Britain to do things in a big way ................................ 
M M ED ED ED 
It is important that Britain win in international sporting 
competitions like the Olympics ................................. 
Q MM 
It is really not important that Britain be number one in 
whatever it does ...................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
Generally, most people can be trusted ......................... 
11 11 11 11 Q 
Most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance .................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Most people can be counted on to do what 
they say they will do ................................................ 
11 Q Q Q Q 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until 
they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy Q Q Q Q Q 
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I trust the government to do what is right ..................... 
11 Q Q Q Q 
The government is run for the benefit of all people ...... 
ED Q Q Q Q 
People in government waste a lot of money 
that we pay in taxes .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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The government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves ........................................ 
QQQ 
None Very little Some 
How much confidence do you have in your 
government? ............................................................ 
QQQ 
Britain's electoral system is based on proportional 
True False Don't know 
representation .......................................................... 
Q Q Q 
Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ........... 
Q Q 
British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen............ 
The longest time allowed between general elections is 
four years ................................................................ 
QQQ 
No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay 
a deposit .................................................................. 
Q QQ 
The number of members of parliament is about 100 ..... 
[D 0Q 
Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament 
and the British Parliament ......................................... 
. EJ 
MPs from different parties are on parliamentary 
committees .............................................................. 
QQQ 
Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State 
in the government .................................................... 
El QQ 
No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two 
different places ........................................................ 
QQ 
QQ 
Quite a lot A lot 
QQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems 
such as world hunger or world peace ......................... 
Q QQQ Q 
Britain should help improve the standard of living in less 
developed countries ................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Britain should put pressure on countries which 
systematically violate basic human rights .................. 
QQQQ 
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Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate 
on taking care of problems at home ........................... 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough ...................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Britain should take all steps including the use of force to 
prevent aggression by an expansionist power ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with 
other nations ............................................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or 
international organisations such as the UN or NATO.. Q QQQ Q 
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling 
international disputes ............................................... 
QQQQ 
Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together 
with other nations or international organisations ......... 
QQQQQ 
Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what Is your 
assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each) 
Very Neither Likely Very 
Likely Likely nor Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be injured? .............................................................. 
QQ 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be killed? ................................................................. 
QQQ 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken 
hostage? .................................................................. 
QQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree 
As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in 
European conflicts ................................................... 
11 QQ 
As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to 
Q Q 
Q Q 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Q Q 
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intervene in countries that experience conflict ............ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries 
would have been better spent at home ....................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
British peace operations are a waste of money ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
One should always find ways to help others less fortunate 
than oneself ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The dignity and well-being of all should be the most 
important concerns in any society ............................. 
ED Q Q Q Q 
One of the problems of todays society is that people are 
often not kind enough to others ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
All people who are unable to provide for their own should 
be helped by others .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
A person should always be concerned about the well-being 
of others .................................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness 
will only be abused .................................................. 
QQQQQ 
People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of 
others than they should ............................................. 
Q Q [ý [] Q 
Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one 
box for each, where 1= Very Negative, 2= Negative, 3= Slightly Negative, 
4= Neither Positive nor Negative, 5= Slightly Positive, 6= Positive, 7= Very Positive) 
1234567 
Some groups of people are simply not the 
equals of others .................................................... 
Some people are just more worthy than others ......... 
This country would be better off if we cared less about 
how equal all people are ....................................... 
Some people are just more deserving than others ..... 
Q 
It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance 
in life than others ................................................. 
11 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
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Some people are just inferior to others ..................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Increased economic equality ................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Increased social equality ........................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Equality ................................................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
If people were treated more equally we would have 
fewer problems in this country .............................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
In an ideal world, all nations would be equal ........... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
We should try to treat one another as equals 
as much as possible .............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
It is important that we treat other countries as equals ED Q Q Q Q Q 
Q 
Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please 
mark one box for each, where 1= Disagree Strongly, 2 =Disagree somewhat, 3 
=Disagree slightly, 4= Neither agree nor disagree, S= Agree slightly, 6= Agree 
somewhat, 7= Agree strongly) 
1234S67 
Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to 
preserve our way of life ........................................ 
Q 
People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other 
old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead 
develop their own personal standards of what is moral 
and immoral ........................................................ 
Women should always remember the promise they make 
in their marriage ceremony to obey their husbands. 
Our customs and national heritage are the things that have 
made us great, and certain people should be made to 
show greater respect for them ............................... 
National anthems, flags, and glorification of one's 
country should all be de-emphasized to promote the 
brotherhood of all men ......................................... 
QQQQQQ 
QQQQQQ 
QQQQQQ 
QQQQQQ 
QQQQQQ 
The facts on crime and sexual immorality, all show we 
have to crack down harder on deviant groups and 
troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards 
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and preserve law and order ................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual 
behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any 
better or holier than those which other people follow[] QQQQQQ 
Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are 
unfortunate people who deserve much better care, 
instead of so much punishment ............................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn .................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
Organisations like the army and the priesthood have a pretty 
unhealthy effect upon men because they require strict 
obedience of commands from supervisors .............. 
Q QQQQQQ 
One good way to teach certain people right from wrong is 
to give them a good stiff punishment when 
they get out of line ............................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war 
unless they themselves agree the war 
is just and necessary ............................................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having 
a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a 
gentleman and, especially a lady ........................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without 
mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and 
revolutionaries who are stirring things ................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
Atheists and others who have rebelled against the establish ed 
religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those 
who attend church regularly .................................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they 
grow up they ought to get over them and settle downQ QQQQQQ 
Rules about being "well mannered" and respectable are chains 
from the past that we should question very thoroughly 
before accepting ................................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment 
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would not do any good in cases like these .............. 
QQ 
If a child starts becoming a little too unconventional, his 
parents should see to it he returns to the normal ways 
expected by society .............................................. 
QQ 
Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them 
to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a 
firm, tough hand when dealing with them .............. 
QQ 
A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. 
The days when women are submissive to their husbands 
and social conventions belong strictly in the past ... 
QQ 
Homosexuals are just as good and virtuous as anybody else, 
and there is nothing wrong with being one ............. 
QQ 
It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election 
campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country 
we owe him our greatest support and loyalty.......... QQ 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
00 11 0D 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
A UN observer mission in Israel and Palestine would be a good solution 
to the political situation in the Middle East ............... 
13 QQ Q Q 
British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission 
after a peace settlement has been reached .................. 
r-1 QQ Q Q 
An observer mission in the Middle East would help Israel and Arab nations to settle 
their differences and live in peace ............................. 
QQQQQ 
In addition to participating in a UN observer mission, Britain should 
Increase diplomatic efforts to broker a peace settlementQ QQQQ 
British participation in a UN observer mission in the Middle East 
would help make the world a safer place .................... 
QQQQQ 
British troops should be sent to the Middle East as part of a UN observer mission 
before a peace settlement has been reached ............... 
QQQQQ 
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Rate the importance of the following items as a guiding principle in your life: (Please mark 
one box for each, where -1 = Opposed to my values, 0= Not important, 3 =Important, 6 
= Very important, 7= Of supreme importance) 
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all) Q 
INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself) Q 
SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)[-: ] 
PLEASURE (gratification of desires) Q 
FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought) [] 
01 2 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
3 4 S67 
QQQ 
QQQ 
aQQ 
QQQ 
A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual 
not material matters) 11 11 QQQQQQQ 
SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others 
care about me) Q 
SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society) Q 
AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences) Q 
MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life) Q 
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners) [] 
WEALTH (material possessions, money) Q 
NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation 
QQQ 
QQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
Q 
Q 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
011 E 
from enemies) 11 0 11 11 13 11 0 0 11 
SELF-RESPECT (belief in one's own worth) El 11 El 0 0 0 0 0 El 
RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance 
of debt) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of 
time-honoured customs) 
MATURE LOVE (deep emotional 
and spiritual intimacy) 
SELF-DISCIPLINE (self restraint, 
resistance to temptation) 
DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns) 
FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones) 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
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SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, 
approval by others) 
UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature) 
A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, 
novelty, and change) 
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) 
AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command) 
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends) 
A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature 
and the arts) 
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, 
care for the weak) 
INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 
MODERATE (avoiding extremes of 
feeling and action) 
LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group) 
AMBITIOUS (hardworking, aspiring) 
BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different 
ideas and beliefs) 
HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing) 
DARING (seeking adventure, risk) 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
(preserving nature) 
INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people 
and events) 
HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS 
(showing respect) 
CHOOSING OWN GOALS 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
(selecting own purposes) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)[] [Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE 
(submitting to life's circumstances) El 0000 ED ED ED El 
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HONEST (genuine, sincere) 
PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE 
(protecting my "face") 
OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations) 
INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking) 
HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) 
ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, 
sex, leisure, etc. ) 
DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief) 
RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) 
CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring) 
FORGIVING (willing to pardon others) 
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals) 
CLEAN (neat, tidy) 
Demographics 
Are you male E] or female 0? 
How old are you 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
Q QQQQQQm 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQ[DOMED QQ 
Please select the highest level of education you have achieved: 
Degree, including PhD ............................................ 
[] 
A-level or equivalent ............................................... 
Q 
0-level/GCSE ......................................................... 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
No qualifications ..................................................... 
Q 
Please indicate your occupation:, 
Do you have children? Yes Q No Q 
Not at all Neither uninterested 
interested nor interested 
Are you interested in current affairs? ..................... 
QQQQ 
Very 
interested 
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Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read: 
The Daily Telegraph ............................................... 
Q 
The Guardian ........................................................... 
The Independent ...................................................... 
The Times ............................................................... 
Q 
The Financial Times ................................................ 
Q 
The Daily Mail ........................................................ 
Q 
The Sun ................................................................... 
The Daily Express ................................................... 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes Q No Q 
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? 
YesQ No [I 
Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes Q No Q 
If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote? 
Labour ..................................................................... 
Q 
Liberal ..................................................................... 
Q 
Conservative ............................................................ 
Q 
Other ..................................................................... 
Q 
Very Neither liberal Very Don't 
liberal nor conservative conservative Know 
In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on 
political issues? ........................................................ 
11 QQQQ 
If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your 
name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which 
will be preserved at all times 
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Demographic Composition of Unweighted Sample Data - 
Chapter 9- Study 2- Iraq 
The table shows the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample, 
when samples were not weighted, as well as 2001 Guildford Census data for 
comparison (Office for National Statistics, 2002). The average percentage deviation 
of the sample statistics from the Census figures for each sub-section is indicated in 
the column on the right. 
Demographic composition of unweighted study sample compared to Guildford 
2001 Census data 
Study sample Guildford Differences 
(N = 209) Census data Sample/Census 
Gender Male 55.1% 49.0% 6.10% 
Female 44.9% 51.0% 6.10% 
Age 18-24 10.6% 11.65% 1.05% 
25-29 13.8% 13.34% 0.46% 
30-44 34.6% 33.64% 0.96% 
45-59 23.5% 22.23% 1.27% 
60- over 17.5% 19.14% 1.64% 
Education Degree 29.3% 30.57% 1.27% 
A level or equiv 14.4% 11.50% 2.90% 
O level or equiv 35.3% 33.66% 1.64% 
Other 4.7% 5.96% 1.26% 
No qual. 16.3% 18.3% 2.00% 
Social class 1 15.5% 19.28% 3.78% 
2 20.2% 16.40% 3.80% 
3 17.5% 17.00% 0.50% 
4 12.1% 13.42% 1.32% 
5 9.5% 9.24% 0.26% 
6 6.2% 5.49% 0.71% 
7 8.5% 6.80% 1.70% 
8 4.8% 3.89% 0.91% 
9 7.7% 8.48% 0.78% 
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APPENDIX M 
Questionnaire Items for Chapter 9- Study 1-Attitudes towards 
Iraq 
In society today, nationality and what it means to identify with your country is a topic that 
attracts a good deal of attention. The following few questions aim to improve our 
understanding of how people like you think about these things. 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I love my country ....................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
I am proud to be British .............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
In a sense, I am emotionally attached to my country and 
emotionally affected by its actions ............................ 
[] 
Although at times I may not agree with the government, 
my commitment to Britain always remains strong ....... 
Q 
I feel a great pride in Britain ....................................... 
It is not that important for me to serve my country ....... 
J 
I feel good when I see the British flag flying ................ 
0 
The fact that I am British is an important part of 
my identity .............................................................. 
It is not constructive for one to develop an emotional 
attachment to ones country ....................................... 
In general, I have very little respect for the 
British people .......................................................... 
Britain is really just a big and powerful institution ....... 
Q 
QQQQ 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
QQQQ 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
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Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The first duty of every young Britain is to honour British 
history and heritage .................................................. 
El QQQ Q 
The important thing for the British foreign aid programme 
is to see to it that Britain gains a political advantage... JJ 00 
Other countries should try to make their government 
as much like ours as possible .................................... 
D El EI El El 
Generally, the more influence Britain has on other nations, 
the better off they are ............................................... 
QQQQQ 
Foreign nations have done some very fine things but it takes 
Britain to do things in a big way ................................ 
M El 
It is important that Britain win in international sporting 
competitions like the Olympics ................................. 
11 D ED 17 El 
It is really not important that Britain be number one in 
whatever it does ...................................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agrce Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
Generally, most people can be trusted ......................... 
11 U 11 0 11 
Most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance .................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Most people can be counted on to do what 
they say they will do ................................................ 
ED Q Q Q Q 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until 
they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy ED (] Q Q Q 
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it ..... 
Q Q 0 Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I trust the government to do what is right ..................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The government is run for the benefit of all people ...... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
People in government waste a lot of money 
that we pay in taxes .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q 
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The government is pretty much run by a few big interests 
looking out for themselves ........................................ 
. El ED 
None Very little Some 
How much confidence do you have in your 
government? ............................................................. 
ED QQ 
Britain's electoral system is based on proportional 
True False Don't know 
representation .......................................................... 
Q Q Q 
Women are not allowed to sit in the House of Lords ........... 
Q Q Q 
British Prime Ministers are appointed by the Queen ............ 
0 Q Q 
The longest time allowed between general elections is 
four years ................................................................ 
QQQ 
No-one may stand for Parliament unless they pay 
a deposit .................................................................. 
QQ 
The number of members of parliament is about 100 ..... 
Q 11 
Britain has separate elections for the European Parliament 
and the British Parliament ........................................ 
El M 
MPs from different parties are on parliamentary 
committees .............................................................. 
QQQ 
Ministers of State are senior to Secretaries of State 
in the government .................................................... 
QQQ 
No-one is allowed to be on the electoral register in two 
different places ........................................................ 
QQQ 
aQ 
Quite a lot A lot 
QQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
International cooperation should be encouraged to solve common problems 
such as world hunger or world peace ......................... 
Q QQQ 
Britain should help improve the standard of living in less 
developed countries ................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Britain should put pressure on countries which 
systematically violate basic human rights .................. 
QQQQQ 
378 
Appendix M 
Britain shouldn't worry about world affairs but concentrate 
on taking care of problems at home ........................... 
E00 
Strongly Neither Agree 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree 
In dealing with other nations, our government should be 
strong and tough ...................................................... 
QQQ 
Britain should take all steps including the use of force to 
prevent aggression by an expansionist power ............. 
11 El 
The best way to ensure peace is to negotiate with 
other nations ............................................................ 
QQQ 
aQ 
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
QQ 
QQ 
QQ 
Strongly Neither Agree 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree 
To make a change in the world, Britain needs to work together with other nations or 
international organisations such as the UN or NATO.. Q000 
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in settling 
Strongly 
Agree 
11 
international disputes ............................................... 
QQ Q Q Q 
Britain's power in the world is diminished by working together 
with other nations or international organisations ......... 
QQ Q Q Q 
Even non-combat missions, such as peacekeeping, involve some risk; what is your 
assessment of risk to British peacekeepers?: (Please mark one box for each) 
Very Neither Likely Very 
Likely Likely nor Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be injured? .............................................................. 
F-1 Q Q Q Q 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will 
be killed? ................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
How likely is it that British peacekeepers will be taken 
hostage? .................................................................. 
QQQQQ 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
As part of Europe, Britain has a moral duty to intervene in 
European conflicts ................................................... 
Q QQQ Q 
As a wealthy and powerful country, it is Britain's duty to 
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intervene in countries that experience conflict............ Q Q 
Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
The money spent on keeping the peace in foreign countries 
would have been better spent at home ....................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
British peace operations are a waste of money ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
One should always find ways to help others less fortunate 
than oneself ............................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
The dignity and well-being of all should be the most 
important concerns in any society ............................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
One of the problems of todays society is that people are 
often not kind enough to others ................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
All people who are unable to provide for their own should 
be helped by others .................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
A person should always be concerned about the well-being 
of others .................................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
It is better not to be too kind to people, because kindness 
will only be abused .................................................. 
QQQQQ 
People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of 
others than they should ............................................. 
El QQQQ 
Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please mark one 
box for each, where 1= Very Negative, 2= Negative, 3= Slightly Negative, 
4= Neither Positive nor Negative, 5= Slightly Positive, 6= Positive, 7= Very Positive) 
1234567 
Some groups of people are simply not the 
equals of others .................................................... 
Q 
Some people are just more worthy than others ......... 
This country would be better off if we cared less about 
how equal all people are ....................................... 
Some people are just more deserving than others ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 0 
It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance 
in life than others ................................................. 
QQQQQQQ 
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Some people are just inferior to others ..................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Increased economic equality ................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Increased social equality ........................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Equality ................................................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
If people were treated more equally we would have 
fewer problems in this country .............................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
In an ideal world, all nations would be equal ........... 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
We should try to treat one another as equals 
as much as possible .............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
It is important that we treat other countries as equals Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Which of the following statements do have a positive or negative feeling towards: (Please 
mark one box for each, where 1= Disagree Strongly, 2 =Disagree somewhat, 3 
=Disagree slightly, 4= Neither agree nor disagree, 5= Agree slightly, 6= Agree 
somewhat, 7= Agree strongly) 
1 234567 
Laws have to be strictly enforced if we are going to 
preserve our way of life ........................................ 
Q QQQQQQ 
People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other 
old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead 
develop their own personal standards of what is moral 
and immoral ........................................................ 
Q QQQQQQ 
Women should always remember the promise they make 
in their marriage ceremony to obey their husbands. Q QQQQQQ 
Our customs and national heritage are the things that have 
made us great, and certain people should be made to 
show greater respect for them ............................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
National anthems, flags, and glorification of one's 
country should all be de-emphasized to promote the 
brotherhood of all men ......................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
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The facts on crime and sexual immorality, all show we 
have to crack down harder on deviant groups and 
troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards 
and preserve law and order ................................... 
1 Q1 11 Q1Q 
A lot of our society's rules regarding modesty and sexual 
behaviour are just customs which are not necessarily any 
better or holier than those which other people follow[] [] Q0QQQ 
Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are 
unfortunate people who deserve much better care, 
instead of so much punishment ............................. 
Q 1: 1 QQQQQ 
Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn .................. 
1: 1 [l Q 
Organisations like the army and the priesthood have a pretty 
unhealthy effect upon men because they require strict 
obedience of commands from supervisors .............. 
0 00QQQQ 
One good way to teach certain people right from wrong is 
to give them a good stiff punishment when 
they get out of line ............................................... 
Q QQQQQQ 
Youngsters should be taught to refuse to fight in a war 
unless they themselves agree the war 
is just and necessary ............................................. 
Q QQQQQQ 
It may be considered old-fashioned by some, but having 
a decent, respectable appearance is still the mark of a 
gentleman and, especially a lady ........................... 
Q QQ1: 1 Q El Q 
In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without 
mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and 
revolutionaries who are stirring things ................... 
Q 0QQQQQ 
Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established 
religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as th ose 
who attend church regularly .................................. 
Q QQQQQ 11 
Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they 
grow up they ought to get over them and settle downQ QQ E] QQ0 
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Rules about being "well mannered" and respectable are chains 
from the past that we should question very thoroughly 
before accepting ................................................... 
QQ QQQQQ 
The courts are right in being easy on drug offenders. Punishment 
would not do any good in cases like these .............. 
QQ Q0QQQ 
If a child starts becoming a little too unconventional, his 
parents should see to it he returns to the normal ways 
expected by society .............................................. 
QQ QQQQQ 
Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them 
to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a 
firm, tough hand when dealing with them .............. 
QQ QQQQQ 
A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. 
The days when women are submissive to their husbands 
and social conventions belong strictly in the past ... 
QQ QQQQQ 
Homosexuals are just as good and virtuous as anybody else, 
and there is nothing wrong with being one ............. 
QQ [] Q 11 Q0 
It's one thing to question and doubt someone during an election 
campaign, but once a man becomes the leader of our country 
we owe him our greatest support and loyalty.......... Q0 Q 11 QQQ 
Now that military action in Iraq has officially ended, the Government believes that British 
forces should contribute to making Iraq a peaceful and democratic country. How do you 
feel about British troops being involved in such post-conflict missions in Iraq? 
Strongly Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree 
I approve of British troops being used to bring peace 
to Iraq .................................................................... 
QQQQQ 
British peacekeeping troops will help make Iraq a more democratic 
country ................................................................... 
QQQQQ 
British peacekeeping troops in Iraq will help restore the 
human rights of Iraqi citizens .................................... 
QQQQQ 
British troops should not be involved in humanitarian action 
in Iraq without the consent of the UN .......................... 
QQQQQ 
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British involvement in humanitarian action in Iraq will 
make the world a safer place .................................... 
QQQQQ 
Rate the importance of the following items as a guiding principle in your life: (Please mark 
one box for each, where -1 = Opposed to my values, 0= Not important, 3 =Important, 6= 
Very important, 7= Of supreme importance) 
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all) 
"1 
Q 
INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself) Q 
SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)Q 
PLEASURE (gratification of desires) Q 
FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought) Q 
012 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
3 4 567 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual 
not material matters) QQQQQQQQQ 
SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others 
care about me) Q 
SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society) Q 
AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences) Q 
MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life) Q 
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners) Q 
WEALTH (material possessions, money) Q 
NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
r-l 
Q 
QQQ 
QQQ 
QQQ 
from enemies) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
SELF-RESPECT (belief in one's own worth) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS (avoidance 
of debt) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q 
RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of 
time-honoured customs) 
MATURE LOVE (deep emotional 
and spiritual intimacy) 
SELF-DISCIPLINE (self restraint, 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
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resistance to temptation) 
DETACHMENT (from worldly concerns) 
FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones) 
SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, 
approval by others) 
UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature) 
A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, 
novelty, and change) 
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) 
AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command) 
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends) 
A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature 
and the arts) 
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, 
care for the weak) 
INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 
MODERATE (avoiding extremes of 
feeling and action) 
LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group) 
AMBITIOUS (hardworking, aspiring) 
BROAD-MINDED (tolerant of different 
ideas and beliefs) 
HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing) 
DARING (seeking adventure, risk) 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
(preserving nature) 
INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people 
and events) 
HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS 
(showing respect) 
CHOOSING OWN GOALS 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
aEl El QEl QQEl El 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQ 
(selecting own purposes) El 11 El 0 0 El 11 El 0 
HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally) EI 11 El El El El El El 0 
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CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient) 
ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE 
(submitting to life's circumstances) 
HONEST (genuine, sincere) 
PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE 
(protecting my "face") 
OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations) 
INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking) 
HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) 
ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, 
sex, leisure, etc. ) 
DEVOUT (holding to religious faith and belief) 
RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) 
CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring) 
FORGIVING (willing to pardon others) 
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals) 
CLEAN (neat, tidy) 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
QQQQQQQQQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q QQ 
Q 
11 
r-l 
Q 
Q 
Q 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
DEED 
QQQQ 
DEED 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
QQQQ 
Demographics 
Are you male Q or female Q? 
How old are you ? 
Please select the highest level of education you have achieved: 
Degree, including PhD ............................................ 
Q 
A-level or equivalent ............................................... 
O-leve1IGCSE ......................................................... 
Q 
Other .................................................................... 
Q 
No qualifications ..................................................... 
Q 
Please indicate your occupation: 
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Do you have children? Yes E] No Q 
Not at all Neither uninterested Very 
interested nor interested interested 
Are you interested in current affairs? ..................... 
EJ QQQQ 
Please indicate the newspaper you most frequently read: 
The Daily Telegraph .............................................. 
D 
The Guardian ........................................................... 
Q 
The Independent ...................................................... 
Q 
The Times ............................................................... 
Q 
The Financial Times ................................................ 
Q 
The Daily Mail ........................................................ 
Q 
The Sun ................................................................... 
Q 
The Daily Express ................................................... 
Q 
Other .................................................................... 
Q 
Have you ever served in the Armed Forces? Yes El No 
During the last thirty years has someone from your family served in the Armed Forces? 
Yes Q No Q 
Do you have friends serving in the Armed Forces? Yes E] No Q 
If there were an election tomorrow for which political party would you vote? 
Labour ..................................................................... 
Q 
Liberal ..................................................................... 
Conservative ............................................................ 
Other .................................................................... 
Very Neither liberal Very Don't 
liberal nor conservative conservative Know 
In general, how liberal or conservative would you rate your position on 
political issues? ........................................................ 
QQQQQ 
If you would like to receive a summary of the findings from this study, please write your 
name and address below. Providing this information will not affect your anonymity, which 
will be preserved at all times. 
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